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Preface 
The papers and discussions gathered in this volume arc the outcome of a 
workshop on financial market dcvelopnient held in Beirut in July 1994, the 
first such meeting to he organii.ed by ERF. At this time, ERF had been oper- 
ating for less than a year, resources were limited, and our offices in Cairo 
were still underequipped and understaffed. The decision was made neverthe- 
less to proceed with the workshop, since research events such as this work- 
shop lie at the heart of ERF's mandate. 
With energetic support from ERF's core constituency of Research Fellows, 
the workshop was highly successful, as evidenced by the quality of the con- 
tributions to this volume. ERF is particularly grateful to the refereeing corn- 
mittec who worked long hours to screen and recommend papers, as well as to 
Moharned El—Erian, from the JMF and an ERF Fellow, who accepted to write 
the introductory chapter and to begin almost at once to organize for a l'ollow- 
up workshop in Abu Dhabi. The choice of Lebanon as host country was 
appropriate because of this country's historical role as a regional IThancial 
center. Nasser Saidi from the Central Bank of Lebanon and an ERF Fellow, 
is to he warmly thanked Er his help in organizing the logistics in Lebanon, as 
is the Association des Banqucs do Lihan for their hospitality. 
I would like to take this opportunity to extend heartfelt thanks to those niem— 
hers of the ERF staff who — under difflcult conditions — made the Beirut work- 
shop possible. This volume has been entirely prepared in—house, the first such 
ERF product in what we hope will he a long and sustained effort to publish 
quality research work on topics of relevance to the countries of the ERF 
region. 
Heha Handoussa 
19 April 1995 
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Financial Market Development in the 
Middle East: The Main Issues 
Mohamed El-Erian 
Introduction 
Middle Eastern economies are facing the challenge of mobilizing larger 
domestic and external resources in order to finance productive investments 
aimed at sustaining high economic growth and improving social sector per- 
formance. Accordingly, as is the case in many other developing countries, 
policy-makers are devoting more attention to improving the operation of 
domestic financial markets. The policy objectives include greater mobiliza- 
tion of domestic savings, larger inflows of non-debt-creating foreign capital, 
and the channeling of these resources to their most productive uses. In addi- 
tion to reducing financial imbalances, the policy emphasis involves strength- 
ening and broadening the institutional base, improving the functioning of 
market signals, and enhancing regulatory and supervisory regimes. 
The workshop sponsored by the Economic Research Forum on financial mar- 
ket development, which was held in Beirut in July 1994, sought to contribute 
to policy deliberations on these issues. The papers discussed at this work- 
shop, and presented in this conference volume along with discussants' com- 
ments, all started from a common premise: that an efficiently-operating 
domestic financial system is a critical component of efforts to achieve sus- 
tained improvement. Agreeing on the importance of sound macroeconomic 
conditions - the key aspect of the "enabling environment" - the papers sought 
to analyze the main elements affecting the operation of the financial sector, its 
role in the macroeconomy, and the policy implications. 
For presentational purposes, the policy issues addressed in the papers may be 
organized under three categories: first, a review of systemic issues relating to 
financial market reform; second, an analysis of the status, role and outlook for 
specific market segments (particularly, securities trading); and third, aspects 
relating to selected financial instruments. In addition to discussing these pol- 
icy matters, the workshop identified areas for future work. Proposals focused 
not only on the nature and scope of further analytical work but also on the 
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required background information. 
The issue of financial sector reform 
The five papers on the financial system (Chapters 2 through 6) provided 
insights into systemic issues affecting the process of financial intermediation. 
The papers focused on the institutional aspects of financial reform efforts, the 
challenges facing the sustained and timely implementation of such efforts, 
and the reaction of major market participants. 
David Cobham's paper entitled Financial Systems fir Developing Countries, 
ii'ith Particular Refrrence to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Si'ria 
reviewed the issues that need to be considered when assessing which of the 
polar models discussed in the literature - that is, bank-based versus market- 
based systems - is more appropriate. After reminding us that there is no a 
priori agreement on the general dominance of either system, the paper set 
forth a case for the superiority of the hank-based system in the specific cir- 
cumstances of these five Middle Eastern countries. The policy implication 
was that rather than seek to improve financial efficiency by organizing finan- 
cial markets, policy—makers should focus on upgrading their banking and 
other financial institutions. 
This interesting paper triggered a lively discussion in the workshop. In gen- 
eral, participants comments tended to add caution to the paper's main con- 
clusion. Many issues were raised in this regard. These included the limita- 
tions of bank-based systems, the need for a detailed assessment of the scope 
in the region for cost-effective capital market reforms, and implications for 
linkages with external financial sources. Underlying much of the related dis- 
cussion was a simple argument concerning policy formulation and imple- 
mentation: rather than consider the systems as alternatives, financial sector 
reform efforts should view measures affecting the banking and capital mar- 
kets as complementary. Accordingly, the policy emphasis should be placed 
on both markets - an issue that was picked up in the workshop's subsequent 
discussions on the role of equity markets. 
The second paper, Risk-Taking Behavior of Banks, Credit Rationing and 
Structural Adjustment by Hasan Ersel, extended the discussion of financial 
reform programs to actual experience with liberalization efforts. Drawing on 
the author's direct involvement in the Turkish reform program, the paper pre- 
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seated a comprehensive analysis of the main challenges that confronted poli- 
cy—makers. It argued that the combination of structural reform and liberaliza- 
tion adds a substantial amount of uncertainty to financial market activities. 
There is a significant risk that the reaction of banks to this increased uncer- 
tainty may result in undue credit rationing, thereby potentially undermining 
the ultimate objective of the reform effort, which is to provide adequate 
financing for productive private sector activities. The paper noted that the sit- 
uation in Turkey was further complicated by large public sector borrowing 
requirements and concerns about policy reversals. 
The papers treatment of the policy implications found broad-based support in 
the workshops discussions. Specifically, participants agreed on the impor- 
tance of macroeconomic stability being accompanied by efforts to strengthen 
information flows - this, inter cilia, as a means of avoiding undue and disrup- 
tive asset price instability. There was less agreement on the need to revisit 
issues relating to the pace, sequencing, and coverage of financial reforms and, 
in particular, market liberalization measures. 
The third paper in this group focused on the extent to which Turkeys liberal- 
ization measures have enhanced the efficiency of banking operations. In The 
Lfjects of Financial Liberalization on the Efficiency qI Turkish Commercial 
Banks, Osman Zaim investigated the impact of measures to remove barriers 
to entry and increase price competition in the banking system. His findings 
supported the view that the post—financial liberalization period in Turkey was 
associated with an improvemilent in the technical and allocative efficiency of 
the banking system. The workshops deliberations centered on the robustness 
of the postulated causality links. Simply put, several participants noted that it 
was difficult to abstract from the ongoing and large—scale transformation in 
the economic and financial environment. Accordingly, they felt that there was 
a need for further analysis into other causal factors and associated welfare 
implications. 
Several of the elements of financial sector reform were also featured in The 
Experience qt islamic Financial System and its Prospects for 
Development, by Heydar Pourian. This paper reviewed the implementation of 
Islamic banking practices and their impact on the macroeconomy. It argued 
for further progress in liberalizing financial markets in Iran. In discussing the 
paper, participants observed that a comprehensive analysis of Irans experi- 
ence under the Islamic financial system was complicated by the important 
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changes that took place in the economy in the period under consideration. 
These included the transformation into a peace economy after the termination 
of the war with Iraq, the subsequent efforts at structural reform and liberal- 
ization, and the range of adverse exogenous developments impacting the 
economy. This undermined the effectiveness of Dr. Pourians paper, leading 
some to argue for a different analytical approach. More generally, with other 
studies in the area having established the validity and feasibility of the Islamic 
banking system, workshop participants stressed the need for further detailed 
work, especially as regards the enlargement of the set of Islamic financial 
instruments (including those at the short-end of the maturity range), strength- 
ening the supporting institutional base, and empirically examining the experi- 
ence of other countries in which Islamic banking systems have been in oper- 
ation. 
In Le Financernent Monetaire des Entreprises: Marché Financier ou Credit 
Bancaire?, Abderrafia EI-Bakkali presented the case for greater policy 
emphasis on bank credit to the enterprise sector and the associated need for 
accommodative policies on the part of the Central Bank. The paper argued 
that, in conditions of limited retained earnings capacity, bank credit provided 
the main instrument for promoting private investment. Workshop participants 
noted the importance of taking into account macroeconomic implications 
when considering whether to assign credit policy the role of investment pro- 
motion. They also noted the need for additional analysis of the underlying 
reasons for the relatively low generation of retained earnings by the enterprise 
sector. 
The issue of securities markets 
The four papers having capital markets as their primary focus (Chapters 7 
through 10) dealt with the status of these markets in the Middle East region 
(including comparisons with other emerging markets), their role in chan- 
neling resources to the corporate sector, and the policy implications. 
The paper by Mohamed El-Erian and Manmohan Kumar entitled Emerging 
Equity Markets in Middle Eastern Countries contained an overview discus- 
sion of the role of equity markets in the macroeconomy of developing coun- 
tries. Remarking that international equity flows are expected to remain an 
important element of external flows to developing countries, it noted the ben- 
efits and risks of equity market development and the implications for macro- 
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economic and financial policies. The paper provided a quantitative evaluation 
of markets in selected Middle Eastern countries focusing, inter alia, on price 
efficiency, concentration, capitalization, and price correlation with industrial 
country markets. It noted that, with the exception of two markets (Jordan and 
Turkey), equity markets remained relatively narrow. Nevertheless, there were 
clear prospects and need for effective market development. 
The general narrowness of equity markets in the Middle East region was also 
a feature of Gulf Capital Markets: Development Prospects and Constraints, 
by Henry Azzam. The paper also considered the role of government and cor- 
porate securities markets in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. The 
paper discussed the policy steps being taken to remove the various barriers to 
market entry, pointing to the significant potential for market development at 
both domestic and regional levels. It noted the need for policy measures to 
broaden equity markets, including the development of the necessary legisla- 
tive infrastructure and financial service expertise. 
While the two papers differed in their treatment of the contributing to 
the general narrowness of markets in most Middle Eastern countries, there 
was broad agreement among participants on the prospects and policy impli- 
cations. In this regard, they again stressed the importance of an enabling envi- 
ronment, the most important elements of which were a sound and stable 
macroeconomic framework and an adequate prudential regulation and super- 
vision regime. Emphasis was also placed on the need to reduce barriers to 
entry into equity markets; improve information flows, credit rating mecha- 
nisms, as well as auditing and disclosure requirements; strengthen property 
rights rules; and enhance payments and settlement systems. Following up on 
the earlier discussion on the complementarity of bank and capital market 
reforms, participants noted the importance of coordination and harmoniza- 
tion. 
There was recognition that the process of capital market development and 
deepening is not easy, nor is it guaranteed to succeed. Guven Saks paper enti- 
tled The Istanbul Stock Exchange and the Corporate Sector highlighted an 
interesting and hitherto unexplained phenomenon. The papers analysis sug- 
gested that while secondary market activity rose significantly in the Turkish 
market, this was not accompanied by an increase in primary issuance activi- 
ty. Accordingly, Turkeys equity market has not fully met initial expectations 
regarding the channeling of resources to new investment activities by the 
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Turkish corporate sector. The paper provided a catalyst for the workshop's 
discussion on data sources - specifically, macro-based versus firm-based 
inlormation. The deliberations pointed to the need for a reconciliation of 
Saks findings (based on macro data) with those of other studies (based on 
sample data), including the recent work undertaken by the International 
Finance Corporation. Participants also noted the need to analyze the magni- 
tude of other potential welfare-enhancing contributions of equity markets 
(including an enhanced disciplinary mechanism). 
In The Renaissance of Beirut's Financial Markets, Nasser Saidi discussed 
capital market development taking into account three issues specific to 
Lebanon at this time: the aftermath of the country's internal conflict, its sig- 
nificant reconstruction needs, and Lebanon's regional links. The presentation 
noted that with the return of peace, Beirut was poised to regain its role as an 
important financial center. It reviewed the institutional steps being taken to 
this end - this in the context of the authorities' general policy stance aimed at 
broadening structural reforms and reducing domestic financial imbalances. In 
the subsequent discussion, questions were raised as to the rationale for a 
regional financial center, especially given the recent advances in technology 
and direct connections to industrial country markets. Linked to this discus- 
sion was the more general issue of the need for a careful evaluation of the eco- 
nomic case br developing equity markets in the smaller economies of the 
region. Participants noted the importance of balancing the benefits of local 
knowledge — and its beneficial impact in channeling funds to small— and mcdi— 
umn—sized domestic corporations — with the costs (including overheads) of 
operating and supervising capital markets. 
Selected aspects relating to financial instruments 
The third theme of the workshop related to selected aspects of financial instru- 
ments. In this context, A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions by Ahmet Alkan 
analyzed the mechanism for Treasury bill auctioning using a game theoretic 
approach. The paper shed light on the following paradox: the theoretical lit- 
erature's preference for uniform price auctions as compared to the practical 
preference for multi-price auctions. Alkan demonstrated that a multi-price 
sealed bid auction is more advantageous to the seller than a multi-unit auction. 
The workshop's discussion concerning this paper sought to analyze the impli- 
cations of relaxing certain assumptions in the model and assessing the stabil- 
ity properties. It demonstrated the need for a cross-country analysis of the 
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operation of auction mechanisms for government securities. The paper also 
whet participants' appetite by pointing to potential extensions of the model to 
the analysis of privatization programs and the allocation of environmental 
property rights. 
Looking forward 
The papers contained in this volume should be considered in the context of 
the need to mobilize additional resources to finance productive investment 
opportunities in the Middle East - this with a view to exploiting the region's 
considerable economic potential. Not only do they involve analyses of key 
issues, but they also point to areas where further work is needed. Indeed, the 
volume offers considerable material both for further analytical work and for 
greater i riteraction between researchers and policy-makers. 
As detailed above, several suggestions for future work emerged directly from 
discussions on individual papers. This was supplemented by issues that arose 
in the workshop's concluding session. Thus, participants stressed the need for 
disaggregate studies of financial market performance in mobilizing and allo- 
cating loanable funds from domestic, regional and international sources. 
Emphasis was placed on the two-way links between the macroeconomy and 
the financial sector, the interaction between the formal and informal market 
segments, and the role of Islamic financing and instruments. There were also 
references to the importance of assessing the soundness of financial markets 
and the implications of the domestic debt stock in certain countries. In the 
area of equity markets, the emphasis was on their contribution to enhancing 
enterprise efficiency, as well as the relationship with ongoing and envisaged 
privatization programs. An effective process of analysis and policy formula- 
tion and implementation requires comprehensive and timely information. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, workshop participants emphasized the importance of a 
sound financial statistics data base. Several participants also saw merit in 
compiling information on the types of financial instruments in use in the 
Middle East region and associated laws and regulations. 
In closing, it is important to note the regional and international dimensions of 
the domestic policy issues discussed in this volume. Indeed, there is much 
talk about regional economic and financial integration and, more generally, 
the process of globalization of financial markets. As previous and current 
experiences in the region denionstrate (e.g. the GCC), and as confirmed by 
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developments in other regions (e.g. the European Union), the effective har- 
monization of financial sector policies has an important impact on welfare- 
enhancing regional activities. Timely and forceful progress in the develop- 
ment of domestic financial markets is also a key determinant of the ability of 
Middle Eastern economies to compete effectively in what has become an 
increasingly interdependent world economy. 
2 
Financial Systems for Developing Countries, 
with Particular Reference to Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 
David Cobham 
Introduction 
After a long period in which financial arrangements in developing countries 
received relatively little attention from development economists or interna- 
tional financial institutions, the issue of the appropriate financial system for 
LDCs has returned to prominence. The World Bank (1989) in particular has 
argued strongly for the development of financial markets and institutions, 
including the establishment and promotion of securities markets along 
Western developed country lines, while economists such as Stiglitz (1989) 
and Collier and Mayer (1989) have put the emphasis on banks rather than 
securities markets. At the same time, the endogenous growth literature has 
revived interest in the relationship between financial intermediation and eco- 
nomic growth from a rather different perspective (see, for example, King and 
Levine 1993). 
This paper focuses on the choice between 'bank-based and 'market-based' 
financial systems, with special reference to some non-oil Middle Eastern 
countries. First, it identifies these two systems, discusses recent empirical 
work for the developed countries, and brings in the related distinction 
between universal and specialized banks. The paper then shows how the rela- 
tionships concerned can be analyzed by reference first to the theory of finan- 
cial intermediation and then, in addition, to the theory of agency costs and 
corporate governance. It discusses the choice between systems for the devel- 
oped and developing countries respectively, and assembles the information 
that is available on the financial systems of the countries concerned. It then 
considers the choices which countries should make, referring also to the issue 
of international financial centers - a status to which at least two of the coun- 
tries aspire - to see whether this aspiration might affect the preferred financial 
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system. Finally, the paper brings out the conclusions and sets out the areas in 
which further research is urgently needed. 
Market-based and bank-based financial systems 
Differences between the financial systems of developed countries in their 
periods of industrialization have long been recognized by economic histori- 
ans, and some (e.g. Cameron et. al. 1967) have argued that German econom- 
ic growth benefited considerably from the close involvement of German 
banks in the financing and managing of industrial companies, and/or that 
Japanese growth was facilitated by the existence of industrial-financial con- 
glomerates (the zaibatsu and later keiretsu). The standard contrast is between 
the Anglo-Saxon 'market-based financial system in which securities markets 
are highly developed and banks are not closely involved in industry, and the 
German-Japanese 'bank-based' system in which securities markets are less 
developed and less important and banks are more closely involved with indus- 
trial firms. 
A related distinction is commonly made between 'universal' banks, which pro- 
vide a full range of services to their corporate customers in particular, and 
other more specialized banks whose activities are concentrated, for one rea- 
son or another, in a limited area. One of the first examples of a universal bank 
was the Credit Mobilier in France in the mid- 19th century, which used funds 
raised mainly from small savers via both shares and deposits to set up and pro- 
mote companies in a range of industrial undertakings, from railways to steel— 
making. The Credit Mobilier went bankrupt in but it served as a model 
for banks set up in the second half of the 19th century, notably in Germany 
and Austria, countries now thought of as the 'home' of universal banking. 
Some of the earlier universal banks did not raise funds from small depositors, 
but the collection of retail funds soon became the norm, although such trans- 
actions remained less important for them than for, say, British deposit banks. 
A defining characteristic of universal banks in this traditional sense was the 
holding of equity participations in nonfinancial companies; such banks can 
also be regarded as extreme versions of 'relationship banking', as opposed to 
the more arms' length 'transactions banking' commonly seen in Anglo-Saxon 
ci rc I es. 
More recently, the term has been used to refer to banks which aim to combine 
retail/commercial and wholesale/investment activities, such as the large UK 
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clearing banks which purchased securities houses in the run up to London's 
'Big Bang" (1986). However, even apart from the loss of clarity through this 
recent extension of the term, the distinction between universal and more spe- 
cialized banks is not coterminous with that between bank-based and market- 
based financial systems. Since the Second World War, Japanese banks have 
been legally prevented from undertaking universal operations (in a local 
application of the US Glass—Steagall Act), but this has had little effect on the 
financial system as such; historically, French banks have been less universal 
than UK banks, but the French financial system is closer to the bank-based 
model than the UK financial system. 
The discussion has recently been revived by a series of contributions from 
Mayer (e.g. 1988, 1990), in which he has presented new empirical evidence 
on the overall contributions of internal finance and various forms of external 
finance to the nonfinancial corporate sectors of a number of developed coun- 
tries. One key finding is that internal finance (from retentions of profits) is 
the most important source of finance in all the countries considered; a second 
is that securities markets do not provide large proportions of funds in any 
country; a third is that banks are the most important source of external finance 
in all countries. These findings tend to minimize the distinction previously 
perceived, hut some significant differences between financial systems remain. 
In particular, on Mayer's figures the self—financing ratio is considerably high- 
er for the UK and the US than for Japan. France and Italy, while Germany's 
position is an intermediate one. In addition, bank finance is markedly more 
important for Japan, France and Italy than for the other countries. More 
detailed work by Corbett and Jenkinson (1994) strengthens the finding that in 
terms of sources of finance for firms, Germany should be grouped with the 
UK and the US, as against Japan. 
The differences in the financing of firms are commonly set alongside differ- 
ences in relationships between banks and firms, which are conveniently sum- 
marized in Corbett and Mayer (1987): in Germany and Japan, but not in the 
UK and the US, banks typically hold significant amounts of corporate equity 
(either directly or, in the case of Germany, as proxies for personal sharehold- 
ers); banks are also typically represented on firms' boards of directors and 
there are large and stable cross-shareholdings between companies. However, 
for (lermany, this picture too has been qualified by Edwards and Fischer 
(1994) who show that it is only the big three German banks which operate in 
the way indicated amid that bank finance in Germany is overwhelmingly debt 
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rather than equity. They also cast doubt on the importance of the role of banks 
in monitoring and controlling firms' managements. 
It is clear that there is scope for more research in this area on the developed 
countries. In the first place there is a need for disaggregated studies which are 
more directly comparable to the aggregate data provided by Mayer (1990) and 
Corbett and Jenkinson (1994). Financial flows within the nonfinancial sector 
are netted out in the aggregate data, and this may explain why securities mar- 
kets do not appear to act as a major channel of funds for the corporate sector 
as a whole. However, it is still possible that markets play an important role in 
allocating capital between firms.' In the second place, there is a need for 
more differentiation, for example to identify more clearly the characteristics 
of financial systems such as those of France and Italy, where banks appear to 
play an important role in the financing but a less important role in the control 
of firms. 
Financial intermediation and corporate governance 
How can the key findings identified above and the differences between finan- 
cial systems be analyzed?2 One obvious place to look for an answer is in the 
theory of tinancial intermediation, that is, in explanations of the existence of 
financial intermediaries (indirect finance) as opposed to securities markets 
(direct finance). Long-standing arguments in this area explain the existence 
of banks in terms of (a) their ability to reconcile the different preferences over 
liquidity and maturity of ultimate lenders (typically households) and ultimate 
borrowers (typically firms), and (b) their ability to exploit economies of scale 
in portfolio management and financial transactions. More recent work has 
viewed banks as mechanisms that compensate for the absence of secondary 
markets in claims issued by small firms and households: such markets do not 
exist because of economies of scale in transactions (the turnover of such 
claims would not be large enough to justify the costs involved in operating 
secondary markets), and because of the lack of public information on such 
Allen (1993) has provided a "defense" of stock markets as mechanisms which provide multiple 
"checking" of individual firms' plans in cases where there is no consensus on how firms should 
he operating. 
2 The intention here is not to give a survey of relevant papers, or to provide precise explanations 
for the details of the empirical findings; rather, the intention is to indicate the principal consider- 
ations and approaches that ale relevant. Further discussion can be found in Mayer (1990, 1992) 
and Stiglitz (1989). 
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issuers (which would he costly to provide). Instead, banks specialize in gath- 
ering relevant information - on the location and creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers, on the likely success of their investment projects, and on the real- 
iied success of completed projects - as well as in providing finance. Because 
their information will nevertheless remain imperfect and because screening 
and monitoring are costly activities, it is most efficient for banks to lend in the 
foriii of standard debt contracts, in which the borrower either makes a fixed 
repayment (regardless of his profits) so long as he is solvent, or turns over all 
his assets to the bank if he is unable to pay. These loans are non-marketed and 
non-marketable. 
This explanation for the existence of banks suggests that we should expect 
different forms of finance to coexist, with that for small firms and individuals 
being supplied mainly via banks, and that for large firms with more easily 
evaluated investment projects coining mainly through securities markets, and 
there is some evidence to support this prediction (see Mayer 1990, Table 
12.10). However, such considerations provide no explanation for the key 
findings of Mayer and others listed above: also, in the absence of evidence of 
significant differences between developed countries in lirm size, they do not 
account for the difference between developed countries in overall financial 
systems. Appeal needs to he made to principal-agent issues and signalling 
problems in addition to imperfect information. 
In a world of perfect it is clearly efficient for risk to he shared 
between agent and principal, e.g. between firm and financier or between man- 
ager and shareholder. However, in a world where information is imperfect 
and, ill particular, where the principal cannot observe the actions of the agent 
either directly or indirectly (because the outcome is also affected by other ran- 
dom, non-observable factors), efficiency requires that the agent should face an 
incentive structure which gives him a higher share of the return to his effort; 
he must therefore hear a larger share of the risk. Debt contracts can he regard- 
ed as incentive structures of this sort (as well as mechanisms which reduce the 
need for monitoring by lenders), hut with imperfect information credit is still 
likely to be rationed. Equity contracts, on the other hand, give more scope for 
managerial discretion, since shareholders will in principle bear some of the 
reduction in profits associated with managers pursuing their own objectives 
(in practice, dividend appear more stable than this would imply). In 
addition, unlike equity contracts, debt contracts can be of varying terms: 
shorter term contracts such as hank loans will keep managers under greater 
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pressure than longer term contracts such as bonds, but they may also encour- 
age managers to concentrate on projects with shorter time horizons. 
Imperfections in information can be countered by signals. For example, 
directors who purchase shares in their own firms may be signalling to the 
linancial markets their own confidence in the firms based on their superior 
access to information. However, there are adverse signals associated with 
issues of both equity and bonds which discourage such issues (and therefore 
encourage reliance on indirect finance from financial intermediaries). 
Entrepreneurs who sell shares in their own businesses may be doing so 
because they know that the markets are overvaluing the business. Since mar- 
kets cannot easily distinguish these cases from those ot entrepreneurs seeking 
only to raise more funds for expansion, prices for new issues reflect the prob- 
ability of the former being included with the latter, so that new issues become 
more expensive as a source of finance. Issues of bonds, on the other hand, 
may be taken as signals that firms, or their managers, want more funds but do 
not want to accept the monitoring which would accompany shorter term loans 
from banks; again, new issues turn out to be more expensive. 
Considerations of incentives and signalling problems thus help to explain 
some of Mayer's key findings: debt finance improves incentives relative to 
equity finance and is therefore more attractive to financiers, while the adverse 
signals associated with new issues tend to make bank finance more attractive 
to firms; likewise, the problems associated with all external borrowing make 
internal financing preferable for firms. At this level of generality, however, it 
is not possible to say much about the reasons br the differences in financial 
systems. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, bank finance is less important, and 
with it, banks control of firms; but the more developed security markets pro- 
vide a market for corporate control which acts as a backstop discipline Ofl 
managers. In Japan, bank finance and bank control of firms are both more 
important, while the less developed security markets function mainly as a 
mechanism for the exchange of marginal ownership claims. Other countries 
seem to lie somewhere in between these two models; in many of them a large 
amount of financial flows have passed, at least until recently, through banks 
or other institutions in the public sector. But the origins of the differences 
appear essentially historical. 
The optimal financial system for developed countries 
While it may be difficult to explain why different countries have different 
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financial systems, and while an individual country may not have a realistic 
possibility of switching from one system to another, it should still be possible 
to ask what sort of system is preferable. Here the crucial considerations are 
commitment and competition. 
In a bank-based system it can be argued both that banks have superior infor- 
ination about their borrowers and that there is a stronger mutual commitment 
between the two sides (expressed by the banks' equity holdings and their rep- 
resentation on the board of directors), so that banks are more willing to lend 
for projects whose returns will accrue over a longer time horizon: a bank 
understands better the nature of the choices between projects facing the firm, 
and it knows that it has a secure position as lender to the firm and will there- 
fore share in the higher profits that will accrue later as well as the smaller 
profits available in the interim. Thus, long-term investment projects are more 
likely to be financed, and overall economic growth should be enhanced. At 
the same time, the bank-based system typically generates greater commitment 
between the firm and other 'stakeholders' such as the firm's employees and its 
major suppliers because the more stable legal ownership of the firm means 
that these stakeholders are less exposed to sudden changes in policy on 
employment or purchasing which in effect renege on the firm's outstanding 
implicit contracts. This greater commitment means that these other stake- 
holders are more willing to make firm-specific investments of their own - in 
specitic plant and equipment or in human capital - which strengthen the posi- 
tion of the firm. Again, overall economic growth should be enhanced in this 
context. 
The firms in a bank-based system are therefore typically under "insider con- 
trol." This has the further advantage that if the firm gets into difficulties as a 
result of poor management or a marked deterioration in the external environ- 
ment, the stakeholders should be jointly able to intervene at an early stage to 
correct management deficiencies or share the burden of dealing with the 
adverse external factors. Corporate rescues, in other words, can be imple- 
mented speedily by the insiders themselves. 
In the market-based financial system, on the other hand, those who finance 
the firm know that they have no secure position as its financiers, and that the 
firm may at any moment switch its custom elsewhere. They therefore have 
no incentive to concern themselves with anything other than the immediate 
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returns on their investments, and in any case they have no access to superior 
information about the alternatives open to the firm. In addition, the firm in a 
market-based system is typically under "outsider control" in the sense that the 
non-shareholding insiders (stakeholders) have little power or influence and 
the shareholders themselves are dispersed and unorganized. The stock mar- 
ket provides a backstop discipline on management and a mechanism for cor- 
porate rescues in the form of (threatened or actual) hostile takeovers in which 
a management team from outside the firm which believes it can improve the 
firms profits tries to persuade existing shareholders to appoint it instead as the 
firm's managers. But this market for corporate control works only imperfect- 
ly because the transaction costs involved in organizing takeovers are large, so 
that existing management teams have to err substantially before they become 
vulnerable (on the assumption that potential takeover bidders are reasonably 
well-informed). Moreover, incumbent management teams often develop 
defensive barriers against takeovers which are related, for example, to size 
rather than superior performance. In this sense, the takeover threat does not 
encourage efficiency. However, non-shareholding stakeholders know that 
their relationship with the firm can be turned upside down by any new man- 
agement team, and they are therefore discouraged from making firm-specific 
investments. Thus, the firm's access to long-term finance may be more diffi- 
cult, it may have an incentive to opt for projects that yield larger short-term 
profits, and its suppliers and workforce may be less willing to make related 
investments from which the firm might benefit. In this scenario, overall 
investment and economic growth may be lower. 
On the other hand, in a bank-based system a firm which has a single 'house 
bank' but no easy access to alternative sources of finance may be vulnerable 
to opportunistic pressure from the bank. Such pressure could have adverse 
effects on the development of the firm (though if it leads to financial instabil- 
ity rather than low profitability, the bank itself would be adversely affected). 
There is in fact some evidence that German, Swiss and Japanese firms have 
tried to move away from simple house bank relationships in recent years, pre- 
sumably for this reason.3 At the same time, in a bank-based system the banks 
will have an incentive to consider the position of their various borrowers as a 
group, and therefore to coordinate their behavior so as to maximize overall 
profits. If the economy in which the system is operating is one where overall 
levels olcompetition are low, such coordination may lead to anti-competitive 
H&lwig(1991:58). 
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practices whose effects on economic welfare may outweigh any possible 
gains from the superior commitment identified above. Hence, the choice 
between bank-based and market-based systems seems to depend on the bal- 
ance in a particular case between the benefits of commitment and the costs of 
reduced competition.4 
Separate consideration should also be given to the advantages of universal 
banks (in the traditional sense of the term).5 Such banks may be thought to 
benefit in their operations from superior acquisition of information on their 
corporate clients - which would enable them to provide loans with lower 
default rates and therefore at lower interest rates - and, more generally, from 
economies of scope, but empirical evidence to support the existence of such 
benefits is weak. On the other hand, universality in banking creates negative 
externalities insofar as banks own financial stability may be threatened by dif- 
ficulties among their industrial clients and vice-versa. Indeed, problems of this 
sort lay at the root of the decision to prohibit banks from holding equity in non- 
financial enterprises in France and Italy in the 1930s and 1940s. Finally, the 
danger of anti-competitive practices identified above is present with universal 
banks even in a non-bank-based overall system. 
The optimal financial system for developing countries 
Much less empirical research has been done on financial systems in develop- 
ing than in developed countries. It is clear that no LDC has anything close to 
the Anglo-Saxon system, but it also seems likely that in most LDCs banks have 
looser ties to and less control over nonfinancial firms than in the Japanese case. 
As a first approximation, most LDC financial systems are probably some- 
where near those of France and Italy. 
However, there is one recent piece of research on corporate financial structures 
in LDCs by Singh and Hamid (1992). This is a disaggregated study of top 
firms listed on stock exchanges in India, South Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe (with particular reference 
to the first two countries). Singh and Hamid investigate the sources of corn- 
No generat historical statement can be made about the efficiency of the two systems, since we 
only have a small of countries and many other factors are involved. See also Edwards and 
Fischer (1994, chapters I and 3) for some recent material on growth, investment, and the financ- 
ing of aggregate investment in Germany and the United Kingdom. 
This paragraph draws on Steinhcmr and Huvenccrs (1992). 
18 David Cobham 
pany finance against the background of the bank-based versus market-based 
distmction and find that equity finance has been much more important for 
these firms than for firms in the industrialized countries, and much more 
important than previous work on LDCs had suggested.1' This is a surprising 
finding which clearly deserves further examination so as to check its robust- 
ness between countries and over time, and to see how it shows up in aggregate 
data of the kind used by Mayer. For the moment, however, it should be regard- 
ed as raising important questions rather than providing new answers. 
On the choice for LDCs between financial systems, the first point to be made 
is that the level and flow of information is substantially more imperfect in 
LDCs than in developed countries as regards, for example, accounting and 
auditing procedures and the effectiveness of the financial press. In terms of the 
theory of fInancial intermediation, this means that a higher proportion of finan- 
cial flows should be expected to pass through intermediaries rather than secu- 
rities markets. In addition, the framework of legal and property rights - upon 
which the functioning of securities markets in particular is dependent - is in 
many cases both less clearly codified and less securely established than it 
might be. While some of these weaknesses can be corrected over time by reg- 
ulatory action, efficient information networks require a development of civil 
society that cannot be engineered from outside. 
Securities markets in LDCs also suffer from high transaction costs because 
they are too small to benefit from the economies of scale that characterize the 
major financial markets of the world. Roe and Popiel (1988: 40) refer to 
spreads between bid- and ask-prices of 10-15 percent in LDC stock markets. 
These are comparable, for example, to the spreads at the London Stock 
Exchange on 'less liquid stocks', which are widely regarded as too large to 
make transactions efficient or worthwhile. (Turnover in these stocks repre- 
sents a very small percentage of total turnover). Overall, the market value of 
domestic equities listed on the London Stock Exchange (roughly the third 
largest in the world) at the end of 1992 was 5.8 times that on the Delhi mar- 
ket, 32-34 times that in Tel Aviv or Tehran, 263 times that in Amman, and 336 
times that in Korea; comparable figures for turnover were 105, 23, 44, 235 and 
2437, respectively. Part of this problem is simply a reflection of the fact that 
1'See for example Fry (1985:288): The 35 security markets that exist in the developing countries 
have generally played only very minor roles in domestic resource mobilization" See also 
Goldsmith (l969:357-60). 
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firms in LDCs tend to be on average much smaller than those in developed 
countries. However, it also reflects the prevalence of family-owned and/or 
closed companies. 
Similar and perhaps stronger arguments about commitment can be applied to 
Ll)Cs as to more developed economies. Indeed, in economies with a smaller 
number of firms, it may be more important for the stakes of non-shareholding 
stakeholders to be recognized in order to persuade suppliers to make specific 
investments. On the other hand, dangers from anti-competitive practices orga- 
nized by banks within a bank-based system (or by universal banks more gen- 
erally) may be larger, unless actual or potential competition can be ensured 
from abroad through the minimization of protective trade barriers. 
At the same time it can be argued that in an economy where the stock of man- 
agerial resources is limited (and that limit is a key constraint on development), 
those resources should be concentrated in financial institutions whose role is 
to apply those management skills to the key decisions throughout the econo- 
my, and which therefore need to have an important element of control over the 
nonfinancial companies that they finance.7 The alternative mechanism of con- 
trot - through stock market takeovers - is costly, but in any case it is difficult 
to envisage the emergence of an appropriate shareholder culture before eco- 
nomic and financial development has proceeded a great deal further. Finally, 
second-best arguments indicate that since other markets are incomplete and 
imperfect, there is no reason to believe that setting up securities markets where 
these were previously non-existent will necessarily bring the economy as a 
whole closer to a social welfare optimum. 
These considerations suggest that, while it is difficult to establish a preference 
between financial systems for developed countries, for LDCs there must be a 
strong preference for bank-based rather than market-based systems. 
Financial systems in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria 
It is worth noting at the start that the existing level of research and even basic 
information about financial arrangements and institutions in these countries is 
extremely low, mainly it seems because economists have not turned their atten- 
tion to these matters. For example, while Sayigh's (1978a) descriptive survey 
Sec Mayer and Collier and Mayer (1989). 
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of the Arab economies includes some limited material on monetization and 
banks, his companion analysis of Arab development (I 978b) includes no index 
entry for either banking or finance, and these are not even mentioned in his list 
of the economic determinants of development. 
As an introduction to the financial systems in the above countries, it would be 
useful to present the values for these countries of the two key ratios which 
Goldsmith (1969) calculated: the financial interrelations ratio, which measures 
the relationship between a country's financial superstnicture and its real infra- 
structure in the form of the ratio of all financial assets to national wealth; and 
the financial intermediation ratio, which measures the relative importance of 
direct and indirect financing through the proportion of debt and equity securi- 
ties issued by nonfinancial domestic and foreign issuers which are held by 
domestic financial institutions. However, although Goldsmith (1969) presents 
some data for Egypt, he does not mention these ratios, and his later work 
(1985) does not cover any of the countries considered here. Nevertheless, 
some useful information can be obtained by looking at the ratios of money to 
GDP and at the shares of notes and coin as well as quasi-money in the overall 
money supply. In what follows, some comments are made on these ratios, and 
then some other descriptive material is presented for each of the countries in 
turn. Towards the end, an attempt will be made to characterize the financial 
system of each country. The intention here is to make strong statements which 
will give rise to debate, rather than statements so heavily qualified that they 
preclude criticism but fail to advance the discussion. 
Figure 1 shows the ratios of broad money (money + quasi-money) to income 
(gross domestic product) from the early 1960s. At this period the four coun- 
tries other than Lebanon were in much the same position. Over the next 30 
years Jordan had a gradual but sustained process of financial deepening; Egypt 
experienced a spurt of deepening in the second half of the 1970s which 
enabled it to catch up with Jordan, but then fell behind again; Syria experi- 
enced rather less deepening, and Iraq had very little change up to 1976. 
After this time, monetary data are no longer available. Lebanon, on the other 
hand, had already experienced greater financial deepening than the others by the 
Figure 2 shows the ratio of currency held by the public to broad money. In the 
early I 960s this ratio was relatively high for all countries with the exception of 
Lebanon, and particularly so for Syria and Iraq. By the end of the period, cur- 
rency had become less important (and bank deposits had become much more 
important) in Jordan and Egypt, but Syria and Iraq (in the years for which data 
are available) had experienced little change. Figure 3 shows quasi-money as a 
proportion of broad money (the third element of broad money is demand 
deposits). In Syria this ratio started and ended the period at a very low level, 
which indicates the underdevelopment of financial institutions; Iraq had a high- 
er ratio which rose slightly in the years shown. Jordan and Egypt again had 
more substantial and sustained development, the former throughout and the lat- 
ter mainly from the mid-1970s onwards. Lebanon had a higher ratio through- 
out: the figures for quasi-money include residents' foreign currency deposits, 
which were very large in the late I 980s as a result of the "dollarization" of the 
Lebanese economy. 
All data are taken from the International Statistics Yearbook 1993, with the exception of 
Lebanon's income data (not available in IFS); the Lebanese income data for 1967-1972 were pro- 
vided by Dr. Saad Andary, and those for 1988-1990 by Dr. Samir Makdisi on the basis of Makdisi 
et al. (1990) and later extrapolations. (These data are in IJS$ and have been converted into 
Lebanese pounds at the average exchange rate for the year, line rf in IFS). 
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late 1960s, and in the late l980s again had a much higher ratio than the 






















Financial institutions and activity developed earlier in Egypt than in nearly all 
the other countries in the sample. Banking activity dates back to the entry of 
Western banks in the first half of the 19th century to service British and French 
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companies and individuals doing business in the country. Some foreign-owned 
Egyptian-based banks were established from the middle of the century but did 
not survive. The National Bank of Egypt, a privately-owned (mainly British) 
bank with some responsibilities typical of a central bank, was set up in 1898 on 
the initiative of Cromer; in 1957 it was nationalized and divided into two, with 
the Central Bank of Egypt carrying out normal central banking functions and 
the National Bank of Egypt operating as a conventional commercial bank. 
Bank Misr, the other of the two main banks, had been tounded by Talaat Harb 
in 1920 as a universal bank along the lines of the German model. It was corn- 
mitted to setting up new industrial enterprises in which it held equity partici- 
pations and on whose boards it was represented, with a view to nurturing 
these companies until they could stand separately on their own. It appears to 
have overextended itself, either in absolute terms or given the opposition it 
provoked in the rest of the mainly foreign-controlled banking system, and 
Talaat Harb was forced to resign in 1939 as a result of a liquidity crisis, to be 
replaced by directors with a more conventional (and pro—British) 
However, the bank retained wide industrial connections, and its nationaliza- 
tion in 1960 was partly a way of bringing a large number of nonfinancial com- 
panies into the public sector. 
The other two most important deposit banks were nationalized in 1961, with 
Barclays Bank becoming the Bank of Alexandria and Credit Lyonnais (plus 
other French—owned operations) becoming the Banque du Caire. These four 
banks had all had fairly extensive branch networks; after the nationalization 
they continued their separate existences with certain (non-competing) spe- 
cializations (e.g. Bank Misr in industrial finance), but were drawn into the 
states economic planning and control mechanisms. These specializations 
were revoked in 1975, and the banks have come to compete more with each 
other and with the growing number of private banks, including some Islamic 
operations. The big four public sector banks appear to be more heavily 
involved in lending to industry than the new private sector banks.H It is not 
clear whether Bank Misr has retained any of its earlier tradition as a univer— 
Sec (I 9S4) for further discussion. 
(1 Brien (1966: I 
(1956:640-2), 
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sal bank. In any case, Egyptian banks hold vcry little equity. 12 
In addition to commercial banks, Egypt has a smaller sector of business and 
investment banks which lend mainly to the service sector, and specialized 
banks which lend mainly to agriculture. Other financial institutions include 
insurance conipanies and pension funds which lend heavily to the government 
and hold almost no equity. There is a stock exchange in Cairo and a smaller, 
related exchange in Alexandria. These date horn the late 19th century, when 
their main business was in the shares of foreign—owned cotton and related 
enterprises; they have languished since the Suez War sequestrations and the 
nationalizations ot the I 960s, hut attempts to revive them have been under 
way since the mid-l970s.'3 At the end of 1990 some 573 companies were list- 
ed on these exchanges, but turnover is small. Most large firms remain in the 
public sector, and many private hrms are closed companies. 
Egypt has thus had a relatively well-developed financial sector since before 
the Second World War, but one whose development has been strongly affected 
by the nationalization and state controls of the I 960s and since. Attempts were 
made to open up the sector in the I 970s and further measures of liberalization 
have been introduced in the I 9805,1 but success has so tar been limited. 
iraq 
The figures above show a relatively low level of financial development in 
Iraq, at least over the period up to I 976 tor which data are available. The 
banking sector was nationalized in I 964, and all the commercial banks were 
combined in either the Rafldain Bank or the Commercial Bank. Information 
is difficult to obtain, but it seems reasonable to speculate that the banking sec- 
tor operates essentially as part of the state apparatus of economic planning and 
control, much like the banking systems of Soviet-type econoiiiies. The latter 
performed little genuine role of financial intermediation, and certainly no role 
in the allocation of financial resources. Instead, they simply provided loans 
to enterprises where the planning apparatus required them to be made. It is 
now turning out to he extremely difficult to transform these institutions into 
Naiionat lank of (I 992ar t 9) 
Sec Nalionat Bank oF kgypl (I 992a), Atxtut-FIadi (I and Aly (1993). 
4 
See El Nil (t994), and Nationat Bank of Egypt (t992h). 
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banks which can play such roles, partly because of the lack of relevant skills 
within the banks but partly also because these banks currently suffer from 
enormous problems of bad debts.'5 There is rio stock exchange in Iraq, and 
few nonhank financial institutions. 
Jordan 
Jordan is the most straightforward case of private sector financial develop— 
ment among the sample, with a pattern of gradual but sustained financial 
deepening shown in the preceding figures. It has a range of competing (and 
not too concentrated) private sector deposit banks, some specialized public 
sector credit institutions, and a small development of private sector nonbank 
financial institutions. One of its main banks, the Arab Bank, was founded in 
1929 by a Palestinian who had worked in the United States and was therefore 
familiar with US banks. In the beginning, it specialized in lending to small 
businesses and professionals, but later it expanded throughout the Arab world 
and of its activity is now devoted to collecting deposits in the Gulf for 
reinvestment in the money and other markets of London. The Arab Bank, and 
Jordanian banks more generally, are thus not heavily involved with nonlmnan— 
cial companies: they hold little equity and are more like Anglo—Saxon than 
continental European banks. Another important activity is the repatriation of 
the remittances of migrant workers, especially from the Gull'. 
Jordan also has a small stock exchange in Amman, established in 1976, on 
which about one hundred companies are listed (see also the figures above). 
Roe and Popiel (1988: 39-40) refer to it as "still shallow and inactive. The 
study by Singh and Haiiiid (1992: 81) found that the 35 largest quoted corn- 
panics in Jordan "financed more than So percent of their growth from equity 
issues," but without more information on companies and industrial structure 
it is difficult to know how much weight to assign to these results. 
Lebanon 
Lebanon is an outstanding example of financial development ofa very special 
kind as a regional financial center catering mainly to expatriate Arab funds. 
The previous figures indicate the extensive use of banks rather than cash from 
IS 
See. t.su Regg and ('ones (1993). 
paragraph cli',tws pailly 1)0 Wilson (953, I 957) and the Central Bank of Jordan's 992 
Annual Report. 
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at least the early I 960s. If income figures had been available it seems fair to 
assume that Lebanon would show (in Figure 1) the highest level of financial 
deepening of the countries considered here. banking sector'7 had 
been internationally oriented since at least 1948, when exchange controls were 
abolished and it experienced a major inliux of Palestinian capital; at the same 
time Beirut became a major transit port in place of Haifa. Lebanon's strict laws 
on banking secrecy date from 1956; soon thereafter, political developments 
elsewhere in the Arab world generated a need for a safe banking haven which 
the Lebanese banking sector was able to satisfy. Beirut quickly developed as 
an important regional center, with large numbers of Arab and other foreign- 
owned banks setting up branches or representation there. Lebanese banking 
was dynamic and freewheeling, and it experienced its share of instability - 
notably the crash of the Intra Bank in 1966, which led to improved regulation 
with the implementation of the 1963 Code of Money and Credit. At the same 
time Lebanese commercial banks (there were no specialized banks of the kind 
found elsewhere, at least until the establishment of the Banque de l'Habitat in 
1977) were apparently closely involved in medium- and long-term lending to 
domestic industry. The first oil price shock of 1973-74 encouraged a further 
hut short-lived entry of foreign banks. The conllicts within Lebanon from 
1975 onwards created major difficulties, but the banking sector has survived 
remarkably well in the circumstances. Indeed, it may even have increased its 
power and influence over the non—financial sector. 
There is a small stock exchange in Beirut. first established in 1920, which has 
been closed br periods since the late I 970s. Moore (1987) has emphasized 
the inkrmation problems which prevented the market from operating effec- 
tively, from insider dealing through to poor accounts and the predominance of 
closed companies. There are also large stocks of government bonds and 
Treasury-bills outstanding, though not as yet active secondary markets. 
However, attempts are currently being made to revive the exchange and to set 
up other, mostly short-term, capital markets 2() 
See Ghazi (1987), Karain ((993/94) and Moore (1987). 
Moore (1987:2(14). 
I am giatelbi to Saad Andary fbi discussions on (his point. See also Mooie (1987). 
See I hers jew with R iad Salatuch, (loverner of I lie Banquc dii Lihan, in i/u' 1/mike,'. Ni'vc 
993. 
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Syria 
The figures above reveal, if anything, an even lower level of financial devel- 
opnlent in Syria than in Iraq in the early I 960s, with only minor progress 
since then. The banking sector (which was Syrian rather than foreign-owned) 
was first nationalized in 1961 during the short-lived union with Egypt, then 
renalionalized in 1964 when all the commercial banks were combined in one 
hank, the Commercial Bank of Syria. There are also a number of much small- 
er specialized banks. It is not clear if any of these banks hold nonfinancial 
equity. As with Iraq, it seems that the banking sector as a whole lunctioiìs 
largely as part of the state planning process, rather than as an allocator of 
funds in its own right; in this respect, Syria's banking system must be close to 
those of the pre-reform Soviet bloc countries. There is no stock exchange, 
and few nonbank financial institutions. 
Some comparative characterizations 
There are a number of dimensions along which the financial systems of these 
countries can be measured. First, as regards the development of securities 
markets, it is clear that none of them has stock exchanges of a size and impor- 
tance which could place them anywhere near the Anglo—Saxon market—based 
systems; they also lack active secondary markets in bonds and short—terni 
government as well as markets in derivative products. Secondly, 
regards the involvement of banks in industry, it seems clear that, while in Iraq 
and Syria the banks are largely conduits for official planning processes, in the 
other three countries the banks have varying amounts of involvement, main- 
ly in the financing of industry and less commonly in its control. Thirdly, it 
should be noted that in Iraq and Syria, but to a considerable extent in Egypt 
and a much smaller extent in Jordan, the public sector itself has a role in the 
financial system through government—owned banks - commercial and/or spe- 
cialist — and that the criteria for the allocation of financial resources are heav- 
ily influenced by the government. Lastly, no bank in any of these countries 
can he characterized as a universal bank along the lines of the traditional cen- 
tral European niodel, although Bank Misr was exactly that at some stage in 
the past and many banks today have some involvement in industry; in fact, no 
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hank appears to exercise the dominance and control that are the crucial attrib— 
Lites of a universal bank.' 
How then should the existing financial systems he characterized! The finan- 
cial institutions that exist in Iraq and Syria are undeveloped and essentially 
part of the state apparatus: they hardly constitute financial systems at all in 
the normal sense of the term. The Jordanian financial institutions and mar- 
kets are somewhat more developed; they constitute a financial system in 
which banks provide the hulk of the finance hut exercise relatively little con- 
trol over nonfinancial enterprises, while some finance (but again no control, 
in the sense of an Anglo—Saxon—style market for corporate control) is also 
provided through the securities market. The system is nearer a hank-based 
than a market-based system, but above all it is a financial system that is sub- 
ordinate, in the sense that individual banks are probably more concerned 
with allocating financial resources between the particular nonfinancial firms 
(largely family—owned rather than joint—stock companies) which arc mem- 
bers of their groups, rather than allocating resources to the lilost productive 
investment opportunities throughout the economy. Egypt has a wider array 
of financial institutions with a longer history, but one that has been disrupt— 
ccl by major in political power and accompanying policy measures, 
troin British domination through Nasserite socialisni to Sadat's open—door 
policies and Muharaks hesitant liberalization efforts. The Fgyptian finan- 
cial system is also subordinate, hut mostly to the state rather than to well— 
established private sector nonhnancial companies. If and when the iole of 
the state is inoditied, there seems to he a reasonable possibility that the sys- 
tem will come to operate as a well—developed, mainly bank—based system. 
Finally, the Lebanese financial system appears internally to operate in a 
largely bank—based hut externally to emphasize transactions rather 
than relationship banking in a way reminiscent of financial centers else- 
where. 
Financial systems and financial centers 
On the basis of previous considerations and the empirical characteristics of 
21 
Some commentators (e.g. Roussillon, 988) specutated that the Istamic investincnt institutioiis 
(vliortkai taw2iI al-oinwol) iii Egypt in the mid—I 980s night have dcvetoped Into migor t inanciat— 
industriat congtoiiieiates. but tater i'evetations of the way in which these institutions operated 
showed ttiis to be lancilut. For a discussion ol ttie unicaliied potential ot lstaniic banks in this 
alea, see ('obtia in ( t ), 
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the financial systems discussed earlier, there seems to be little reason to 
argue that any of the countries with which this paper is concerned should 
devote the significant resources that would be required to building up a mar- 
ket-based rather than a bank-based financial system. This does not mean 
that stock exchanges should be closed down or discriminated against (e.g. 
fiscally), but it does mean that policy should be geared towards improving 
the functioning of the banks and in particular their obility to make well—based 
decisions about the allocation of financial resources between firms and 
between activities.22 
If banks are to be given more control, they must also be subjected to more 
conipetition. While this does not represent a problem in the case of Lebanon 
or .Jordan, in Egypt the question must be raised as to whether more competi- 
tion can he introduced without major changes in ownership. For Iraq and 
Syria, a major distancing of financial institutions from the state apparatus is 
the sine qua non for the success of any policy designed to improve the func- 
tioning of financial institutions, It cannot, of course, be assumed that a state 
planning process in which financial arrangements are entirely subordinate is 
necessarily inferior to a more market—driven economic mechanism, but at the 
very least it can be said that state planning in the Middle East and elsewhere 
has failed to live up to the hopes once held out for it. If state planning is to be 
replaced, the experience of Eastern Europe suggests that the process of 
rebuilding thc financial scctor should be started as early as possible.23 
If a country wanted to become an important international financial center, 
would this make any difference to the above conclusion? There is a consid- 
erable literature on why financial activity (in contrast to most industrial activ- 
ity) tends to cluster.24 The most important factors are the economies of scale 
and scope involved: the concentration of financial institutions in a single cen- 
ter leads to improved flows of inlorniation, higher liquidity and greater effi- 
ciency in organized markets; concentrations of related financial markets 
improve information, liquidity and efficiency in a similar way; and concen- 
22 Moore (I 987 :207) for instance bemoans the emphasis of Lebanese banks on trust and friend- 
ship rather than professional credit analysis. 
See, or example. Begg and Portes (1993). 
See I )avls (I 990), Grilli (1989), Kindlebei'ger (1974), and for a brief summary. Bonetti and 
Cohhain (1992: 18—21). 
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trations of financial institutions facilitate activities like credit syndication and 
security issuance that require the joint action of a number of different sorts of 
financial firms. Moreover, such economies are dynamic, that is, concentra- 
tion in one place attracts more institutions to the same location, as liquidity 
attracts liquidity. This means that the growth of financial centers can 
become self-perpetuating. Most of this literature refers to the main existing 
ccnters such as London and New York, where there are wide arrays of securi- 
ties and derivatives markets, but the basic idea of economies of scale also 
applies to centers such as Switzerland, where the emphasis is on a certain 
form of banking, namely private banking. For both cases the key conclusion 
to come out of the literature is that well-established centers are likely to retain 
their prominence, and it is very difficult for a new center to get off the ground: 
Paris and Frankfurt, for example, would both like to challenge Londons posi- 
tion as an international financial center but are unlikely to succeed. 
Egypt has had aspirations to becoming a major regional financial center since 
the beginning of the open-door policy, and Lebanon aspires to reestablish its 
previous position as a regional center. Lebanon's position was more like that 
of Switzerland than that of London because it was based in part on banking 
secrecy, and this factor may continue to operate in its favor. In other respects, 
though, it seems unlikely that the previous position can be restored: produc- 
ers and consumers of financial services alike have learned to operate through 
other centers (notably London, but also Paris), and once they have made the 
investments required to access the much more efficient markets of Europe 
they will continue to carry out both standard and many non—standard transac- 
tions there. Apart from secrecy, the only attractions Beirut can otter are 
expert information and, perhaps, the large number of skilled nationals cur— 
rently working in financial centers abroad but likely to return to Lebanon. 
However, Lebanon's position will be hard to build up again after so many 
years of turmoil. On the other hand, it is clear that the aspiration to become 
a center of that kind provides no reason for preferring a market-based to a 
bank-based financial system. 
Egypt, on the other hand, apparently aspires to a more widely—grounded posi- 
tion as an international financial center with a range of organized securities 
markets.25 The fulfillment of such an aspiration would be facilitated if Egypt's 
domestic financial system were more market—based and less bank—based than 
Sec National Uank ol Egypt (I I). 
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it is at present. However, the costs of shifting the internal system in that direc- 
tion would be substantial, and the prospects for success in establishing Egypt 
as such a center seem remote: regional investors are already well served else- 
where; the time zone is not sufficiently different from the European centers; 
there are no well-established spot securities markets anywhere in the region 
whose products could become the underlying instruments for derivatives mar- 
kets; and so on. Thus, it does not seem sensible for Egypt to pursue a differ- 
ent sort of financial system for such a reason. 
An agenda for future research 
The central conclusion of this paper is that the countries considered should be 
looking to improve the financial efficiency of their economies not primarily 
by developing organized financial markets, but rather by upgrading their 
banking and other financial institutions. 
However, the preparation of the paper has revealed a large number of gaps in 
knowledge which future research could address. First, we need to know more 
about overall financial flows: at the aggregate level, how much of nonfinan- 
cial firms finance needs are provided through internal and the various forms 
of external finance? Secondly, we need to be able to relate that aggregate 
information to more detailed data on corporate financial structures: namely, 
what lorms of finance do different sorts and sizes of firms use? Thirdly, we 
need to know more about the relationships of finance, information and con- 
trol between banks and nonfinancial firms across countries, types of bank, and 
types of firm. 
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This paper addresses the important issue of what should be the optimal finan- 
cial structure in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, now that many of the 
countries in the Middle East have embarked on a financial liberalization 
process. This particular topic has received a great deal of attention in recent 
years. So far, no consensus has been achieved on what the optimal banking 
structure should consist of in industrialized economies, let alone in develop- 
ing countries. The poor performance of specialized banks in the United States 
can easily be compared to the difficulties of universal banks in Japan and the 
Scandinavian countries. Since the debate will probably not be settled at this 
point in time, the following comments will approach the issue from a differ- 
ent 
The conclusion of the paper is quite fitting in suggesting that developing 
countries should improve the financial efficiency of their economies by 
upgrading their banking system. Contrary to the implication of the 
however, this should not preclude the development of financial markets alter 
reform of the banking system has occurred. 
In my view the development of a strong banking system is a prerequisite 
rather than an alternative to the development of financial markets. First and 
foremost, the existence of' a sound banking sector lies at the heart of an effi- 
cient capital market because securities markets depend heavily on the exten- 
sion of bank credit for liquidity purposes. Secondly, the access of banks to 
'good funds" from the Central Bank provides the liquidity that maintains con- 
fidence in the payment system. indeed, the creation of securities and equities 
markets with a weak banking sector would inevitably create systemic prob- 
lems. In that sense, banking reform seems crucial. 
One can observe that, in many Arab countries, banks are not sufficiently cap- 
italized; in addition, they tend to have a large stock of non-performing loans 
as well as a high concentration of loans both to single groups and to single 
sectors. In such an environment, financial reform should begin with the 
restructuring and privatization of the banking sector; the development of cap— 
ital markets should then follow the banking reform. When one analyzes the 
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trend over the last decade in industrialized countries, and over the last three 
years in developing countries, it becomes clear that a process of disinterme- 
diation has occurred. Bond and equities markets represent an increasingly 
important source of external finance for developing countries. Also, the 
development of government securities markets is important for countries with 
large budget deficits and for absorbing the sale of privatized public enterpris- 
es. Similarly, the development of money markets is important in providing 
liquidity to the system as well as in facilitating the conduct of monetary pol- 
icy. As such, one would expect Middle Eastern countries to be willing to tap 
this new source of financing. This willingness can already be seen in such 
countries as Jordan and Turkey, where about 50 percent of corporate financ- 
ing has been raised from equity. 
Turning to the issue of universal versus narrow commercial banks, the paper 
appears overly positive vis-a-vis universal banks as a model for banks in 
developing countries. As long as banks remain inadequately supervised and 
insufficiently well capitalized, the safest policy would be to l)revent their 
expansion into other financial activities. On the one hand, banks face addi- 
tional sources of risks when they participate in capital markets: these include 
liquidity risks, trading risks, and settlement risks which banks are not always 
equipped to manage. Moreover, a conflict of interests would tend to prevail 
with such a structure. On the other hand, it is generally more difficult for pru- 
dential authorities to supervise universal banks than the narrower commercial 
banks. When the right regulatory and supervisory infrastructure has been 
established and banks have been restructured, it may then be possible to 
broaden their activities. Another factor in the choice between universal and 
specialized banks is that universal banking may lead to excessive cartelization 
of the financial sector as well as to the underdevelopinent of capital markets. 
The author needs to tighten the link between the two types of financial sys- 
tem introduced in the beginning of the paper and the following section, which 
depicts the current financial structure of the five Arab countries under con- 
sideration. It is difficult to understand why the current financial structure of 
those five Arab countries argues in favor of a bank-based rather than a mar- 
ket-based system. The evidence presented in the paper shows that these coun- 
tries need to privatize or restructure their banks in order to make them more 
competitive, but does not present a convincing argument as to why these 
countries should adopt a bank-based rather than a market-based structure. 
Also, the choice of Syria and Iraq seems surprising in view of the precarious- 
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ness of their financial systems; Turkey and Bahrain would have been better 
cases. 
Further, it would be fitting to recall that many countries in Asia and Latin 
America had a similar banking structure in the early 1980s. Over the last 
decade, however, some of these countries have liberalized their economies, 
modernized their financial infrastructure, and reformed their banking system. 
As'a result, some were successful in developing capital markets, such as the 
corporate bond market in Chile, the money market in Mexico, and many equi- 
ty markets in Asia and Latin America. There is no reason to believe that Arab 
countries could not follow a similar pattern of development. 
Finally, one of the implications of the paper is that it will be difficult or per- 
haps unnecessary to develop a financial center in the Middle East. In this 
regard, it would do us well to remember that the sheer size of the region cou- 
1jled with its huge pool of resources requires a regional financial center to 
cater to local investors, as regional centers do in Asia. In addition, small and 
medium—size firms are unlikely to tap into the capital markets of the large 
financial centers, whereas they are likely to get tinancing from regional cen- 
ters. To be sure, these centers would not be in a position to compete with 
London or Tokyo, but they would still have an important regional role. Also, 
it is incorrect to point to the difficulties of Paris or Frankfurt in displacing 
London as an argument against the development of a financial center. At pre- 
sent there is no regional financial center in the Middle East, so the issue 
revolves around creating one rather than displacing another. Hence, the cost 
of developing a financial center - laying a financial, legal, regulatory and 
supervisory infrastructure - would not be as high. 
Today the underdevelopment of financial centers and markets in the Arab 
world reflects macroeconomic imbalances, political instability, inadequate 
regulations and practices, and the dominant role of the public sector in ceo- 
nomic activity. These problems have begun to be tackled, so that some 
progress may be expected in the future. Moreover, as the peace process forges 
ahead, and as local economies open up and modernize their financial infra- 
structure, there is reason to believe that some financial centers will eventual- 
ly emerge in the region. 
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Samir Makdisi 
The author presents two main themes in his paper. The first concerns market- 
based versus bank-based financial systems as well as the conditions that cre- 
ate a preference for one over the other. the optimal financial 
system is discussed. In addition, the German and Japanese models are con- 
trasted with those of the United Kingdom and the United States. According 
to the author, two factors — commitment and competition — are crucial in deter- 
mining the type of system to be developed. In connection with these issues, 
two remarks or queries seem warranted: 
(i) The first query is quite specific. In a world of competition, the 
author needs to elaborate on the question of signals - that is, adverse signals 
associated with the issuance of new securities. Further, he needs to explain 
whether or not this has been a common historical experience which tended to 
shift focus to bank-financed systems and/or internal financing. 
(ii) The second query is more general. The author observes that in a bank- 
based system, banks have superior information about borrowers, and that 
there is stronger mutual commitment between the two sides and hence better 
prospects for longer—term financing and economic growth. In a market—based 
system, access to long—term financing is more difficult. As a result, firms may 
opt for shorter-term projects, overall investment decreases, and SO does eco- 
nomic growth. The choice between the two systems in a particular case 
depends on the balance between the benefits of commitment and the costs of 
reduced competition. In light of the foregoing comments, what conclusion 
does the author reach as far as developed countries are concerned? Has 
investment and growth been less significant in market-based financial sys- 
tenis than in bank-based ones? Does the experience of developed countries 
provide useful lessons to developing countries? 
The second main theme relates to the optimal system for developing countries 
in general, with particular reference to five Arab countries: Egypt, Iraq, 
.Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The general conclusion is that developing coun- 
tries have a stronger case for bank-based rather than market-based financial 
systems. The low level of information, imperfections in the market, and the 
low stock of managerial resources, among other factors, point in favor of this 
conclusion. In this regard, three remarks need to be made: 
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(i) It is true that the financial ratios for Lebanon are very high. National 
income estimates for recent years are available, and they corroborate this con- 
c lus ion. 
(ii) With regard to Jordan and Egypt, the author should elaborate on his obser- 
vation that the financial system in Jordan is subordinated to non-financial 
and in Egypt, to the state. How does this situation contrast with bank- 
based systems in Germany and Japan? Can we say that in these two coun- 
tries, subordination is in reverse order, so that banks actually control industry? 
How does the concept of subordination apply to developed countries? 
(iii) Finally, in referring to Beirut's prospects as a financial center, the author 
states that, apart from the bank secrecy law, the only attraction exerted by 
Beirut is expert information. But in this case, no reason would exist for pre- 
ferring a market-based financial system to a bank-based one. Once again, the 
author needs to elaborate further on this point. Indeed, as regards Egypt, he 
concludes that the system should become more market and less bank-based if 
Cairo is to become a financial center. 
How can these observations be reconciled with the general conclusion of the 
paper, namely that the Arab countries under consideration should concentrate 
on improving the financial efficiency of their economies by upgrading their 
banking and other financial institutions and not by developing organized 
financial markets? 
3 
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During the last decade many countries embarked on structural change-cum- 
liberalization programs so as to enhance the performance of their economies. 
A closer look at these experiences shows that the results were less satisfacto- 
ry than originally expected. In other words, the positive effects of these 
reforms on the real side of the economy were observed to have only partially 
materialized. 
Recent studies on such reform experiences, even though they paid attention to 
country-specific factors such as the sociological structure of the country in 
question and its pre-reform history, emphasized two major issues which have 
significant bearing upon the success of the reforms. The first issue is the role 
of the state during the reform process and its governance capacity. The expe- 
rience of reforming countries in the l980s indicates that when the state 
achieves relative independence (that is, when government is not captured by 
one or a coalition of social groups) and is thus able to exercise its governance 
capacity during the reform as well as in its aftermath, the probability of suc- 
cessful transition increases.' 
The second issue which this paper deals with is the role of the financial sec- 
tor during the reform process. Structural adju.stment-cum-liberalization pro- 
grams aim at expanding the allocative role of markets at the expense of 
administrative decisions made by the government. Such policies place the 
financial sector at the core of the economy and expect it to function in a way 
as to allocate resources efficiently in order to promote - and sustain - the 
growth of the real sector. To be sure, the success of the reform depends very 
For a thorough analysis of the role of the state during the reform process, see Fritshcak (l993), 
which was prepared as a theoretical background paper for a very interesting research project at 
the World Bank on this issue. 
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much on both the financial sectors ability to assume this role and its speed of 
adustment.2 
The purpose of this paper is to point out that the success of liberalization poli- 
cies, albeit paradoxical at first sight, is highly positively correlated with gov- 
ernment behavior in the economic sphere. In other words, contrary to the 
accepted rhetoric, financial liberalization can enhance social welfare, not if 
the government completely refrains from intervening in the working of the 
market mechanism, but rather if it makes proper policy decisions in order to 
enable the financial system to carry out its much-increased role under the new 
conditions. Within this framework, the problem of uncertainty is the major 
issue to which government contribution is most needed, and it should there- 
fore be examined more thoroughly. 
First, the paper discusses the basis for government intervention, that is, the 
uncertainty-augmenting effects of structural adjustment-cum-liheralization 
programs, as well as the fundamentals of credit rationing theory. The paper 
then examines, within a simple framework, the effect of economic policies 
followed by governments on the credit-rationing behavior of banks. The con- 
cluding section of the paper is devoted to a re-examination of the role of gov- 
ernment during the economic reform process. 
Structural adjustment, financial liberalization and uncertainty 
Early proponents of liberalization programs advocated the removal of interest 
rate ceilings and similar constraints on the financial system so as to enable it 
to operate freely and exploit the advantages of the market system with a view 
to enhancing efficiency in resource allocation. Such a move was considered, 
at least in theory, a transition from an imperfect allocation mechanism 
towards a perfect one. However, the experience accumulated over the last 
decade does not fully confirm the predictions of these early advocates. The 
subsequent performance of the real sector of the economy in some countries 
has been weaker than expected. 
Such developments led to a new line of thought in the analysis of economic 
2 
The iole of the financial system and the effect of the libcralization policies drew the attention 
of many researchers towards the end of the 1980s. Some of the findings of these early studies arc 
rellected in World Bank (1959), which surveys these issues with a mildly critical tone. For a corn- 
prehensive survey of the pmoblemns relaled to financial liberalization, see Akyuz (1993). 
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reforms. This took a less optimistic but more realistic view as the starting 
point by abandoning the assumption that liberalization programs will lead to 
an optimal resource allocation system. Instead, it explicitly introduced the 
concept of transition from one imperfect allocation mechanism to another and 
began to question the relative merits of the latter.3 This approach broadens the 
discussion of economic reforms on two issues. The first issue is the desir- 
ability of reforms. Once the imperfect nature of the outcome is acknowl- 
edged, the research agenda is broadened to compare the merits and weak- 
nesses of the existing and targeted states. It should be noted that by dropping 
a research program which seeks to reach a state of bliss for society as a whole, 
the problem becomes more complicated since it requires the social evaluation 
of alternative solutions. This also brings in the second issue, which is the 
need to identify proper economic policies so as to minimize the social costs 
of transition. 
Structural adjustment-cum-liberalization programs aim at decentralizing eco- 
nomic decisions by strengthening the role of the market mechanism. 
Therethre, they rely on individual decision-makers' ability to make proper 
decisions. However, by simultaneously removing interest rate ceilings and 
allowing prices to be determined by market forces, these programs also exac- 
erbate the volatility of many economic variables and thus increase the uncer- 
tainty perceived by economic agents. In other words, the proponents of such 
reform programs seem to assume implicitly that, under uncertainty, the per- 
förmance of market-based systems which rely on the decisions of individual 
decision—makers is superior to that of the administrative allocative mecha- 
nisms when it comes to increasing social welfare. Unfortunately, this 
assumption is neither self-evident nor valid in general. In fact, by referring to 
the fundamental non-decentralizability theorem proved in Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1986) one can argue the opposite, that is, market allocations can be 
improved in general through proper government interventions.4 
The preceding arguments indicate the need for the explicit introduction 
ofuncertainty into the picture when evaluating the desirability of economic 
As an example of such an appi'oach to cconomic problems. see Caprio Jr. et.al. (1994). 
The fundamental non—decentralization theorem states that whenever the in formation is endoge— 
floiis or markets are incomplete — that is, in almost all conceivable states — competitive al lOCatiOilS 
arc not constrained Pareto efficient. 
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reforms aimed at establishing a market-based allocation system. For this pur- 
pose, in the remainder of this section a conceptual decomposition of the 
uncertainty-augmenting effects of such reforms will be attempted. The goal 
is to identify the source and nature of the uncertainties tied to such reforms as 
well as discuss their effects on the behavior of economic decision-making 
on its. 
The first source, which may be called the structural adjustment effect, refers 
to the increase in uncertainty due to changes in the economic structure. When 
reform programs are implemented, many of the parameters which character- 
ized the economic system change. For example, most structural adjustment 
programs change the pattern of production since they aim at modifying the 
growth strategy of the country in question. In many cases, growth strategies 
were shifted from inward-looking industrialization under protection' to 
"export-led growth under competition". The implied shift in the production 
pattern of the economy will inevitably change the behavior of economic 
agents as well as the set of economic information on which their decisions are 
based. However, such a radical change in the economic environment decreas- 
es or even nullifies the information capital5 of economic agents, particularly 
banks, since historical data has little - if any - relevance in making economic 
decisions. The decline in information capital implies that banks will find 
themselves less capable of evaluating projects and choosing the ones with the 
best return-risk properties. This behavior will adversely affect the credit sup- 
ply of banks and may hinder the growth of the real sector. 
Another source of uncertainty which is closely related to the reforms can be 
referred to as the liberalization effect, which stems from the modified role of 
the state during and particularly after the transformation. In all reforming 
countries, the transformation is towards a system in which risks are individu- 
This simply means that the reforms also aim at stripping government 
of its general insurance agency role. This, by definition, will increase the 
Caprio Jr. (1992) developed an analytical framework that focuses on the concept of information 
capital in explaining bank behavior during structural adjustment. See also Caprio Jr. (1994) for 
an exposition of his conclusions. 
For the former socialist Countries the stalling point may be identified as the one in which "both 
profits and risks arc socialized". This system, at least conceptually, is more consistent than the 
Protective economies, where profits are private but risks are soeiolized. However, for the purpose 
of this paper, the nature of the existing system is of secondary importance. 
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risks perceived by economic agents, even if total risk remains unchanged. 
These two effects differ from each other both in their duration and in the way 
they influence the behavior of economic agents. The structural adjustment 
effect is felt most severely during the transition period, but it may be reduced 
by increasing the information capital available to economic agents, particu- 
larly banks. On the other hand, the liberalization effect is more durable and 
requires all agents, and again particularly banks, to be ready to assume risks 
and act accordingly. However, the findings of economic theory clearly 
demonstrate once again that under uncertainty the behavior of economic 
agents, particularly banks, may indeed hamper the expected positive effects of 
the reforms on the performance of the economy. This problem is particularly 
important in the case of banks since their behavior under uncertainty leads to 
what is known in economic theory as credit rationing. 
Credit rationing 
One of the problems detected in those economies which launched economic 
reforms is the continuation or even worsening of the finance constraint affect- 
ing the corporate sector. This result stands in sharp contrast to the expecta- 
tions of the proponents of these reforms. The liberalization measures were 
expected to increase savings as well as enhance the ability of the economic 
system to allocate them to projects with the highest social returns. Since sav- 
ings depend on many economic and social factors, it is simply a mistake to 
expect the savings rate of an economy to increase in response to the freeing 
of interest rates.7 However, it can still be argued that the development of 
financial markets may indeed induce a shift in the composition of savings 
towards financial savings.8 The second issue revolves around another theo- 
retical problem, namely the theory of credit rationing. This refers to whether 
the financial system, or banks, for almost all practical concerns, are able to 
seek out those projects with the highest social returns and whether they are 
willing to extend loans to such projects. 
Credit rationing, as defined in Ghandhi (1987), is the case in which the risk- 
Akyuz (1993: 24-27) lists the factors which can adversely affect the rise in the savings late in 
reforming economies. 
For a lucid discussion of the need for distinguishing between savings in general and financial 
savings, as well as the implications for the development of financial markets, see Ghandhi (I 987: 
6-7). and Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990: 839). 
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return tradeoff is truncated, so that financial institutions decline to accept a 
higher amount of risk regardless of the yield offered. In practical terms, this 
means that '... some borrowers are denied credit even though they are willing 
to pay the market interest rate (or more), while apparently similar borrowers 
do obtain credit.9 This problem was first detected by Keynes in his discus- 
sion of unsatisfied fringe borrowers in his Treatise on Money (1930). Over 
the last decade and a half, many researchers have dealt with this problem and 
have developed models based on the optimizing behavior of financial 
The basic finding of credit rationing theory is that banks may not 
increase the interest rate they charge even if there is excess demand for funds 
for fear that such an action might reduce their expected rate of return, either 
by reducing the portion of low-risk borrowers or by inducing borrowers to 
undertake riskier projects. Instead, banks choose to curb their credit supply, 
and thus a portion of the borrowers remain unsatisfied. However, unlike 
uncertainty, credit rationing in this sense is not a universal phenomenon. In 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) three conditions are presented under which credit 
rationing may occur: 
"I) There must be some residual uncertainty (information imperfection) 
after lenders employ whatever means they have at their disposal to differ- 
entiate among applicants and control their behavior; 
2) The adverse selection/adverse incentive effects of changing interest 
rates or the non-price terms of contract (collateral, equity, etc.) must be 
sufficiently strong (at some values of the relevant variables) that it is not 
optimal for the lender to use the instruments fully to allocate credit; 
3) The supply of funds must be such that at the Walrasian equilibrium 
(where demand equals supply, taking into account the use of non-price 
instruments), the expected returns to the lender are lower than for some 
other contract, at which point there exists credit rationing. 
Hence, in order to consider credit rationing a major factor that impedes 
growth in the real sector, one needs to demonstrate that these three conditions 
are satisfied. Clearly, the first condition holds in general; therefore, what is 
needed is the validity of the remaining two conditions. In the following sec— 
JaiThe and Sliglili (1990: S39). 
For a comprehensive survey ol credit rationing. see Jalfee and Stigliiz (1990). 
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non, the effects of government behavior on credit rationing will he discussed 
in a simple lramcwork and by using the experience of Turkey over the last 
decade as an example. 
Government behavior and credit supply 
The adverse effects of credit rationing are not, as the proponents of financial 
liberalization evidently believe, a logical possibility observed almost 
nowhere, nor are they inevitable. Both beliefs lead to inaction on the part of 
governments. Instead, one should ask whether or not there are policy mea— 
sm-es that governments can take to influence the behavior of banks so as to 
curb the tendency Fr credit rationing. To this end, the effects of government 
behavior on bank lending decisions are analyzed in a simple lramework. The 
analysis is restricted to two out of many conceivable policy decisions made 
by the government, namely 'high public sector delicits during financial liber- 
alization' and "reversals in policy decisions'. These two types of government 
behavior are rather conimon in countries which launched structural adjust— 
nient—cum—liberalization programs in the I 980s. Although the direct adverse 
ettects of these policy mistakes" are well documented, the purpose of deal- 
ing with them in this paper is simply to emphasize their indirect effects in 
exacerbating the credit—rationing behavior of banks.'' 
In order to achieve this goal. suppose that in an econoniy there is one riskless 
asset (say, government bonds) and many risky loans whose returnsare multi— 
variate normal with finite variances. Therefore, demand for risky loans can 
In his comment on this paper, Di- Ai,ou-F,ie emnphasiied two factors that may diminish the sig- 
nit icauce 01 ciedi rationing under he above circumstances. The hrst facto, refers to governmmmcnt 
behavior and calls or caichil implementation of tihcratization—cumni—structuiat aditistitment pro— 
grains. The second is the existence of ''in lorimial emedit markets'' in developing Countries. I )r 
Abou—Ezze argues that Ci-edit rationing may not be very signiticant in an economy lihcraliing 
its Onancial markets while remain mo at the early stages of development. timformnat markets meet 
he cmedit needs of ittost enterprises that ale laigety taittity—owtied'' This pomt Is impor- 
tant since in such countries the segimiented natume of credit markets acts as an impediment tor 
financial development and, by definition. iedttees the speed and magnitude of the spmead of macro 
shocks its the economy This nay indeed be one of the factors behind the resiliency of business 
enterprises in stieli countries staring peiiods of crisis Howevei, it should also be pointed out that 
the behavior of lenders in iii Onmual credit markets is neither exogenous nor invariant. Bell (I 990) 
anal y ied the interact ions between institutional and ml ormal credit agencies in rural India and 
csplumred the ways in winch goveinntcnt pot ides infltienced the behavior of the latter type of 
agents. Finally, mecent studies on rural cm-edit markets indicate that lending behavior in such mar— 
kets cati he accurately explained by meferring to the "inIperfect informatioti" approach. On this 
point, see Hoff and Stighiti (1990). 
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be defined over the mean and variance of portfolio returns. Assume also that 
banks are risk averse, which under the previous assumptions will imply that 
the indifference curves of banks - defined as a relation between expected 
return and risk - are convex. The locus of the minimum variance portfolios 
that have the same expected utility is called the loan return frontier.'2 Finally, 
assume that banks have no special information about their borrowers and are 
therefore unable to distinguish among them, and as the contractual rate of 
interest charged increases, the quality of the borrower pooi falls. Using the 
above analytical concepts, the effect of government policies on bank behav- 
ior can be examined: 
High public sector deficits and credit crunch 
The effect of high public sector deficits can be analyzed by referring to Figure 
I, which is drawn by using the above assumptions. Before the liberalization 
measures became effective, suppose that the government was able to borrow 
from banks at the repressed rate of interest . This means that banks were in 
equilibrium at and allocated a certain portion of their resources, 
to the corporate sector as loans.'3 Suppose that, while liberalizing the finan- 
cial sector, the government declined to reduce public sector deficits. Under 
the celeris parihus assumption, as can be seen from Figure 1, this may cause 
banks to curb their credit to the corporate sector. (The figure is drawn to 
demonstrate the case of ). The removal of interest rate ceilings will 
increase the return from government securities. Hence, banks will allocate 
more of their resources to the public sector, which may lead them away from 
other borrowers and thus create a credit crunch.'4 
Here the terminology is adopted for the case of loans in order to preserve the continuation of 
the argument. The basic framework is more general and refers to all risky assets. For a thorough 
exposition of the analytics of this approach see, for example, Huang and Litzcnberger (1988). The 
portfolio choice approach was used by Caprio Jr. (1992) to analyze bank behavior during the 
relorm piocess. 
Since the portfolio of banks consists of riskless government securities and risky assets, the 
variance of portfolio is the weighted average of these assets. Using this relation one can derive 
the expression given above for the share of resources allocated to the corporate sector. 
If the corporate sector is identilied with the private sector, and if extending loans to state ceo- 
ioiriic enterprises is not considered risky, then such behavior can be viewed as the main reason 
behind the crowding out of the private sector in such economies. 
r 
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Figure 1 
Table 1. PSBR and the share of riskiess assets in commercial bank 
portfolios in Turkey 
. 
YLJI 
Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (% of GNP) 
Share of Riskiess Assets 
Commercial Bank Portfo 
in 
lbs (%) 
1986 4.7 22.15 
1987 7.8 26.11 
1988 6.2 33.16 
1989 7.2 35.01 
1990 10.2 27.40 
1991 14.5 35.47 
1992 14.9 33.6! 
Souice: PSBR figures are those released by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign 
Trade; the last column is calculated from data given in Money and Statistics 1986-1991. 
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 1993. 
Turkey's experience in the second half of the 1980s can be viewed as an exam- 
pie of the adverse effects of a high public sector borrowing requirement 
(PSBR) on the credit market. Although Turkey introduced an auction 
r2 
'2 
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system° to sell government securities at a market-determined rate as an integral 
part of the structural adjustment—cum—financial liberalization program intro- 
duced in 1980, the economic policies followed did not succeed in reducing or 
even stabilizing the public sector borrowing requirement at reasonable levels. 
Therefore, as can he seen from Table I, the ratio of risk-free assets (defined here 
as government securities and loans to the central government) to loans extend- 
ed by commercial banks increased considerably in the 1986-1992 
Although the close relation between the rise in the PSBR and the increase in the 
share of riskless assets in the portfolios of commercial banks is clearly visible 
from Table I , the increase in the latter variable cannot be attributed solely to the 
change in PSBR. Indeed, Figure I and the explanations given in relation to it 
are based on a ceteris paribus assumption, which in this case unrealistically 
rules out any change in the uncertainty perceived by banks. 
In the following subsection a particular behavior of the government which 
increases the uncertainty perceived by economic agents, particularly by banks, 
will be discussed so as to highlight the importance of this problem. 
The uncertainly-augmenting effect of policy reversals and bank 
behavior 
There is nothing mysterious about the uncertainty-increasing effect of a change 
in a systems parameters which are relevant for decision-makers. Therefore, in 
some sense, any reform program will increase the uncertainty perceived by eco- 
nomic decision—makers until they are able to achieve reliable estimates of the 
It should also he pointed out that in Turkey there is a captured pomon of the demand for gov- 
crnioerit sccurities due to the imposition of a constraint on the asset composition of banks. Banks 
are obliged to invest a certain portion of the deposits they collect in government securities in 
order to I ulfill their liquidity i'equireinents. The existence of such a constraint may he intei'pret— 
ed as being iiicoiitpatihle with the idea of market determination of interest rates on government 
securities. However, as was demonstrated in Ei-sel (1992). for most of the period in question this 
constraint was not binding since hank holdings of government securities were considerably high- 
er than the implied lower bound. For a detailed analysis of the effects of public sector borrow- 
ing on financial markets and banks. see Atiyas and Eisel (1994). 
Loans of commercial banks are defined as the sum of loans to non-financial public enterpris- 
es, loans to local governments, loans to non—commercial bank financial institutions (investment 
and development banks and non-bank financial institutions), loans to the private sectoi, and cred- 
its extended to non-residents. In the BIS risk—weighing scheme, the first two types of loans are 
akin to riskless government securities. However, since these loans are relatively sittall in the port- 
folios of coirunercial banks, they are not counted as riskless assets. 
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new parameters. The question revolves around minimizing the time and effort 
required of economic agents to regain confidence in their estimates of the rele- 
vant parameters. Government actions play a significant role in this regard. 
Indeed, if decisions are consistent and clearly indicative of the policies to be fol- 
lowed, then economic agents will be in a better position to filter out the noise 
that distorts the estimation process. 
Such a rise in uncertainty may be the outcome of policy uncertainty, which 
occurs when the public assigns high probability to policy reversals. As it was 
demonstrated in Rodrik (1989), when government policies are suspected of' 
being prone to reversal, entrepreneurs will be extremely reluctant to make non- 
reversible decisions such as those related to fixed investments. The effect will 
be exacerbated once the financial sector is added to Rodriks framework. When 
banks assign high probability to policy reversals, they will face difficulties in 
determining the expected return on projects. In terms of Figure 2, this means 
that the loan frontier will shift towards the southeast. Even without a change in 
the return on the riskless asset, at the new equilibrium point the proportion of 
banks loans to corporations will be lower than the pre-reform ratio. This result 
strengthens the conclusions embodied in Rodrik (1989). At the same time, 
bringing banks into the picture also complicates the issue by emphasizing the 
multi-dimensional nature of the policy credibility problem.t7 
In Dr. A laa El-Shazlys comment, I lie following question was posed Is it advantageous for the 
govern muent to foil ow the strategy of policy reversal? In a 2x2 non—cooperative game Iram mmework. 
the author demonstrates that once the credibility ol governhmsent policies is established and lie 
other player takes the government's strategy as a given, then the outcommte is Pareto superior with 
respect to the equilibriitmu of the original game. However, in order to understand the problem of 
policy reversals, one should leave the world of static models. l'he policy credibility problem is 
due to the fact that the govern ment's opti mmial program is t i joe dependent. As Kydland and 
Prescott (1977) demttonstrated, govem'nments may not be able to precomnmit themselves to carry out 
promised policy actions; instead, they may choose to follow discretionary policies to gain tiexi- 
hility in the short run. One solution as observed by the author is the enlorcement of such poli- 
cy rules by an external agency. e.g. international institutions. Another may lie to Lllow the prac— 
ice of coon tries like Germany, New Zealand amid Chile and assure the autonomy of Central Banks 
and tlteir effectiveness in implementing tttonelary policy. This problem is analyzed thoroughly 
in Cukiertmian (1992). Omme important aspect of the policy credibility problem lies in the nature of 
the game played. Dr El—Shuzly discusses the issue in a non—cooperative gammie frammiework. 
However, if preplay commmmmiumnication is allosved, that is, t f the game ts transfortncd itito a cooper— 
au se one, then the outco inc can be i improved upon the non—cooperative solution. 'llie wlmole idea 
behind seeking consensums in immmplemncnting economic reforms is to lay the foundations for estab— 
I ish tug a coal mtmoms among the deeision—nsakittg units of an economy, i mid tiding the govern mcmi 
itself. Brumno (1993) deals with this probleum. which attracted the interest of not only economists 
but also political scientists, by referring to t lie Israeli and Latin American experiences. 







during her reform process. Although the implementation of the reform pro- 
gram was reasonably consistent in promoting exports, a similar attitude was 
absent from the remaining issues, including the countrys investment 
strategy.a This kind of policy uncertainty directly affected the corporate sec- 
tor, and private fixed investments remained rather weak until the end of the 
decade. On the other hand, the reluctance of entrepreneurs in undertaking 
investment projects was compounded by the finance constraint, as banks 
viewed the financing of investment projects as too risky under the existing 
conditions. Hence, the corporate sector, albeit able to receive loans from the 
banking sector for foreign trade activities, had to rely on its own internal 
funds and on rather limited medium and long-term preferential credit allocat- 
ed by investment and development banks under the governments guidance. 
In other words, despite all the efforts aimed at encouraging financial markets 
to play a significant role in the allocation of financial savings, the importance 
of administrative decisions in this sphere remained almost intact. 
These conclusions were also supported by the findings of a survey conducted 
in 1991 by a team of researchers.'9 The survey was based on questionnaires 
This interpretation is based on the discussion in Eiscl (1991). 
1) 
The complete set of results of this survey was reported in Atiyas, Ersel and Ozturk (1993). For 
a summary of the main lindings. see Atiyas and Ersel (1994). 
L&NN RETURN FRONTIER, 
Turkey suffered from both high public sector deficits and policy uncertainty 
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sent to the heads of the credit departments of a sample of banks operating in 
Turkey in the summer of 1991. The main idea was to identify the behavior of 
banks when confronted with rather austere imperfections in financial markets 
due to problems of information and costly contact enforcement. One of the 
major findings of the survey was that the uncertainties brought about by the 
liberalization program coupled with inconsistencies in the implementation of 
economic policies actually induced banks to practice credit rationing. 
Banks classify their potential customers into three risk groups, namely: blue 
chip companies; the relatively risky but creditworthy companies; and compa- 
nies which are considered not eligible for credit. Banks were extremely reluc- 
tant to expand their clientele and were inclined to concentrate their activities 
on those companies classified as "Blue Chip". When banks were asked to 
identify what would make them more willing to lend to borrowers not within 
their customer base, an overwhelming majority chose the option "reduce 
macroeconomic uncertainties and establish an information-gathering system 
to collect necessary data to make loan decisions" 20 
What should governments do to ensure the success of 
reforms? 
In broad terms, two markedly different approaches to secure the safe and 
sound working of financial markets can be distinguished. The first is the lib- 
eral approach, which relies on the working of competitive forces and sees 
government intervention as distortionary. The second, which can be referred 
to as the New Keynesian approach, places relatively more emphasis on the 
imperfections in financial markets stemming from informational problems, 
and hence calls for government intervention. The fundamental thesis embod- 
ied in the latter approach, as aptly summarized in Stiglitz (1993), is that 
"financial markets are markedly different from other markets; that market fail- 
ures are likely to be more pervasive in these markets; and that there exist 
forms of government intervention which will not only make those markets 
function better, but which will improve the overall performance of the econ- 
omy."2' 
20 
Pehlivan (1991) also reports similar results from a survey that she indcpendently conducted. 
21 Stiglitz is the leading theoretician and advocate of this new approach. His ideas on the 
economic role of the state arc put forth and discussed by a group of economists in Heertje, ed. 
(1990). !n Stiglitz (1993), the focus is on the role of the government in financial markets. 
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The New Keynesian approach can be viewed as a reaction to the liberal ortho- 
doxy of the 1980s. However, one should also note that it differs considerably 
from the Keynesian thought that shaped economic policies in almost all coun- 
tries until the l970s. First of all, the new approach explicitly calls on gov- 
ernments to take actions aimed at creating the appropriate environment for the 
market system to perform satisfactorily, and not at replacing it. Secondly, the 
New Keynesians are not as overly confident as their predecessors, and are 
therefore questioning the efficiency of governments in carrying out such a 
function.22 Hence, identifying the need for government action is only the 
starting point rather than the main issue. The real problem is to inquire about 
the possibility of designing government actions aimed at enhancing the con- 
tribution of financial markets to the steady growth of the real sector. 
Two types of government action - increasing public sector deficits and fol- 
lowing non-credible economic policies - have been discussed iii this paper. 
From these discussions it becomes clear that governments should refrain from 
such actions if their ultimate goal is to secure the contribution of the financial 
sector to the development of the economy. 
On the other hand, government policies can also positively affect the perfor- 
mance of the financial system. First of all, the government may take the ini- 
tiative in broadening the scope of financial markets. The introduction of new 
organized financial markets is expected to contribute to increase the informa- 
tion available to economic decision-making units, and therefore enhance their 
ability to evaluate risks.2 However, in most instances existing financial insti- 
tutions are quite reluctant to bear the cost of establishing new markets. 
Turkey's experience over the last decade indicates that the government's lead 
in establishing the stock exchange in 1986, as well as the efforts of the Central 
Bank in founding the interbank money market in 1987 and the foreign 
exchange market in 1988, were absolutely necessary to start up the process. 
22 Again as Stiglitz (1993: 2) points out: "It is now widely recogmzcd that the existence of mar- 
ket failures need not, by itself. constitute justification for government ntervcntion: government 
regulation, no less than markets, is beset by problems' 
23 The second part of the above assertion is not self-evident. Ghandhi (1987) and Stiglitz (1989) 
warn against the poor working of such markets itt general, and particularly in developing cowi— 
tries, where they lack depth and breadth. The arguments of these authors should he viewed as 
criticizing the exaggeration of the role of financial markets, but not as suggesting to proceed with- 
out them. 
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Secondly, governments may also contribute to the safe and sound operation of 
the financial system by promoting and/or enforcing measures to reduce uncer- 
tainty. On the one hand, governments have the power to regulate markets so 
as to minimize systemic risks.24 To this end, governments should enforce 
rules concerning the working of markets, introduce settlement and payment 
systems, establish the requisite supervisory authorities, and set prudential 
standards. On the other hand, government actions may reduce uncertainty by 
increasing the supply of information to the market. Information is a public 
good. It is well known that the competitive mechanism is not capable of 
securing a sufficient supply of public goods. Therefore, governments should 
use their power to introduce regulations such as disclosure requirements in 
order to guarantee the flow of information necessary for the financial system 
to contribute to the development of the economy. 
Finally, it should also be stressed that, within certain limits, governments have 
the power to influence the institutional structure of the financial system. In 
other words, governments are in a position either to follow the policy of pro- 
moting partially—overlapping competitive institutions85 or to choose 
to lend support to existing institutions so that these can adapt to the changing 
environment. At first, it is almost impossible to argue the superiority of one 
choice of institutional strategy over the other. Logically, one can argue that if 
the former strategy is adopted and the risk-taking behavior of newly-created 
financial institutions differs from previously-existing behavior, the system 
may gain some flexibility in adjusting to changes in the economic environ- 
ment. On the other hand, one can also argue that if the existing financial sys- 
tem is characterized by the dominance of universal banks, flexibility will 
again be achieved, since such financial institutions can diversify their opera- 
tions among various financial 
a systemic 'isk is defined as ".. the [inancial risk that arises Irom inst i- 
ut and structural arrangements iii markets which all pail icipants (in the economy) oust bear 
as a group.' 
Partially ovcrlapping competitive I inancial institutions arc those which compete with each 
other in some, but not all, financial markets and/or instruments. 
In Turkey, [or example, the reform stratcgy was based on promoting competition among the 
existing financial institutions, that is, universal banks. As a m-esult of this approach, the Turkish 
Ii nancial me forms strengthened and consol dated the doittinance of banks in the financial system. 
Thm s has had an I nmpacm on the node of extei'nal limianci rig of the corporate sector and the devel — 
opmmment of financial markets. The institutional structure of tIme domestic financial system also 
affected the pattern of articulation between the latter and the international financial system. Sec 
Ersel (l994) for a discussion of the last point in the case of Turkey. 
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In recent years many developing countries have taken steps towards more lib- 
eral economic systems in which private enterprise replaces the public sector as 
the main engine of growth and development. The liberalization measures aim 
essentially at eliminating price and non-price controls in the real and financial 
sectors (associated with extensive government intervention in economic activ- 
ity) and emphasize private and market-based decision-making for a more effi- 
cient functioning of the economy. Because finance is the key to investment 
and hence to growth, financial reform has been at the heart of financial adjust- 
ment Liberalization of the financial sector should not be a target in 
itself; it is needed for promoting performance on the real side of the 
economy, and it is to be undertaken alongside macroeconomic 
The paper by Hasan Ersel examines the contribution of financial liberalization 
to tangible progress in the real sector, with special reference to the case of 
Turkey. It suggests that some form of prudential - as opposed to extensive - 
government intervention may be desirable. The paper considers the implica- 
tion of informational imperfections in flnancial markets for the allocation of 
resources, taking the phenomenon of credit rationing as an example, and points 
out that there exist forms of government intervention which will make these 
markets function better and improve the overall performance of the economy.2 
This is in contrast to government actions such as reversals of policy decisions, 
which raise doubts about public policy credibility and increase the business 
risk borne by individual as well as institutional investors, with adverse conse- 
quences for the functioning of financial markets. 
In this regard, Ersels analysis of high public sector deficits and credit crunch- 
es warrants a remark. The author extends the analytics of consumer equilibri- 
urn in the standard two-parameter consumption-investment model of capital 
market theory to the case of bank equilibrium in the presence of a riskiess asset 
A review recent theoretical results in the liberalization literature may he found in World Bank 
(I 989) and the special issue on Onance and development in the Oxftnsl Review of Econo'nh 
Polo v (I 989). 
2 On the role of the government in linaneial markets, see Stiglitz (1994). 
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(such as government securities). The analysis shows that, ceteris paribus, an 
increase in the riskiess return will lead banks to allocate more of their 
Fesources to the government sector at the expense of loans supplied to the 
riskier corporate sector. However, it is not difficult to see that the ceteris 
paribus assumption, apart from being implausible, has biased the result of the 
analysis. Specifically, with Turkey introducing an auction system to sell gov- 
ernment securities at market-determined interest rates as mentioned in the 
paper, these market rates will normally influence the Central Bank discount 
rate, and hence bank rates. While there are limits to the increase in bank loan 
rates because of the related adverse incentive and selection effects shown in 
the Stiglitz-Weiss banK model,3 an increase in the return on government secu- 
rities will naturally be associated with a change in the mean-variance space of 
risky bank loans, thereby inducing a shift in the loan return frontier (if Figure 
I in the paper. The nature of this shift will be determined by the price and non- 
price (e.g. collateral) terms of debt contracts. Hence, as Ersel mentions in his 
paper, the ceteris puribu.v assumption is quite strong indeed, and one should 
seek other plausible explanations for the close relationship between the rise in 
public sector borrowing requirements and the increase in the share of riskless 
assets in Turkish bank portfolios of the kind reported in the paper. This will 
lead to the important issue of public policy credibility and bank lending behav- 
ior, which is discussed extensively elsewhere,4 and which will be addressed 
briefly below. 
Reform, Commitment, and Credibility 
One can use game theory to think about the credibility of reform programs and 
its implications for the working of financial markets. Consider a sequential 
move game between the government undertaking economic reforni and 
investors, namely banks for present purposes.5 Investors move first by decid- 
ing whether to increase their investments in risk assets or not; the government 
then moves by deciding whether or not to carry through the economic reform 
policies. 
See J. Snglitz and A. Weiss (0)81). "Credit Ratiomng in Markets with Imperfect Informadon", 
Ameriewi Economic Review. Vol. 7 , No. 3, pp393—3 10. 
4 
See, for example. A. Dixit and B. NalehulT (199 ), Thinking Sfrategh:oIIv. New York: W. W. 
Norton. 
The exposition applies to private decision-making in general when the latter set of "players' refers 
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While the government does not niove first, it achieves a strategic advantage 
through a coninlitment to a response rule. The response rule prescribes gov- 
ernntent actions as a response to investors moves. Although the government 
acts as a follower, the commitment to the response rule must be in place before 
investors make their The important feature of this game of strategic 
nioves is that once investors take their action, there is an incentive for the gov- 
ernment to renege on its promise by reversing previously-made policy deci- 
sions. Such policy reversals may be due, for instance, to the high social costs 
of reform as perceived by the government at a given point in time. 
Table 1. The game between the government and investors 
Investors' Strategy 
Not acreasi ng Increasing 















Assignment of points: 
Investors Government 
Increasing risk-taking investments 0 
Not increasing risk-taking investments 1 0 
Policy reversals 0 
No policy reversals 0 
For instance, a government which promises to sustain Consistent retortmi policies as well as 
'educe systematic (Or macro) risk ii' investors react positively to the initial stages ol the liberal— 
i.ation pi'occss by mci-easing their i'isk—taking investments (i.e. risky loans) is establishing such a 
response rule. In particular, the governments response rule in this ease is a compelling — as 
opposed to deterring — pr ttiise designed to induce investors to take a bivorable actioit. 
Comments 59 
Regarding the behavior of the government and investors, two questions must 
be considered: (i) Will investors increase their investments in risk assets? (ii) 
Will the government keep its promise to carry through the reform measures? 
There are two possible actions that investors can take, namely increasing risk- 
taking investments or not increasing them. Likewise, there are two possible 
actions that the governillent can pursue, namely carrying through the reform 
policies or not carrying them through. Such a context points to tour possible 
and corresponding outcomes in the game between the government and 
investors as illustrated in Table I . Each of the four cells ill Table I refers to a 
possible outcome; the government and investors each have preferences about 
the Fur possible outconies shown in the table. For expository purposes, pref- 
erences may be measured in terms of points, so that the moore points an eco- 
nomic agent assigns to a given outcome, the more he prefers it. 
The government has an incentive for policy reversals given the social costs 
associated with reforms, SO let us assume that it assigns two points to not car- 
lying through the reform measures. Also, the government assigns one point to 
having investors increase risk-taking investments. The total number of points 
assigned by the government to each outconie is shown in each cell in Table I 
The governments most prelerred outcome is B, in which investors increase 
risk-taking investments and the government avoids the costs of carrying 
through the reform programli. The government's worst outcome is C, in which 
investors do not increase risk-taking investments and the government incurs 
the costs of reform. 
Investors, on the other hand, would like to see the government carrying 
through the reform program and reducing business risks, so they assign two 
points to having no reversals in policy decisions. They would also like to post— 
pomme expanding their business activity until tangible progress has been made 
m the direction of a market—oriented economy, and they assign one point to not 
increasing risk-taking investments.7 The total of points assigned by investors 
in each outcome is also shown in each cell in Table I. The most preferred out- 
Come from the point of view of investors is C, in which they do not increase 
risk—taking investnients and the government carries through the reform pro- 
grain. Their worst outcome is B, in which they do increase risk-taking invest- 
appcars reasonabte in I ight oil he somewhat stow response often observed in inVestors' 
behmav UI. Cf iig I tie early stages ot me forni progra Ills. 
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ments and the government does not carry through the reform program. 
The equilibrium of the game (situation of conflict) under discussion is out- 
come A, in which the two players do the best that they can for themselves. 
Outcome A is an equilibrium point because investors recognize that the gov- 
ernment has an incentive to renege on its promise when the time comes for car- 
rying it out. In other words, investors recognize that the government's promise 
of no policy reversals is not credible. To see how credibility affects the equi- 
librium of the game, suppose that the government is credible, so that if 
investors increase their risk-taking investments, policy reversals will not be a 
possible choice for the government. The effect of this state of affairs is to rule 
out cell B in Table I as a possible outcome. By making it.s promise credible 
and by keeping in mind that investors choose actions in their own best inter- 
est, the government achieves outcome D (i.e., policies are upheld and there is 
an increase in investors' risk-taking investments), which is obviously prefer- 
able to outcome C. To be sure, outcome D has positive implications for the 
development of financial markets and the performance of the economy within 
a liberal economic system. 
This brief exposition attests to the importance of public policy credibility. In 
order to give its promise credibility the government must take supporting 
actions that make breaking the promise too costly (i.e., more expensive than 
the costs of carrying through the reform measures). Public policy credibility 
requires a strong commitment to the government's strategic move or promise 
ot carrying through the reform program. Such a commitment could take the 
shape of an unbreakable "reform" rule stating that reversals in policy decisions 
send the wrong signals to the market, thereby threatening the efficient func- 
tioning of the economy. This rule could be enforced by some outside agency, 
such as the international institutions which provide the necessary financial and 
technical assistance during the reform period contingent upon satisfactory 
progress towards a private sector economy. Prudential government interven- 
tion in financial markets is desirable if it encompasses institutional regulations 
which strengthen the role of the private sector in monitoring financial institu- 
tions (e.g., adequate bank capital requirements) and help to enforce reform 
rules and improve the working of financial markets. Only then will the van- 
ous economic agents be genuinely committed to economic retorm. 
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Pierre Abou-Ezze 
The author of this paper has effectively argued that financial liberalization 
introduces additional uncertainties that affect the behavior of economic deci- 
sion-niaking units. The sources of these uncertainties are two: the structural 
adjustment effect resulting from the decrease or nullification of the informa- 
tion set available to agents; and the liberalization effect stemming from the pri- 
vatization of risks. Additional uncertainties lead to credit rationing on the part 
of commercial banks, which in turn will have a negative impact on economic 
growth; hence, the author stresses the importance of the role of government in 
adopting policies during and particularly after the reform so as to reduce the 
uncertainties as well as the risks perceived by economic agents. Overall, the 
paper is well argued on a subject of considerable importance. The few com- 
ments and observations that follow might be viewed as footnotes at best: 
First and foremost, credit rationing may not necessarily follow a liberalization 
process even under the conditions stated by the author, namely high public sec- 
tor deficits during liberalization. In the Philippines, for instance, the liberal- 
ization program undertaken between 1980 and 1983 was accompanied by a 
percent yearly expansion of domestic credit. Likewise, Indonesia wit- 
nessed a high rate of credit growth during the second phase of the reform that 
took place in 1989. 
Moreover, credit rationing may not be very significant in an economy liberal- 
izing its financial markets while remaining at the early stages of development. 
Informal markets meet the credit needs of niost enterprises that are largely 
family—owned. In addition, liberalization programs may be introduced in a 
way as to minimize additional uncertainties or to avoid their creation altogeth- 
er. The gradual introduction of financial reforms may lead neither to the nul- 
lification or significant decrease of the information set available to economic 
agents nor to an increase in the risks perceived by economic decision-making 
units. This is the case because the gradual introduction of the reform process 
allows sufficient time for the training of bank staff, the strengthening of bank 
supervision in step with the removal of restrictions, and the development of 
markets as well as instruments for overall monetary control. Hence, the 
iniportance of the role of government is felt as the latter follows a slow and 
gradual liberalization process instead of focusing on policies to deal with the 
consequences of a sudden, fast-paced deregulation program. 
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Finally, the timing of the liberalization process may have a significant impact 
on the amount of acklitional uncertainties introduced. Indeed, the latter could 
be magnified if there is general instability at the macroeconomic level. Thus, 
governments must stabilize inflation rates, exchange rates, and capital flows 
before embarking on any ambitious reform program. 
4 
The Effect of Financial Liberalization on the 
Efficiency of Turkish Commercial Banks 
Osman Zaim 
Introduction 
The financial markets of developing countries are undergoing a period of 
rapid transition, and Turkey is no exception. Structural changes in the Turkish 
economy, technological breakthroughs, the competitive structure of the finan- 
cial services industry, and changing borrower demands have all had a signif- 
icant impact on the delivery of credit to industry, agriculture, and households. 
A fundamental concern among borrowers and depositors is the impact of such 
changes on the cost and availability of credit and banking services. The abil- 
ity of commercial banks to continue to deliver credit efficiently in the future 
will play a major role in determining the efficiency of Turkey's industrial and 
agricultural production. 
The topic of efficiencies in commercial banking can be subdivided into issues 
regarding the scale of production (economies of scale), the cost complemen- 
tarities of joint production (economies of scope), and deviations from an effi- 
cient frontier (X-efficiency). Greater degrees of efficiency among banks 
could result in greater accessibility of loanable funds, higher bank profitabil- 
ity, more preferable rates for borrowers and depositors, increased services for 
customers, and greater profitability for long-term viability by using savings- 
generated efficiencies as a capital cushion. 
Since policies regarding the regulation and/or deregulation of commercial 
banks and their competitors could be guided by inferences based on empiri- 
cal results of' studies of bank efficiency, it is crucial to apply to the banking 
sector the methodologies developed for measuring efficiencies. 
In this brief introduction, the setting for efficiency measurement of commer- 
cial banks is established, and potential benefits of efficiency analysis are 
reviewed. The objective of' this work is to investigate the effect of financial 
liberalization policies on the economic efficiency of Turkish commercial 
banks at the micro level. 
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Before the introduction of the 1980 stabilization program, the banking sector 
in Turkey was characterized both by restricted entry of domestic and foreign 
banks and by regulated interest rates. The lack of interest rate competition in 
the sector forced banks to compete for deposits by establishing a network of 
branches across the country. This led to overbranching and overstaffing in 
commercial banking. The main goal of the financial policies embodied in the 
1980 stabilization program was to create a competitive environment and 
thereby enhance the efficiency of the sector. The first steps taken in this direc- 
tion were to pursue liberal policies such as allowing new entries (both domes- 
tic and foreign) into the sector and liberalizing interest rates, commissions and 
fees. The sector was quick to respond to the program. The liberalization of 
interest rates and increased competition in the market forced banks to 
decrease their costs. As a result, unprofitable branches were closed and the 
number of staff was reduced in many banks. 
To investigate the effect of financial liberalization policies on the economic 
efficiency of Turkish commercial banks at the micro level, a nonparametric 
frontier methodology is applied to commercial banks for representative years 
in both pre— and post—liberalization eras. The method of analysis relies on 
estimates of multi—output production and cost frontiers using linear program- 
ming techniques. 
Estimating production frontiers by imposing different scale assumptions on 
the technology and by measuring each unit's distance from the frontier will 
not only yield information on the technical inefficiency of the unit under 
investigation, but will also determine at which scale it operates. In other 
words, the methodology allows the exploration of whether a particular bank 
is experiencing decreasing, increasing, or constant returns to scale. Thus, a 
comparison of the scale economies of each bank in the pre- and post-liberal- 
ization eras will shed light on whether the liberalization policies succeeded in 
lorcing banks to operate at the optimum scale. Similarly, from the compari- 
son of bank level cost efficiency measures, one can obtain information on 
whether the liberalization policies succeeded in forcing banks to allocate 
resources more optimally. This paper will review the structure of the Turkish 
banking sector, followed by a model that will be used for efficiency compar- 
isons. Subsequently, the paper will present data sources as well as a discus- 
sion of results, followed by a conclusion. 
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Structure of the banking system 
The Turkish financial system includes the Central Bank, commercial banks, 
as well as investment and development banks. Commercial banks are the 
dominant institutions of the system. Investment banks were established with 
the purpose of underwriting securities; however, they are also engaged in 
commercial banking without depending on deposits as a source of funds. 
Development banks, on the other hand, are primarily engaged in extending 
medium and long-term loans to selected industries. Their funding comes 
either from the government or from international organizations like the World 
Bank. The total share of investment and development banks in the system is 
limited; in fact, in 1990 only nine percent of the consolidated total assets of 
all banks belonged to these institutions. Thus, given the rather different struc- 
ture of development and investment banks as well as their limited scope in the 
financial system as a whole, the focus of this work will be on commercial 
banks so as to maintain the comparability and uniformity between the units 
under investigation. 
As in most other countries, banking is a heavily regulated industry in Turkey. 
Restrictions on entry and exit, capital adequacy, reserve and liquidity require- 
ments, asset portfolio restrictions, number of branches, deposit insurance, and 
interest rates on deposits and loans are all regulated by the government. The 
financial reforms in Turkey starting in 1980 were designed to reduce state 
intervention and increase the role of market forces in the operation of the 
financial system. The refornis included both the abolition of interest rate ceil- 
ings and reductions in reserve and liquidity requirements as well as in finan- 
cial taxes. In addition, together with recently-established Turkish banks, for- 
eign banks were permitted to operate in Turkey, and restrictions on foreign 
exchange operations were significantly relaxed during that period.' 
The role of government in the banking system is not limited to its regulatory 
authority. As of the end of 1990, the state is the owner-manager of eight corn- 
mercial banks troni a total of 56 banks in the country. In terms of size, banks 
owned by the state control 49.7 percent of total assets in the commercial bank- 
ing system. 
For a 111010 coinpiehetisivc reVieW of policies during (he financial liberalization era, see 
Akkur( ci al. (199!). 
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With regard to ownership, private banks in Turkey can be grouped as domes- 
tic and foreign banks. Table I presents the distribution of total assets, deposits 
and loans among commercial banks owned by the state, Turkish residents, and 
foreigners for years 1981 and 1990. 
Close inspection of Table I indicates that the sector was quick to respond to 
the measures which foster competition. During the 198 1—1990 period the 
number of commercial banks in the sector increased from 42 in 198 I to 56 in 
1990. Out of 42 banks in 1981, 13 banks were either liquidated or merged 
with others, implying that 27 new banks entered the sector between 198 1 and 
I 99t). Of these new entrants, 1 8 were foreign-owned, either as branches or as 
subsidiaries. 
Together with the new entries in the market, the liberalization of interest rates 
breed banks to decrease their costs by closing unprofitable branches and 
educing the number of staff. Although the number of banks in the 198 1-1990 
period increased significantly, the number of branches rose by only 4.5 per- 
cent (from 6,259 to 6,543), whereas it had risen by 70 percent in the 1972- 
1981 period. As for the number of staff, the rate of increase was 14.9 percent 
between 1981 and 1900 (from 132,313 to 151,982), which was much lower 
than the rate of 64 percent during the 1972-1981 period. Together with these 
developments, the profitability of the banking system gained enormous 
momentum during the financial liberalization era. As exhibited in Table 3, 
real profits for private commercial banks have increased as much as five times 
over the 1981— period, surpassing the real profitability index of manu— 
firms by as much as 2.25 times as of 1989. Moreover, neither a 
modest real increase in deposits (34 percent) and loans (58 percent) nor the 
developments in the nominal and effective spreads can explain the sharp prof- 
it increase entirely. Hence, taking the cost-saving measures described above 
into consideration, one must rely on increased efficiency in the banking see- 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Effects of Financial Liberalization 69 
The section below summarizes the methodology used to investigate the effects 
of liberalization policies on the economic efficiency of commercial banks. 
Model 
To investigate the effects of liberalization policies on the economic efficiency 
of Turkish banks at the micro level, a nonparametric frontier methodology is 
applied to commercial banks for both pre— and post—liberalization eras. This 
method of analysis has been used in most previous bank efficiency studies. 
For example, Sherman and Gold (1985), Parkan (1987), and Vassiloglu and 
Giokas (1990) have analyzed efficiency differences between bank branches, 
whereas Charnes et al. (1990), Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and Berg, Forsund 
and Jansen (1991) have focused on efficiency differences between banking 
firms. 
The method used has been introduced by Farrell (1957). In his influential 
work Farrell (1957) showed how one can measure productive inefficiency and 
its components (allocative and technical inefficiencies) within a theoretically 
meaningful framework. His initial approach has been adopted and extended 
by Farrell and Fieldhouse (1962), Seitz (1970), Afriat (1972), and Meller 
(1976). In more recent studies, Fare, Grabowski and Grosskopf(1985), Fare, 
Grosskopf and Lovell (1982), and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984) 
showed how one can decompose Farrell's measure of technical inefficiency 
and thus extract information on the scale of the unit under investigation. 
The approach utilizes a sequence of linear programs to construct a transfor- 
mation frontier so as to compute efficiency measures relative to said frontier. 
In order to describe the theoretical underpinnings of the model employed, 
suppose we observe a sample of K production units, each of which uses inputs 
x e R+ available at prices w E to produce outputs y E R+ in an envi- 
ronment characterized by variables and a E R+. As a matter of nota- 
tion, let xjkbe the quantity of input i used by unit k, and let the quantity 
of output i produced by unit k. These data can be placed into data matrixes 
a K x M matrix of output levels whose k,i th element is and N a 
K x N matrix of input levels whose k,i th element is 
Environmental variables and a are exogenously-fixed inputs and outputs 
that a decision-making unit cannot control, at least in the short run. The deci- 
sion-making units would like to limit the elements of p as much as possible, 
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given outputs. For the exogenously-fixed outputs, the decision-making units 
would like to expand the elements of a as much as possible, given inputs. 
Again, for notational convenience, let the data on these be placed into data 
matrixes P, a K x S matrix otexogenously-fixed inputs (or categorical vari- 
ables) whose k,i th element and R , a K x T matrix of exogenously-fixed 
outputs whose k,i th element is a1. 
k M 
Using the notation at hand for any y E R+ , production possibilities can be 
characterized in terms of input requirement set L(i), which can be construct— 
ccl from observed input-output data by means of 
A A K T A A T T A 
k=I,2...,k 
where z is a k x I intensity vector. Intuitively, this equation constructs a ref- 
erence technology from observed inputs and outputs. Relative to this bound- 
ing technology, the technical efficiency of each observation is calculated by 









z' = 1 
The solution vector 2L in the above problem measures the fraction by which a 
firm can multiply its input vector and still produce no less of any output. If it 
is not possible to produce the existing outputs with a radially smaller input 
vector, then )L takes the value of I, expressing that the unit under investigation 
is technically efficient. The choice of this input-saving efficiency measure is 
in coherence with the expressed interest of the banking sector in reducing 
costs. In the above formulation, technical efficiency is calculated relative to 
a production frontier that satisfies strong disposability of both inputs and out- 
puts as well as variable returns to scale (VRS). However, by altering the con- 
straint on the intensity vector z, one can also construct production frontiers 
that satisfy different scale assumptions, such as constant returns to scale 
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(CRS) (by deleting the last constraint) and non-increasing returns to scale 
(NIRS) (by changing the last constraint as z7  I). 
By comparing the efficiency scores obtained from production frontiers with 
different scale assumptions, one can also find out at which scale the unit oper- 
ates. Since the VRS production frontier envelopes the data more closely than 
the production frontier, the comparison efficiency scores from these 
two frontiers will reveal information on whether a particular unit is operating 
under IRS or NIRS. While equality between the two scores indicates NIRS 
technology, inequality means that the unit operates under IRS. Furthermore, 
since a production frontier with the CRS assumption envelopes the data least 
closely of all, the resulting efficiency scores will be less than or equal to those 
calculated with NIRS technology. Thus, for any observation operating under 
NIRS, equality between the efficiency scores from CRS and NIRS technolo- 
gies implies CRS, whereas inequality implies DRS. 
If input price vectors are known, the cost efficiency of each unit may be cal- 
culated by solving K additional linear programs of the form: 






zi = 1 
The solution vector the cost minimizer for the input price vector WA and 
the output vector The measures of cost efficiency C(xk; 
yk; vvA) and alloca- 
tive efficiency A(x 
, yL; WA) are given by 
k A A A 
C f 
A Q(y ; vv ) w (x,,W)= 
wx wx 
(4) 
A A A 
A A A C(x ; y , w ) A(x,y,w)= 
A A F(x, y) 
These measures can easily be modified if interest centers on the percentage by 
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which cost is increased due to production inefficiency and its components 
(technical and allocative inefficiencies). For example, C' - I measures the 
by which cost is increased due to both types of inefficiencies, 
while - I measures the by which cost is increased due to alloca- 
tive inefficiency alone. Finally, C - A shows the percentage by which cost 
is increased due to technical inefficiency. 
Data and empirical results 
The literature which models bank production and behavior is divided into two 
distinct categories with respect to the measurement of banks inputs and out- 
puts. HLlmprey made a useful distinction between the production 
approach and the intermediation approach to bank behavior. Under the pro- 
duction approach banks are considered as producing deposits and loans using 
capital, labor, and materials. The proponents of this approach use the num- 
ber of accounts and loans outstanding as banks' outputs. Their measure of 
total costs include all operating costs incurred in the production of outputs. 
The intermediation approach, by contrast, treats banks as collector of funds 
which are then intermediated to loans and other assets. The dollar volume of 
deposits and loans is the appropriate measure of bank output in this case, and 
the combination of operating and interest costs provides the appropriate mea- 
sure of total costs. In spite of this behavioral distinction, the work by Berg, 
Forsund and .Iansen (1991) implies that the production frontier is invariant as 
to how the output is measured. In their own words: 
"We found that important characteristics of the efficiency frontier for 
Norwegian banking are about the same whether we choose to measure 
output by the number of accounts and their average size or by the total 
balances of the accounts. This applies to the size of efficiency gains as 
well as to our results on economies of scale." 
In this study the intermediation approach to banking behavior is adopted. The 
data are compiled from the publications of the Banks Association of Turkey, 
which publishes yearly income statements and balance sheets for each bank. 
The representative years for pre- and post-liberalization eras are chosen as 
and 1990, respectively. The year 1981 was chosen instead of 1980 in 
order to establish conformity with the data used for the post-liberalization era.2 
The sample for the 1990 data set consists of all 56 commercial banks that 
2 
The toimat of balance sheets and inconle statements have been redesigned after I 
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operated at that time. The sample for the pre-liberalization era, which origi- 
nally consisted of 42 commercial banks, excludes three state banks whose 
income statements reflect some of their non-banking activities as well. The 
variables used for the models described above are the following: 
Outputs: 
= dollar volume of demand deposits 
= dollar volume of time deposits 
= dollar volume of short-term loans 
= dollar volume of long-term loans 
Inputs: 
= total number of employees 
= total interest expenditures 
= depreciation expenditures 
A4 = expenditures on materials 
Input price: 
= total expenditures on salaries and fringe benefits 
Total costs: 
C = w1x1 + x2 + + x4 
Environmental variables: 
= average size of demand deposit accounts 
a2 = average size of time deposit accounts 
= number of branches 
= institutional type (I for national; 0 for foreigner) 
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Production frontier results 
For each bank in the sample of 56 fi.r the year 1990 and 39 for the year 1981, 
linear programming problem 2 is solved for all scale assumptions. Table 4 and 
Table 5 below give summary statistics of the efficiency scores and returns to 
scale for pre- and post-liberalization eras. 
Table 4. Average technical efficiency scores under 
different scale assumptions 
1981 1990 

























































These tables point to some striking facts on how liberalization policies have 
fostered competition. First, the level of technical efficiency has increased by 
10 percent on average from 1981 to 1990. Note that all entries for technical 
efficiency scores in 1981 are smaller than those in 1990. Secondly, technical 
efficiency differences between banks have decreased over time. This evidence 
is due to the fact that standard deviations of technical efficiency scores for each 
group in 1981 are greater than those in 1990. Thirdly, banks have undergone 
considerable scale adjustment and were successful in achieving optimal scale. 
An exanlination of Table 5 shows that the proportion of banks operating at the 
optimal scale has increased from 59 per cent in 1981 to 68 per cent in 1990. 
Another important fact is that the rate of change of technical efficiency has 
been greater in private banks compared to state and foreign banks. This find- 
ing, while closing the efficiency gap between banks, is also an indication of 
who benefits the most from the liberalization policies that foster competition. 
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Table 5. Developments in returns to scale 
I 981 1990 
Number of banks with CRS 23 59% 38 68% 
Number of banks with DRS 6 15% 13 23% 
Number of banks with IRS 10 26% 5 9% 
Total 39 100% 56 00% 
Cost frontier results 
In the cost version to he used presently, the method inefficiency measure- 
ment takes on a rather simple and intuitively appealing form. In a word, a 
bank is said to be cost inefficient if it is dominated by one or more banks in 
the Following sense: 
(a) Other banks have lower expenses than its own expenses; and 
(b) All output indicators of other banks are either greater than or equal to its 
own indicators. 
To determine cost inefficiency and its components, the procedure described 
n Problem 3 is repeated for each bank in the samples representing pre- and 
post-liberalization eras. Table 6 gives the summary results for the indexes 
that show the average amount by which cost is increased clue to production 
inefficiency and its components (allocative and technical inefficiencies) for 
each owner class. 
Evidence on cost efficiency indicates that, on average, costs were 75 percent 
above the minimum in 1981 and that this figure drops to 38 percent (almost a 
50 percent reduction) in 1990. The results indicate that the effect of allocative 
and technical inefficiencies on cost increases differs for pre- and post-liberal- 
ization eras. While in 1981 banks were more vulnerable to technical ineffi- 
ciency, the effect of allocative ineFficiency was more dominant in 1990. Also, 
close Inspection of Table 6 shows that in both eras private and state banks dif- 
icr with respect to the relative effects of allocative and technical inefficiencies 
on cost increases. While in state banks a large portion of cost inefficiency is 
due to allocative inefficiency, the same is not true fbr private banks, where the 
main determinant of cost inefficiency seems to be technical inefficiency. 
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Table 6. The effect of technical and allocative inefficiencies 
on cost increases 
1981 1990 

























































A comparison of rates of improvement for different ownership classes 
through the years indicates that a relatively higher rate of improvement of cost 
inefficiency in private banks closed the efficiency gap between the latter and 
state banks. Table 7 was designed to complement the analysis of the effect of 
liberalization policies on economic efficiency. It classifies banks into three 
categories, namely: banks which are economically efficient; those which are 
only technically efficient; and those which are economically inefficient; in 
addition, it shows their respective weights in the financial system for both 
eras. 
A comparison of pre- and post-liberalization eras in Table 7 offers enough evi- 
dence that liberalization policies have encouraged more efficient use of 
resources in the Turkish banking industry. As a result, the proportion of fully- 
efficient banks has increased from 38 percent in 198! toSS percent in 1990. 
A high relative share of deposits and loans accruing to efficient banks in both 
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Conclusion 
Turkeys financial reform seems to have succeeded in stimulating commercial 
banks to take measures aimed at enhancing both technical and allocative effi- 
ciency. As a result, the number of efficient banks has increased over time. 
The following are the main findings of this study: 
i) A comparison of efficiency scores indicates that state banks are more effi- 
cient than their private counterparts. This contradicts the thesis which asserts 
that public ownership is inherently less efficient, at least as far as the Turkish 
banking industry is concerned. 
ii) Banks have undergone considerable scale adjustment and have thus sue- 
ceeded in achieving optimal scale. 
iii) The effect of allocative and technical inefficiencies Ofl cost increases is 
different for private and state banks. While state banks are more vulnerable 
to allocative inefficiency, the effect of technical inefficiency on cost increas- 
es is more noticeable in the case of private banks. 
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Pierre Abou Ezze 
The main point argued in Osman Zaim's paper is that the 1980 liberalization 
of Turkey's financial markets has increased the efficiency of Turkish com- 
mercial banks. 
In order to assess the effect of liberalization on efficiency, a linear program 
technique was used to estimate production and cost functions for representa- 
tive years. Since the results show an improvement in both functions, the 
paper argues that financial liberalization seems to have succeeded in increas- 
ing the efficiency of commercial banks. A few comments need to be made in 
connection with these findings. 
Initially, the methodology used is very appropriate for measuring efficiency at 
a given point in time. However, the use of depreciation expenditure as a mea- 
sure of the cost of physical capital is somewhat problematic. Indeed, depre- 
ciation based on historical or book values actually distorts the true cost of cap- 
ital in the case of banks that bought their buildings and equipment at different 
points in time. 
In addition, using this methodology to compare production and cost at two 
different points in time simply indicates whether production units have 
become more or less efficient and nothing else. Linking this change in effi— 
ciency to factors such as market liberalization is a different matter. Osman 
Zaim argues that the liberalization of interest rates and new entries into the 
market forced banks to decrease their costs. However, the number of branch- 
es increased by only five percent and employment by only 14.9 percent over 
the 1981-90 period as compared with a 70 percent increase in branches and a 
64 percent rise in employment during the 1972-81 period. The question that 
arises here is whether the slow increase is the result of financial reforms or 
simply the end of an overexpansion that took place in the 1970s and which led 
to an overbanked industry. 
Also, the data show that the number of employees per branch increased for the 
entire banking sector as well as for private banks between 1981 and 1990. As 
for the nuniber of branches per bank, while the ratio has decreased on aver- 
age by about nine branches per bank in the case of private banks, it is not clear 
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whether this decrease has been the outcome of the closure of unprofitable 
branches or simply the liquidation of some banks at a time when newly- 
founded ones have not yet opened many branches. As for state banks, the 
average number of branches increased from 215 to 371 during the 1980s. 
Hence, it is not quite clear in Zairn's paper just how much of the increased 
efficiency has been the outcome of financial reforms and how much of it has 
resulted simply from the consolidation of the banking sector which would 
have taken place anyway. 
Moreover, it would have been helpful to discuss the relationship between the 
changes in the returns to scale to an average cost curve and to indicate 
whether there is compatibility between returns to scale and the size of Turkish 
banks. 
Lastly, it seems that private banks have fared better on the production side 
than on the cost side. While the gap between private and state banks is being 
narrowed in this regard, the state-to-private ratio of inefficiencies did not 
change between 1981 and 1990, and this is an issue that the author failed to 
address in his paper. 
Marcel Cassard 
Osman Zairns paper is quite thought-provoking, but some remarks seem in 
order regarding the choice of model used to analyze the efficiency of Turkish 
banks. Generally, input/output models tend to measure the efficiency of 
banks in terms of the ratio of the volume of deposits and loans to a set of 
inputs, without giving weight to the quality of the loans portfolio of banks, or 
the concentration of loans to sectors or individuals. These models also fail to 
address the cost efficiency of banks, which is the spread between lending and 
borrowing rates; indeed, cost efficiency is an important determinant of the 
competitiveness of the banking system. Omitting these variables from the 
analysis does not provide a complete picture of the efficiency of the banking 
sector in TLlrkey. 
In light of the above remarks, it is hardly surprising that the author should 
have reached the conclusion that state banks in Turkey are more efficient than 
their private counterparts. Such a conclusion is not generally supported by the 
experience of state banks in most countries. However, since the volume of 
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deposits and loans is an important determinant of efficiency, the conclusion is 
not surprising; indeed, it can be explained by the fact that state banks have an 
implicit guarantee from the government which allows them to attract more 
deposits as well as to make more loans, since they lend to the captive market 
of state enterprises. Exporters borrow heavily from state banks in Turkey 
hecause the government provides subsidies for loans targeted to exports, 
which again explains the higher volume of loans. 
However, a closer examination of the data in Tables I and 2 will yield a dif— 
picture of the efficiency of state banks in Turkey. For instance, the 
number of branches per state bank increased from 216 in 1981 to 372 in 1990, 
while the number of branches per private bank has declined from 148 in 1981 
to 138 in 1990. Similarly, the number of employees per state bank increased 
Ironi 5,677 in 1981 to 10,103 in 1990, while the number of employees per pri- 
vate hank barely increased &om 2,59() in 1981 to 2,726 in 1990. Nonetheless, 
during this period the total assets held by private and state banks remained 
very close. These measures hardly point to an increase in efficiency on the 
part of Turkish state banks. 
Another conclusion of the paper is that Turkish banks have improved their 
allocative and technical efficiency. Although this may he true, it remains to 
be seen why intermediation costs are still so high in Turkey. When one exam- 
ines the spread between after-tax returns on deposits and effective lending 
rates, which are a measure of intermediation costs, it is not clear whether or 
not they have declined substantially during the period under consideration. in 
fact, the spreads are so high that large corporations bypass local banks and 
borrow directly on international capital markets. Large effective spreads gen- 
erally show low operational efficiency. In addition, they lead to an oversup— 
ply of banking services as well as to low productivity in making such services 
available on the market. It would have been interesting to see these differ- 
ences in efficiency in the Turkish banking system effectively reconciled in 
Zainis 
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The Experience of Iran's Islamic Financial 
System and Its Prospects for Development 
Heydar Pourian 
Introduction 
More than a decade has passed since Iran chose to experience a combination 
of nationalized and Islamic financial systems. Today, Iran takes pride in the 
fact that it has had a truly unique experience in Islamic banking and finance 
in the world. 
While the banking system was nationalized soon after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, it took a few years before the important Usury-Free Islamic 
Banking Law was passed in 1983. Iran's banking system is still evolving, and 
the public has yet to learn about the new Islamic banking contracts and their 
related terminology. In fact, a segment of the public questions whether there 
were indeed changes before and after the revolution with regard to banking 
practices: Were banking practices really changed to fit the Islamic doctrine, 
or was the language simply changed to pretend its Islamization'? On the 
other hand, most ulema who are familiar with the issue believe that, while the 
usury—free law is without fault, the inappropriate execution of the Islamic 
banking law has been the reason for practices to have departed from the spir- 
it of Islamic law. 
Regarding the open financial market, despite the election of a new govern- 
ment to office, the stock market has experienced cyclical and structural diffi- 
culties since its reactivation in 1989. Furthermore, due to the lack of variety 
in securities and other shortcomings, this market has remained considerably 
underdeveloped. 
Unfortunately, Islamic banking practices were implemented in Iran simulta- 
neously with several extraordinary events, such as eight years of war; a mas- 
sive increase in the economic role of the public sector due to expropriations 
and nationalizations; the economic boycott imposed by the West; and large 
fluctuations in the price of oil, the exports of which constitute 90 percent of 
Iran's foreign-exchange earnings. It is the position of this paper that the 
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simultaneous occurrence of such unusual events, together with the multi- 
dimensional aspect of the financial system (explained below), contributed to 
the creation of an economic system in which, for most of the decade, eco- 
nomic indicators such as savings and investment have dropped drastically. 
Therefore, given the complications associated with the above issues, it is dif- 
ficult at this time to evaluate the performance of the Islamic banking system 
per se in Indeed, it is not the purpose of this paper to attempt such an 
evaluation, and no conclusions will be drawn with regard to the performance 
of the Islamic banking system in Iran. In fact, the preliminary view of this 
paper is that Islamic banking practices have not been properly executed, and 
that the usury-free law has not been given a true test, perhaps due to the lack 
of political feasibility, which in turn may have been caused by the occurrence 
of the extraordinary events mentioned above. 
Nor is this paper concerned with Islamic economics or Islamic banking, their 
principles, strengths or shortcomings. Rather, the present descriptive paper 
has three major goals: to review Trans experience with an Islamic financial 
system - the banking sector as well as the securities market - through a statis- 
tical representation of select economic and financial indicators; to attempt a 
preliminary diagnosis of the problems affecting the countrys financial sys- 
tem; and to offer a few possible solutions for deepening Trans money and cap- 
ital markets. The paper is organized as follows: In the next section a brief his- 
tory and description of Iran's experience with the Islamic banking system and 
the implied securities market is presented. Subsequently, the performance of 
Iran's economic and financial system is reviewed on the basis of several indi- 
cators; the paper will then attempt to diagnose the countrys difficulties in this 
regard. In conclusion, some policy recommendations will be made with a 
view to improving the efficiency of Iran's financial system. 
Description of Iran's Islamic financial system 
The banking system 
Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the banking system in Iran was com- 
Posed of about 35 banks and relied on a mixture of government and private 
institutions - domestic as well as foreign-owned. During the 1970s there was 
For a preliminary evaluation of the performance of the banking system in Iran and the problems 
associated with it from the standpoint of Islamic economics, interested readers can refer to 
Hedayati (1994b), and Potirian (1994a). 
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a rapid expansion of the Gross National Product as well as the sources and 
LISCS of funds. Our estimates reveal that, on an inflation-adjusted basis, the 
Iranian economy grew by an average of 8.2 percent per year during the 15- 
year period prior to the revolution. On the other hand, at its peak, the ratio of 
Gross Domestic Investment to Gross National Product amounted to about 35 
percent. 
Almost immediately after the revolution, the Revolutionary Council passed a 
resolution nationalizing commercial banks. This measure was adopted in 
June 1979 and stemmed from a number of reasons, including expropriations, 
capital flight, lack of confidence in the banking system, weak balance sheets, 
and runs on banks. Shortly thereafter, banks were also "amalgamated.2 
Hence, Iran's banking system was affected by two kinds of monopolies: on 
the one hand, fewer but larger banks and, on the other, government control. 
After the amalgamation and a few years' evolution, the system was reduced to 
nine banks, cOmprising six commercial banks and three specialized ones.3 
In the early months after the new revolutionary regime was established, sev- 
eral studies were conducted with a view to Islamizing the country's financial 
system based on the principles embodied in the Sharia, which unequivocally 
calls for the elimination of interest. Based on these studies and prior to the 
passage of the usury-free law, interest was (apparently) abolished, and its 
name was changed to "commissions and minimum guaranteed payment" 
(Shirazi 1988). It was not until late 1983 that a bill was passed by the Islamic 
Parliament - the Islamic Consultative Council - and ratified as needed by the 
Council of Guardians regarding the abolition of interest. This law, which was 
termed the Usury-Free Islamic Banking Operations Law, is known as the pil- 
lar of the Islamic banking system in Iran. It was enforced at the beginning of 
1984. 
Iranian scholars [for example, Mahdavi (1990), Shirazi (1988), and Pourian 
(l994a)I claim that the foundations of the Islamic banking system rest on the 
2 The Banking Law wit! he discussed in this paper. It is also noteworthy that the 
Iranian Constitution requires the banking sector to he owned and controlled by the gOVeriliflent. 
It further specifies that all laws must conform with Islamic Law, For a description of other laws 
related to Iran's banking system. see Hedayati (I 994a). 
A new specialized bank - the Export Expansion Bank - has recently been established, thereby 
the total number of banks in Iran to ten. 
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following principles: 
- Establishing the sovereignty of Islamic values;4 
- Eliminating usury (one of the most important instruments to achieve this 
goal was (fard-al-hasanah or interest-free deposits and loans); 
- Establishing profits in banking operations (banks were considered trustee 
agents in the utilization of funds on behalf of depositors); 
- Setting up a deposit system based on new Islamic forms; 
Granting credit facilities according to new Islamic contracts in the 'right 
(production) direction; 
- Applying new monetary policies in accordance with the Sharia.5 
- Securing economic independence and self-sufficiency and establishing a 
system founded on "social justice.' 
The primary goals of the new Islamic financial system can also be understood 
from the new Banking Law itself; thus, to briefly cover the major points of 
this law: In Article 1, the new law stipulates that the goals of the banking sys- 
tem are to create a monetary and credit system based on rightfulness and jus- 
tice, as well as to further the economic goals set by the government. It calls 
for stabilizing the value of money and servicing the domestic payment system 
as well as the international balance of payments. The law also refers to the 
importance of qard-aI-hasanah deposits and loans. In the same Article, the 
law defines the functions of the banking system (including those of the 
Central Bank) to encompass deposit and investment functions, issuing and 
controlling money, monitoring the performance of the system, and conduct- 
ing monetary policy. 
Article 2 covers the mobilization and absorption of funds by the system which 
allows for interest-free qard-al-hasanah deposits (demand and savings 
deposits), as well as time deposits (which do earn a return). Concerning the 
Interested readers on Islamic economics should consult Sadi (1981); on the philosophical issues 
elating to the abolition of interest, please refer to Motmahary (1983). On the role of Islamic bank- 
ing in economic development, see Sadeq (1993). On Islamic banking, see lqbal and Mirakhor 
(1987) and Mohsin Khan (1992). On the question of stability of the demand for money in Islamic 
l)anking, see Zyuberi (1992). 
On the issue of monetary policy within an Islamic financial system, interested readers should 
consult Mohsin Khan and Mirakhor (1993), and Shojaeddini (1993). 
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latter type of deposit, the law stipulates that banks shall serve as an attorney 
tor granting loans out of them. This section of the law also obliges banks to 
guarantee the payment of principle on qard-al-hasanah deposits, and mentions 
that banks can guarantee the principle on time deposits. It calls for the profit- 
loss sharing system, and allows for promotions and privileges such as prizes 
on qard-al-hasanah deposits as well as discounts on bank fees. As for Article 
3, it sets the new credit facilities or Islamic (loan) contracts to which we shall 
refer below; it also discourages investing in "luxury" commodities. Article 4 
allows for the control of the banking system and the implementation of mone- 
tary policy by the Central Bank. It also determines types of investment to be 
pursued, and sets minimum and maximum levels for banks profit shares as 
well as minimum and maximum amounts of credit to be granted by the bank- 
ing system. In Article 5 the law stipulates that banks, including the Central 
Bank, are not allowed interest transactions with each other; in addition, it 
states that collected tees are not for distribution (to deposit holders), and that 
any other contradictory legislation is hereby repealed. 
It may be interesting to note that most ulema believe that the usury-free bank- 
ing law is without fault e.g. Rezvani (1993)1. To he sure, there is dissent con- 
cerning this issue, and some questions remain regarding the current interest- 
rate system, especially as practiced by the government and the Central Bank. 
A few ulema have questioned the practices of the banking system leg. Azari 
Qonii (1993)1. Moreover, current banking practices in Iran require payment of 
a fixed-rate penalty after the due date for installment payments which, accord- 
ing to most ulema, is not within the framework of the Sharia. The inclusion of 
an inflation premium in the rate of return also seems to be a point of dissent 
among ulema 
I 
e.g. Haeri (1994)1. 
Open financial markets 
The open financial market in Iran primarily includes a stock market - the 
Tehran Stock Exchange. Before the revolution, this traded conimon stocks of 
corporations and financial institutions as well as three kinds of government 
bonds (Treasury hills. land-reform bonds, and 'ownership-expansion" bonds). 
Share prices began to drop six months prior to the 10-clay revolutionary pen- 
ocl, at the end of which the regime was changed. Immediately after the revo- 
lution, the volume of trade at the stock exchange dropped dramatically. 
Indeed, little trade was recorded between 1979 and the enactment of the 1983 
Banking Law. After this law was passed, trade in all kinds of securities was 
halted, and no trade was allowed in the bonds section. 
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The reactivation of the Iranian stock market coincided with the end of the 
eight-year war against Iraq, the election of a new President to office in 1989, 
and the enactment of the first five-year plan coupled with the onset of Trans 
privatization program. At present, almost all trade is conducted in the com- 
mon stocks of the firms targeted by the government during the country's pri- 
vatization program. The public sector, including the investment subsidiaries 
of the banking system, plays a large role in transactions. 
Privatization and liberalization 
Furthermore, with the election of a new government to office, new market- 
and export-oriented policies were drafted. The liberalization program was 
predicated on increased autonomy for banks; current-account liberalization; 
attempts in the direction of capital—account liberalization; the establishment of 
non-hank financial institutions; and interest-rate "adjustments" aimed at 
accommodating the inflation premium. 
As for open financial markets, the Central Bank has recently developed a new 
"non-common-stock" security called the "shared security" in consultation 
with a group of ulema, academics and private-sector representatives. This 
author took part in the advisory group to the Central Bank regarding this new 
security, and one particular aspect of the process may be of interest to the 
reader. There was a great deal of concern over the non-fixed rate at which this 
security was to be issued. The decision was to implement the following pro- 
cedure, which was then used by the City of Tehran to issue a thur-year secu- 
rity for purposes of urban development. Based on a business plan, a tentative 
rate of return was calculated for the project which amounted to 25 percent per 
annum. Five percent was held, and each security was issued with six-month, 
twenty-percent (of par value) coupons attached. The five-percent difference 
is deferred until the project is completed, at which point a "definite" return 
may be calculated. 
Economic and financial indicators for Iran 
Over the last 15 years since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has felt the 
impact of several events, not only the revolution itself, but also the eight-year 
war with Iraq, economic sanctions imposed by the West, the freezing of 
Iranian assets, a transitional change in the financial system itseff, as well as 
various economic events, including the transition from a more centrally— 
Planned towards a more market-oriented system, and from a multiple 
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exchange rate towards a single exchange rate system. Indeed, the simultane- 
ous occurrence of these events has precluded an evaluation of Iran's Islamic 
financial system in this paper. Therefore, we shall only present a review of 
the country's basic economic and financial indicators. Subsequently, a diag- 
nosis of the problems will be attempted from a market-oriented perspective. 
Deposits and deposit rates 
In nominal terms, the banking system has done well in absorbing private-sec- 
tor deposits. During the last twelve years, this measure has increased tenfold. 
However, as Figure I indicates, the performance of Iranian banks in real terms 
has been far from impressive. 
Figure 1: Private Sector Deposits in the 
Ranking System (Nomina' & Amount) 
As revealed by current practices in Iran's Islamic banking system with regard 
to deposit profit rates, a tentative rate br each type of deposit is always com- 
putel at the beginning of the year by the Central Bank. Such tentative rates 
are borecasts of the profitability of banks in the same year. In the beginning 
of the subsequent year, a definite rate for each class of deposit is announced, 
according to which accounts are then settled. The lower part of Table I pro- 
vides an example of deposit rates for a recent year (1993). However, with 
inflation running at double digits, institutional-formal rates are negative, 
which is likely to contribute to the growth of an already-existing informal 
hnancial sector in which interest rates may reportedly go as high as eight per- 
cent per month. The upper part of Table 1, by contrast, shows deposit rates 
over the past several years. Year-to-year changes have been rather small, 
while the inflation rate has been rather volatile, ranging from nine to 35 per- 
cent over the past five years. 
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Table 1. Banking System's Deposit Rates (Percent) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Short Term 6.0 6.5 6.5 
1-Year 8.5 9.0 9.0 
2-Year — 10.0 10.5 
3-Year - 11.0 11.5 











Tentative and Definite I)eposit Rates (1993) 











Source; lion Banking Institute. 
Islamic (loan) contracts, loan rates and their behavior 
The design of so—called "Islamic (loan) contracts" was associated to a large 
extent with the passage of the 1983 Usury-Free Law. This law defined sev- 
eral types of contracts which are currently used by the Iranian banking sys- 
tem. These contracts are very briefly described below. 
— An installment sale is the transfer of, say, a piece of production equipment 
purchased by a bank at a known price to an enterprise in such a manner that 
all or part of the price of the item is received by the bank in installments at 
fixed dates. 
— A civil partnership is defined as mixing the capital of a customer with the 
capital of a hank for the purpose of investing in a specific business for a 
limited duration. 
A Modharal,cih is an agreement signed between a bank and a (legal) per- 
son in order to enter into an investment and jobbing transaction. 
— A .Io 'aalah is an Islamic contract according to which the bank undertakes 
to pay a specified amount of funds to an enterprise rendering a specific ser- 
vice. 
Irati 's Islamic Financial System 91 
- Aft.'rward transaction is an advance cash purchase of an enterprises prod- 
ucts at a pie-determined price. 
— Equity participation may be defined as the injection of capital into new or 
previously—existing joint—stock companies. 
— Qurd-al—hasanah is defined as the granting of a loan without charge in spe- 
cial cases. 
A hire purchase is a lease in which the leasee purchases the financed equip- 
ment at the end of the financing term. 
— Direct i nest/neat is deiThed as the supply ol bank capital br operation and 
production of development. 
- A debt purchase is defined as the discounting of trade documents and coin- 
mercial papers of businesses. 
- A Mozara 'alt transaction between a bank and the owner of a 
barm. 
- A Mo.raqa'at is a financial transaction between a bank and the owner of a 
tree (and the 
It would be interesting to examine the behavior of these contracts over the last 
decade. Table 2 shows the amount and Table 3 the percentage of each contract 
Irom 1984 to 1993. Installment—sales contracts have continued to dominate all 
other classes. Surprisingly, the importance of qard—al—hasanah and mod- 
harabah contracts has declined, while that of civil partnerships has increased. 
According to the rules set for the banking system, the total of qard-al-hasanah 
loans granted by banks must he ten percent of the total of facilities granted in 
each year (not exceeding the total ot qard—al-hasanah funds absorbed through 
qard-al—havanah deposits). 
Bank assets and the capital-adequacy issue 
In nominal terms, the banking system's asset growth has also been impressive. 
Front 1981 to 1993, as reflected in Figure 2, it has increased by a factor of 15. 
However, in real terms (using the GNP price deflator), banks assets had a neg- 
ative growth until 1988, moving up in the last few years. 
The systems capital-to-total-asset ratio also performed poorly until 1990. As 
Foi' a more detailed description ot I hcse COiiiiacts, iiiieiestcd readers stiould consuti Shirazi 
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can be seen in Figure 3, this ratio declined from five percent in 1980 to about 
0.5 percent in 1990. Afterwards, mostly due to the revaluation of assets, this 
ratio has improved; at present it is estimated at about four percent. 
Capital investment, savings and the I/GNP ratio 
The amount of funds channelled into gross private domestic investment over 
the past several years (from national income accounts) is shown in Figure 4. 
Investment performance started to improve only after the end of the Iran—Iraq 
war and the election of a new government. 
However, the performance of savings (from a survey of families) remains 
unsatisfactory. The savings ratio reached a negative 42 percent in 1989. One 
should note that there seems to be a severe problem with the definition of 
income and expenses in these surveys. 
Figure 5 shows the ratio of gross investment to gross national product. By this 
measure, the financial system has also performed poorly. Our current estimate 
of this ratio is about 17 percent. At its peak two years before the revolution, it 
was about 35 percent. 
The exchange rate 
The behavior of the free-market exchange rate (in US dollar terms) reveals a 
continuous depreciation of Iran's national currency. Figure 6 shows the depre- 
ciation ot the Iranian Rial since the revolution. 
Liquidity growth, inflation, and unemployment 
Figure 7 shows the performance of liquidity (as measured by M2). The infla- 
tion and unemployment rates are shown in Table 4. These measures raise con- 
cerns about the control of the money supply and the resulting adverse effects 
of inflation on other economic variables. 
Difficulties in Iran's financial system 
As mentioned before, Iran has faced several extraordinary circumstances since 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, such as large-scale nationalizations and expropri- 
ations; substantial capital flight; brain drain; the freezing of its foreign assets; 
selected sanctions against Iran's exports and imports; an eight-year war against 
Iraq; large fluctuations in its main source of foreign—exchange earnings, oil; 
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very high population growth (about 3.5 percent per annum); shifts in econom- 
ic policies, including the switch in 1989 from an ineffective import-substitu- 
tion policy to an equally ineffective export—promotion policy; and the imple- 
mentation of structural—adjustment programs which included attempts to ratio- 
nalize the price system, reduce budget deficits, cut subsidies, launch privatiza- 
tion, and move towards a single exchange rate regime. 
Table 4. Inflation and Unemployment Rates 
Year Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate 
1990 9.6 14.4 
1991 19.6 13.4 
1992 21.6 11.4 
1993 30.0 Il .0 
36.0 11.2 
Source: The Central Bank and the Plan and Budget Organization. 
Note: Inflation is measured by retail prices. 
Esti imlates br he first half of 1994 ale the author's. 
From another perspective, Iran's financial system is a multi-dimensional sys- 
tem in which at least the following dimensions can be identified: an evolving 
Islamic financial system; a banking system which was nationalized due to the 
unavoidable consequences of the revolution; a financial system still in its pre- 
liminary stages due to the developing—country status of the nation; a largely 
hank-based (as opposed to securities-based) system; a repressed financial sys- 
tem; and a traditional "bazaar" financial system characterized by a large infor- 
mal sector. 
The aforementioned extraordinary events and the multi-dimensional aspects ol 
Iran's financial system have given rise to multi-faceted problems requiring 
conservative approach tor their diagnosis. Nevertheless, the current state 01 
Iran's economic and financial systems makes it imperative to present a diag- 
nosis — albeit crude - of such problems. Therefore, an attempt is made on 
following pages briefly to identify the difficulties afflicting the Iranian bank- 
ing system as well as its open market. 
For a descrmption 01 SOlile of these financial dimensions, systems, and sectors. see World BanI 





























































































































































































































































































































































96 Heyclar Pourian 
The problems of Iran 's banking system 
Iran has a repressed Islamic financial-institutional system characterized by 
several problems and difficulties. First and foremost, the banking sector oper- 
ates under a nationalized system in which credit allocation is administered 
largely through an inefficient planning process. Attempts have recently been 
made to abolish credit ceilings, but progress in this direction has been slow. 
In addition, negative real bank rates are rigidly controlled by the Central 
Bank, which curtails the flow of funds to the formal banking sector and fuels 
the growth of an informal financial sector. The financial system in Iran is 
such that competitive forces are non-existent, and non-bank financial institu- 
tions (perhaps with the exception of nationalized insurance companies and 
pension funds) virtually do not exist. In terms of financial personnel, bank 
employees, who are paid and managed poorly, have no incentive to increase 
their and seem insensitive to customer satisfaction. 
Within the context of structural—adjustment programs, and as far as macro- 
economic policy-making is concerned, industry officials often complain about 
the banking system being too inflexible and contractionary in its credit poli- 
cies. In response, officials in charge of Iran's economic and financial systems 
blame Iranian industries for their inflexibility. Currently, a rising inflation 
rate is occurring simultaneously with the deterioration of the financial condi- 
tion of Iranian firms. 
Moreover, the public in Iran has yet to form a clear picture of Islamic (loan) 
contracts and their related jargon. Indeed, most Iranians do not seem to 
believe that the country's banking system is usury-free as officially claimed.8 
The problems of Iran's stock exchange 
Likewise, Iran's undeveloped open financial markets also face several diffi- 
culties. For instance, until recently only the issuance of common stocks was 
allowed within the context of Iran's capital market. As a result, there is a 
scarcity of securities, and the investment pyramid for portfolio management 
is incomplete. In addition, political and legal risks dictate a large risk premi- 
urn on common stocks, which would suggest large fluctuations (in response 
to new information), as well as depressed trend values. 
For a survey of public opinion on this ISSUe, see Mesbahi (1994). 
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Furthermore, the lack of clear management in Iran's stock exchange (which is 
a private organization vittually under the control of the Central Bank) has 
generated serious obstacles to the governments privatization program as well 
as eroded public confidence. Hence, in order to avert a crisis and for the sake 
of protecting values, the prices of securities are controlled both by the 
stock exchange and by Central Bank authorities. 
In addition, Iran's unsuccessful and slow—moving priVatization program has 
defeated expectations about the swift development of a securities market in 
the country. Similarly, the flow of accounting, micro and macroeconomic 
information is quite deficient, thus hampering the quick decision-making 
required in an efficient open-market system.9 
Summary and policy recommendations 
Over the last 15 years several extraordinary events have affected Iran's econ- 
omy, such as large-scale nationalizations and expropriations, capital flight, 
sanctions against Trans exports and imports, and eight years of war. On the 
other hand, Iran's financial system is multi-dimensional, including an Islamic 
financial system, a nationalized banking system, a largely bank-based system, 
and a repressed tinancial system. While no evaluation of the Islamic banking 
system has been attempted in this paper, it is true that the concomitant occur- 
rence of such extraordinary difficulties and the multi-dimensional nature of 
Iran's financial system have nonetheless created a highly inefficient financial 
system. On the question of what needs to be done, one can recommend a wide 
array of policies from the perspective of both financial development [see 
World Bank (1988)1 and efficient-market theory for example, Fama and 
Miller (1972)1. 
Reconzinendations for financial institutions 
Rather than being administered through a macro-oriented planning process, 
the allocation of credit should be left at the discretion of the banking system 
in granting loans based on microeconomic reasons as well as on the countrys 
coniparative advantage. Alternatively, an industrial policy should be devel- 
oped and funds allocated according to pre-designed programs. Moreover, in 
order to increase the flow of funds to the banking sector, bank rates should be 
For a description of other problems related to Iran's stock exchange and capital market. see 
l'ouiian (I 994b). 
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increased gradually so as to eliminate the current negative real interest rates 
which fuel the growth of the informal financial sector. 
Furthermore, increased attention should be paid to public relations in the 
banking systeni and the Central Bank, especially in explaining the various 
Islamic banking contracts currently in use, and serious attempts should be 
made to increase customer satisfaction. In addition, a merit systeni should he 
developed in the spirit of entrepreneurship in order to increase bank employ- 
ees motivation and productivity. 
Recommendations for open financial markets 
The issuance of securities other than common stocks (such as specially—tai- 
lored Islamic convertible bonds) should be allowed so as to alleviate the 
scarcity of securities; this measure would enhance the methods of financing 
available to corporations (private as well as government—owned), and would 
also complete the 'investment pyramid' for portfolio management. To the 
extent possible, signals implying lower political and legal risks should also he 
given in a uniform manner by the three branches of government (Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial). 
Additionally. the control exercised by the stock exchange on the prices ot 
securities should be abandoned. in tandem with the announcement, establish- 
ment, and strict implementation of a comprehensive program for privatization 
with a schedule lasting several years. Also, the establishment of private 
investment banks should be allowed as well as encouraged, together with 
liprovements in the flow of accounting, micro and macroeconomic intorma— 
ti on. 
Recommendations for supervision and control 
The Iranian Central Bank should focus on the primary reason for its existenc 
— the conduct of monetary policy; accordingly, supervision of the banking sys. 
tem and other financial institutions should be dissociated from the Centra 
Bank and given to a new independent agency. In order to isolate the Centra 
Bank from the political process, it may be necessary to consider the issue o: 
making it independent. Also, the low capital—asset ratio requires 
attention; luckily, recent reports show that this ratio has improved. 
Furthermore, the management of Iran's privately—owned stock exchangi 
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should be improved, and its control by the Central Bank lessened. The super- 
vision of the stock exchange needs to be conducted by a newly-established 
securities commission rather than the Central Bank.m 
Guidelines for financial liberalization 
In order to increase the efficiency of the system, competition needs to he pro- 
moted in the banking sector, which would most likely suggest moving 
towards the (and Islainization) of financial institutions in Iran. 
Increasing the efficiency of Iran's financial sector (banks, non-banking finan- 
cial institutions, and the stock exchange) is also important for the success of 
other government plans and programs, including privatization. In addition, 
the Central Bank should speed up the establishment of non-banking flnancial 
institutions. 
Within the context of structural—adjustment programs, Iran needs to strike an 
admittedly delicate balance between the development of its industry and its 
restrictive credit policies. The sequence of liberalization needs to start with 
basic macroeconomic stabilization programs and credit controls.'' It may also 
be necessary to opt for a gradual implementation of liberalization so as to 
avoid the flnancial crises which can occur in any financial liberalization 
process. 
This paper draws to a close by reiterating, once again, that the analysis 
sentcd above was not meant as an evaluation of the performance of Islamic 
banking principles per se. Indeed, since Islamic banking arguably has yet to 
be given a true test in Iran, the inappropriate performance of some of the 
country's economic and financial indicators reported here is not intended as a 
negative answer to the important question, 'Can the Islamic financial system 
survive?" 
This recommendation was written by the author and is reflected in the Second Plan 13111. which 
at the moment of writing is being considered for -atification by the Iranian Parliament. 
Fm' discussions regarding the sequence of liberalization and the gradual approach, see Cho and 
Kliatkhate (1989). and Bisat ct. al, ( 992). 
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The past decade has seen a surge of interest in the analytic and operational 
aspects of Islamic banking both inside and outside Muslim societies. Aside 
from the that three countries in the Islamic world, namely Iran, Pakistan 
and Sudan, have adopted Islamic financial systems, a relatively large number 
of Islamic banks, financial institutions and transactions have emerged all over 
the world. Additionally, recognizing the market potential of Islamic finance, 
an increasing number of banks and financial institutions in the West have 
started to provide portfolios, transactions and instruments that are essentially 
non-interest based. 
In his paper, Dr. Pourian seeks to analyze the impact of the Islamic financial 
system on economic developments in Iran. The task of the paper is greatly 
complicated by the large—scale structural changes undergone by the Iranian 
economy during the period tinder study. Having emerged from a protracted 
conflict with Iraq, Iran embarked on a process of reconstruction and econoiii- 
ic liberalization at a time of significant changes in the external environment. 
Hence, analyses of recent developments in Iran — particularly in relation to its 
financial sector - need to isolate the impact of these exogenous factors from 
those associated with the Islamic system per se. Since such an analysis lies 
outside the scope of Dr. Pourian's paper at this stage, the remainder of my 
comments will review sonic of the basic issues concerning the analytics of 
and challenges faced by Islamic banking. 
The viability and feasibility of non—interest—based imnancial transactions, 
instruments, institutions and systems, as well as the legitimacy of academic 
research in this area, are no longer questioned by serious and objective 
observers. Given that until the late 1970s and early l980s the concept and 
modes of transactions that could avoid the use of interest rates as the central 
balancing mechanism between the sLmpply of and demand for financial 
m'esources were virtually unknown, particularly in the West, the speed of 
of interest—free financial institutions, instruments and transactions has 
been impressive. Equally important has been the growth of scholarly interest 
in the subject. Considering that three decades have passed since the first 
Islamic bank, Mit Ghamr, began its operations in Egypt, and that ten years 
have passed since the first country, Iran, adopted a complete Islamic financial 
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system, it seems appropriate at this point to take a brief look at the concept, 
operation and challenges of Islamic banking. 
The analytics of Islamic banking 
There is now a general consensus (but not unanimity) among Muslim 
and economists that the prohibition against nba extends to interest, and that 
banking systems in Muslim countries violate this prohibition if they allow the 
use of the interest rate mechanism. At least four characteristics define the pro- 
hibited interest rate: it is fixed cx ante; it is tied to the time period and the 
amount of the loan; its payment is guaranteed by the borrower regardless of 
the outcome of the transaction for which the money was borrowed; and the 
state apparatus sanctions and enforces its collection. One implication of this 
prohibition is that it virtually eliminates all debt financing and debt instru- 
ments as they exist in conventional banking. To replace them, the Sharia 
holds the view that individuals have a wide freedom of contract. Therefore, 
the contracting parties are free to engage in any transactions not prohibited by 
the Shania. This flexibility makes possible a virtually open-ended menu of 
various modes of financial transactions, instruments and contractual forms so 
long as contracts do not contain any element of nba and/or gharar. The 
latiter can operationally be said to exist if one (or both) of the contracting par- 
ties is in possession of sonic information regarding the subject of the contract 
and withholds that information from the other party. Incidentally, this defin- 
ition brings the concept of glianar close to the notions of asymmetric infor- 
nation and moral hazard of contract theory. 
Historically, Muslimfiqahas (with few exceptions) did not define a priori the 
various methods of nba—free transactions available today. The practice was 
that the contracting parties would decide on a particular mode, and the fuqci- 
ha would then rule on its permissibility. Muslim economists often insist that, 
in order to become Islamic, a banking system must replace the interest rate 
mechanism with a profit—sharing mechanism. This is, of course, only the 
economist's inference. The position of the Shania, as stated earlier, is that any 
transaction is permissible so long as it does not contain any element of nba 
and/or gharan. It thus follows that it may be possible to develop a variety of 
nonprofit—sharing methods of financial transactions that meet the basic 
requirement of the Shania. A prime example is the method of Qard a!- 
Has,van; other mnethods include, among others. Morabaha and Sa/af transac- 
tions. Hence, from the perspective of Islamic law a financial system is not 
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rendered un-Islamic if it operates primarily or even mostly with nonprofit- 
sharing modes as long as these satisfy the requirements of the Sharki. This is 
a very important point, because many of those who criticize the current prac- 
tices of Islamic banks contend that many of the transactions conducted by 
these banks, such as Morabaha, installment sales and the like, are not profit- 
sharing methods, and that these transactions resemble or are in effect the same 
as interest-based transactions. While the latter may be true (installment trans- 
actions, for instance, may indeed resemble interest—based transactions), the 
tact is that the former are sanctioned by the Sharia, whereas interest-based 
transactions, which may produce identical results, are not. 
From an economic point of view, it is clear that a financial system that oper- 
ates primarily with a profit-sharing mechanism has advantages that are not 
obtained in a system which, albeit compatible with the Sharici, operates most- 
ly with nonprofit-sharing methods. The most important drawback in the lat- 
ter type of system is that it does not have - or perhaps has not yet developed 
- ways of promoting long-term investments and thus concentrates mostly on 
short-term and trade transactions. While one bank operating on this basis may 
not have a discernible impact on the economy, a total system operating along 
these lines can do considerable damage to the economy's growth and devel- 
opment process. 
Over the last decade, analytic investigations of the conceptualization of 
Islamic banking as a system in which the assets and liabilities of banks are 
acquired on a profit-sharing basis have given rise to important propositions. 
Briefly, such a system has been shown to bear a number of characteristics. 
First and foremost, the real values of assets and liabilities would be equal at 
all points in time. In addition, the prospect of instantaneous equilibrium 
between the asset side of the banking system - driven mainly by the real sec- 
tor of the economy - and the liability side means that there must necessarily 
be a close relationship between investment and deposit yields. Also, since the 
return to liabilities of the banking system is a direct function of the return to 
the asset portfolio of the system, and since assets are created in response to 
investment opportunities in the real sector of the economy, it is the real sector 
that determines the rate of return to the financial sector rather than the reverse. 
Furthermore, in an Islamic financial system the adjustment to shocks leading 
to banking crises and disruptions in the country's payment mechanisms is 
faster than in the conventional system. There will also be no disruption in the 
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intermediation process of the banking system, nor is there any reason to 
believe that the savings and investment process will be impaired. Indeed, sav- 
ings and investment need not decrease, and if the rules of the Sharia regard- 
ing contracts - including full disclosure requirements - are observed, both will 
increase. 
Moreover, monetary policy can be effective in stabilizing the economy, and 
this has been shown in both closed and open economy models. In an open 
economy context, to the extent that external resources mobilized through 
profit-sharing models are channelled to productive investments, such invest- 
ments can be expected to generate a stream of returns at least sufficient to 
repay the associated external liabilities. Also in an open economy context, 
there will be two-way capital flows; that is, there is no reason to expect only 
capital outflows, since net results will depend on the difference between 
domestic and external rates of return. 
In sum, from a theoretical standpoint, there is no reason to suggest that 
Islamic banking or islamic financial institutions cannot fulfill the basic tasks 
required of any financial intermediary or system. Indeed, it is possible to 
argue that, under certain circumstances, their performance may be better. 
Operational challenges and prospects 
Practice and theory both show that Islamic banking is viable, and that the con- 
version of an entire financial system along Islamic principles wili not lead to 
the system's collapse as some had predicted. Indeed, experience has shown 
that Islamic banks are powerful means of mobilizing resources. 
Operationally, however, both the Islamic financial system in the three coun- 
tries that have adopted it and individual Islamic banks face challenges that 
need to be addressed. The most important among these is the fact that, while 
it has been relatively easy to create a system in which deposits do not bear 
interest, the asset portfolios of Islamic banks do not contain sufficiently strong 
components that are based on profit sharing. The two main reasons are the 
lack of a legal and institutional framework providing ftr appropriate contracts 
as well as mechanisms to enforce them, and the lack of adequate menus with 
a broad range and variety of maturity structures for financial instruments. 
Hence, a relatively strong risk perception has been associated with profit- 
sharing methods in particular and Islamic banking in general. This, in turn, 
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has led to the concentration of the asset portfolios of Islamic banks on short— 
term and trade-related assets, with adverse consequences for investment and 
econonlic development. The problem has been exacerbated by the fact that 
Muslim countries, as is the case in much of the developing world, suffer from 
lack of deep and efficient capital and money markets that can provide the 
needed liquidity and safety for existing assets. The absence of suitable long- 
ternl instruments is mirrored in the lack of very short—term financial instru- 
ments. At present, for example, there is no equivalent of an inter—bank mar- 
ket where banks could place, say, overnight funds, or where they could bor- 
row to satisfy temporary liquidity needs. 
Both the theory of Islamic banking and the rapid expansion of Islamic banks 
in recent years have demonstrated the feasibility of non-interest-based opera- 
lions. This must be surprisine to those who believed that banks and financial 
systems could not operate in a modern economy without reliance on the inter- 
est rate mechanism. By and large, Liamic banking has worked reasonably 
well, but it does face challenges. Nonetheless, nearly all of these challenges 
are technical in nature and can be met as long as sufficient resources are com- 
mitted to this task. For instance, developing a suitable menu of Sl,aria-com- 
patible financial instruments is a technical problem that can and will be 
solved. There is no reason to believe that financial engineering cannot span 
the existing menu of assets in order to create a much larger variety of instru- 
inents with different maturity structures to serve the needs of the market. The 
rapid growth of emerging equity markets in the developing countries is a very 
hopeful sign that in the next decade much of the existing institutional and 
technical bottlenecks that may have hampered the efficient operation of 
Islamic banking will be removed. Similarly, the degree of risk perception sur- 
rounding profit-sharing modes can be reduced through the creation of legal 
institutions that embody Islamic injunctions covering property rights and con- 
tracts. 
Abdullah El-Ku waiz 
The paper by Heydar Pourian is useful in shedding light on the internal func- 
tioning of the Iranian economy in general, and the banking system in particu- 
lar. Highlighting the Iranian experience in the area of Islamic banking is very 
important to the Middle East, where the idea holds a special attraction. 
The study covers the period following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, when 
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major changes took place in Iran simultaneously, such as the raging war with 
Iraq; economic sanctions; the freezing of Iranian assets abroad; interruptions 
in oil production coupled with a decrease in both demand and price; the fluc- 
tuation of the US dollar; and the interruption of the nations development pro- 
gram. To be sure, these factors have rendered the researcher's task all the 
more difficult. 
Bearing in mind the above constraints when reviewing Dr. Pourian's paper, 1 
would like to mention some points related to his otherwise impressive 
research. First, in view of experiences to the contrary, it remains to be seen 
whether it is indeed necessary to nationalize banks in order to Islamize them. 
Secondly, it is mentioned that the paper will look into economic and financial 
indicators for iran. Although the author does address financial aspects of 
Iran's economy, sonic major economic indicators are missing, such as the 
country's GDP, national income, and its balance of payments. 
Thirdly, the laper defines the Islamic contract, its related tools, and presents 
statistics in Table 3 relating to the latter's behavior in the eight—year period 
ranging from 1984 to 1991. These definitions and statistics are quite enlight- 
ciii ng, hut it would perhaps have been more useful to expand them and coin— 
pare them with the practices of Western banks and Islamic institutions in other 
countries. 
l'ourthly, a comparison is made between loan rates and deposit rates, and the 
author concludes that these loans were subject to ''large'' interest rate subsi- 
dies; hut that begs an important question: Who is paying for these subsidies? 
In addition, there is a short paragraph based on Figure 2 which compares cred- 
its of specialized institutions with those extended by commercial banks. This 
paragraph serves no particular purpose in the paper unless it is accompanied 
by an explanation of the activities of specialized institutions in relation to 
Islamic banking. 
It is rather alarming to know that the capital adequacy of Iranian banks has 
dropped from five percent to 0.5 percent at a time when international atten- 
tion is focused on increasing it to a minimum of eight percent. However, two 
points should be taken into account in this regard: first, the fact that these 
banks have been nationalized; and second, that the calculations should include 
risk weights attached to the assets of banks. 
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It is also mentioned in the paper that, in spite of a nominal sixfold increase in 
deposits over ten years, these deposits have nonetheless dropped in real terms. 
The author concluded, therefore, that the performance of Iranian banks was 
poor. Before reaching such a conclusion, though, it would have been more 
accurate to compare deposits in relation to GDP and/or national income. The 
paper subsequently presents difficulties of Iran's financial indeed, it 
would have been more helpful to elaborate further on these problems or 
'difficulties, perhaps in light of the experience of other countries. Moreover, 
the paper recommends the issuance of convertible bonds without specifying 
whether these bonds are usury-free or tied to the profitability of projects. 
There are at 'east two approaches to the supervision of banking: by the Central 
Bank or through an independent commission of separate institutions. The 
author advocates the latter, but experts have yet to reach a consensus on this 
particular matter. Furthermore, the paper does not touch upon the interna- 
tional side of banking activities. In particular, it fails to explain how Iranian 
banks and the Iranian Central Bank have dealt with interest on the interna- 
tional market. Also, the paper fails to address the strategy pursued by the 
Iranian Central Bank when conducting monetary policy under Islamic law. 
This is an area where a great deal of research remains to be done, according 
to Mosim Khan and Abbas Mirakhor in their 199! paper on Islamic banking. 
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Le Financement des Entreprises: 
Marché Financier ou Credit Bancaire? 
Abderrafia El-Bakkali 
Introduction 
La pCriode de crise éconornique qui remonte pour Ia plupart des economies 
aux deux chocs pCtroliers, a engendré une pénurie de ressources et des prob- 
Iènies dendettement particulièrernent aigus pour des environnements non 
occidentaux. Une des consequences de cette situation a été un regain d'intérCt 
pour les problèmes de financement de Féconomie. 
En effet, avec laggravation de Ia crise, les systèmes des principaux pays 
industrialisés ont répondu par Ia dérCglementation, Ia désintérmécliation et le 
mouvernent de titrisation.' Ce mouvement, qui repose principalement sur les 
valeurs traditionnelles de Ia libre entreprise et recommande de Iaisserjouer les 
mécanismes du marchC, sest traduit dans ces pays par Ia creation dune quan- 
titC lmpressionnante de nouveaux produits et dinstruments de financement 
qui ont eu des profondes repercussions sur les méthodes de gestion financière 
des entreprises. Ceci laisse entrevoir lémergence dune nouvelle logique de 
choix dinvestisseinent, exigeant au préalable un veritable arbitrage entre 
investissements productifs et placements financiers. 
Lévolution récente des economies occidentales a donc remis a Iordre du jour 
Ic role du marché financier, tant en cc qui concerne lajustement general de I'é- 
pargne a linvestissement quen cc qui concerne lallocation optimale des 
ressources. Cet accent mis sur Ia politique same" de financement de lé- 
conomie, basée essentiellement sur Ia finance directe, oO Ic rnarchC est censé 
Ctre Ic seul régulateur, implique nécessairement une épargne disponible. Dans 
ce contexte, les interrnédiaires financiers - conformément a Ia théorie de 
Gurley et Shaw (1973) - sont des partenaires des autres agents économiques 
sur le marchC des titres. 
Ch. Dc Boissier. 'Mutation Ct Fragilité des Systèmes Financiers, dans Revue Françoise 
d Econo,nie, No. I , 1987 
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Cette transformation du paysage financier dans les pays industrialisés - qui 
offrent des possibilités nouvelles de placements et de financenients cohérentes 
avec les conventions dune economic de titres nCgociables a suscité un 
intérCt indCniable clans certains pays en developpeinent et constitue, par Et- 
méme, Ia base des interventions des organismes internationaux, notamment Ic 
Fond Monetaire International et Ia Banque Mondiale. Avec a crise, les facil— 
ités antérieures dendettement externe des pays en développement se sont 
extrCmement rCtrCcies et les conditions daccCs aux ressoLirces se sont durcies 
progressivement au fur et mesure de laggravation de Ia crise.2 Ce problème 
dc financement externe sest accentué réceinnient avec Ia chute clu mur de 
Berlin, Ia zone des pays de lEst fait lobjet dune attention toute particulière 
de La part de Ia communauté financière internationale. 
Pour repondre a cc nouveau contexte, les pouvoirs publics des principaux 
pays en développement, sous legide des organismes internationaux, ont 
entamé une série de réformes dans Ic but de restaurer Ia logique dii marchC, 
jugCe comme capable d'accroItre lCtTicacitC dii système financier. Rappelons 
que cette strategic financière de développement, qui met laccent sur une 
reconsideration des politiques de mobilisation des ressources intCrieures, trou— 
ye sa source clans les travaux de McKinnon (1973, qui accusent Ia 
repression financière qui sCvit dans les pays en développement d'Ctre long— 
inc dc La mohilisation insuffisante de l'épargne et, par consequent, daffecter 
Ic processus dajustement du stock de capital a son niveau désiré. En sonime, 
les tenants de cette these qui ont gagné de noinbreux disciples au scm des 
économistes des pays cii cléveloppement plaident pour une libCralisation 
financiCre clans tous es domaines: prix, des changes, etc.3 En 
clautres termes, cest IentrCe dans un cercle vertueux" du developpeuient qui 
sera provoquCe cette libCralisation tinancière. II taut noter clue cette 
approclie de McKinnon, qui presente La promotion de l'épargne conime un 
nioyen auquel Ic développeinent économique prendra toute sa signifi- 
cation pour lensemble de Ia société, doit beaucoup a Ia contribution majeure 
de Gurley et de Shaw, dans leur célèbre ouvrage écnit en 1960 (Money in a 
Theory of Finance), oü Ic role des interniédiaires financiers dans Ic 
développement dc l'epargne se trouve au centre dc leur analyse. 
El Quorchi, La Conditionnal ltd du FM I" Thdsc tie I )oclorat. Univcrsitd Paris X 1987. 
Chengucily, La Repression Financidie: Le Cas des Pays Arahes", Thdsc d'Etat, tiniversild 
Paris X, 1984. 
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En effet, Ia théorie actuelie des circuits de financernent externe et, en partic- 
ulier, Ic rOle des institutions financières dans le processus épargne-investisse- 
inent sinspirc très largement de Ia these présentée par Gurley et Shaw. Scion 
cette théorie, es besoins expriniés par les pretcurs ne correspondent pas a 
ceux des emprunteurs. Le rOle des institutions financières consiste alors a 
harmoniser des differences disparates, en mettant des titres qui correspondent 
aux désirs des agents besoin de tinancement. Pour ces deux auteurs, les 
institutions linancières bancaires ou non bancaires ne crCent pas tie fonds 
pretabies; Ic système bancaire, comme tous les autres intermédiaires, est un 
courtier de fonds prCtables". C'est Ia règle de lunité des interméchaires 
financiers qui scion GLirley et Shaw doit être Ia toile de fond de Ia thCorie din— 
termédiation financière. C'est a partir de cc schema ciue Ion a voulu, pendant 
Iongtemps, exphquer Ic mécanisme de creation monétaire, en admettant que 
Ic système bancaire prCte au fur et mesure qu'ii reçoit des depOts. En 
d'autres terines, Ia causahté va du passif a l'actif: les depOts font les credits. 
II apparaIt ainsi que, qLlelIe quc soit Ia facon daborder Ic probIèrne de finance— 
rent dc l'économie, force est de constater ciue les theories dorninantes de 
financement (finance directe ct finance indirecte), abordent cc probièine en 
termes d'améhoration de Ia capacite de collecte de l'épargne et d'Cventuei!e 
transformation tIes ressources d'epargne par les intermédiaires fnanciers. 
Dans tous les cas, Ic financeinent sur ressources prCaiables est privilégié. El 
nest donc pas fait place a l'utilisation du credit sur ressources inonétaires 
comme fondement du financement externe des entreprises. Cette ignorance 
clClibCréc du credit bancaire, commune a Ia plupart des modeles keynCsiens et 
monetaristes qui ont servi de substrat thCorique, a un moment ou a un autre, 
aux politiques cconomiqucs effectivement appliquCes dans les diffCrents envi- 
ronnernents Cconomiques, trouve son application dans I'approche tIe Ia théoric 
financière de I'entreprise, oü l'expression structure du capital' ne semble 
inclure uniqucrnent quc des sources de fonds qui sont reprCsentCes par des 
valeurs mobilières (actions et obligations). 
lJt-dessus, les approches sont controversées et diffCrentes, essentiellernent sur 
lexistence dune structure optimale de financement des entreprises. En effet, 
a Ia suite des travaux de Miller et Modigliani (1958), Ic problèine de Ia struc- 
ture optimale du capital se resume a un choix entre Ic coOt et Ic risque, l'effet 
de levier incitant I'entreprise accroItre son endettement, Ic risque financier 
venant temperer cette tendance. Cette analyse precise Ia rationalité nCcessaire 
a toute decision financière. Le coOt clu capital constitue Ic fondement de l'al— 
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location optimale des ressources financières de lentreprise. Autrement dit, ne 
recourt a lendettement que si cue en tire un bénéfice. Le problème sera alors 
abordé, tout au long de Ihistoire de Ia pensée économique, en termes de pro- 
ductivité marginale du capital (les classiques), puis en terines défficacité mar- 
ginale du capital avec Keynes et, enfin, en termes de profitabilité, avec 
Malinvaud.4 
TI semble donc légitime de sinterroger sur Ia validité de ces analyses, ayant 
pour référence commune les notions de marché, dépargne et de rationalité 
economique, lorscluelles sappliquent a des environnements economiques oà 
les marches scnt étroits, voire inexistants, et les institutions financières non 
bancaires, susceptibles dCmettre des substituts de Ia monnaie, sont rares. 
Seules existent les banques commerciales bien concentrCes et quelques organ- 
ismes financiers specialisCs, principalement publics, qui dCtiennent Ic mono— 
pole en matière de mohilisation de lepargne locale et Ic financement de lac- 
tivitC Cconomique. Par consequent, Ia monnaie est le principal actif financier 
en raison de sa lonction de moyen de paiement, et Ic credit bancaire est Ia 
forme principale de financement. 
Cest là Ia problCmatique dont nous essayerons de dCbattre pour Ic cas précis 
du Maroc, dune part, les banques commerciales constituent lossature du 
système financier et sont en principe les seules a être en contact avec les util- 
isateurs et les épargnants primaires.3 Dautre part, Ic financement externe et 
notamment bancaire des entreprises se presente coinme un facteur incon- 
tournable dans lCtude des contraintes financières auxquelles sont SoUmise5 les 
entreprises marocaines. Afin de cerner ces questions, ii nous parait nécessaire 
de presenter de façon très schématique ICtat des lieux théoriques de Ia ques- 
tion financement des entreprises. Cest au travers de cette analyse quappa- 
raItra lapport essentiel de Ia distinction entre financement interrnédiC et 
financement par Ic marché. 
C. Mali nvaud, Capital Picducti I ucertitudes Ct Profitabi I ité', Anna/es dIAono,n,e ci 
,'toi!siique, No.5 987. 
Au Maioc ii ny a pas de independent (IC celui de Ia Caisse dEpargne Postale. 
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Les fondements analytiques du credit bancaire comme 
mode de financement des entreprises 
Trois modes de financement fondamentaux coexistent dans les economies 
contemporaines. Dune part, Fautofinancement ou Ia finance interne permet a 
chaque entreprise OU unite economique de degager sur sa propre activité les 
ressources nécessaires a son financement, en évitant ou en limitant lappel aux 
ressources du système financier. Dautre part, le financement externe apporte 
a lautofinanceinent un complement parfois marginal et parfois décisif sous 
es deux formes classiques: Ia finance directe et Ia finance indirecte. 
Historiquement, ces trois modes de financement sont apparus de façon pro- 
gressive Ct dans un ordre chronologique, qui a permis lérnergence successive 
dun régime dautofinancement, puis de Ia finance directe et, enfin, ne Ia 
finance indirecte. Aujourdhui, chaque système de financement national com- 
bine ces trois composantes avec une pondération Ct une articulation spCcifique 
qui permettent a Ia fois de situer son stade de développement et de presenter 
les grandeurs caractCristiques de son comportement économique. En con- 
sequence, une approche positive de la finance de lentreprise exige Ia prise en 
compte des influences ciue lentreprise suhit du fait de ses propres caractères, 
mais aussi du fait des caractères inhCrents au système financier dans lequel 
cue se trouve insérée. 
Ces considerations indiquent sans trop dequivoque Ic cadre thCorique 
emprunté par Ic present travail. Nous soutenons, en effet, ciue sil existe un 
dCterminisme de Ia structure de lactif liée a la technologie employee, Ia struc- 
ture du passif reste une caractéristique propre a chaque système de finance- 
inent. 
Ebauche d'une nouvelle approche de Ia finance de l'entre- 
prise 
Leclairage niue nous avons sur Ic comportement du financement des entre- 
nous est donnC par Ia théorie financière qui adopte une optique norma- 
tive et sattache a énoncer des règles universelles danalyse et de comporte- 
men t. 
En general, les formulations théoriques relatives a Ia finance de lentreprise 
qui cml pris leur essor aux Etats-Unis posent Ic problème de financement des 
entreprises en termes de determination de politique optimale. Elles prCsentent 
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tine analyse des relations qui prévaudraient au niveau dun marché financier 
"ideal", oü les agents s'efforceraient d'atteindre un maximum de satisfaction 
clans le cadre de parfaite concurrence. Soulignons que l'importance de l'auto— 
financernent des entreprises anléricaines autorisée par les conditions de 
partage du surplus monetaire et Ic clCveloppement des marches de capitaux 
justifient cette attitude. Aussi clans ces modèles, l'expression structure du 
capital' n'inclut que les sources de tonds qui sont représentés par les valeurs 
mohilières 'action et obligation''. Ce faisant, us évacuent de l'analyse l'auto— 
tinancement et Ic credit bancaire. Rappelons clue, traditionnellenient, les 
theories nionétaires et financières macro—economiques ont éludC ces ques- 
tions, en s'appuyant exclusivement sur Ia logique des modalités d'allocation 
des ressources par Ic marché de titres. 
Cela clii, Ia question Ia plus clCbattue par Ia théorie financiCre est celle de Ia 
repartition optimale clu financement entre capitaux risquCs et non risques. 
C'est là l'objet du vieux cléhat sur Ia structure du capital qui a donnC lieu a 
diverses controverses qui ne sont pas encore apaisées. Observant cepenclant 
clue, meme s'il n'existe aucun veritable consensus entre les partisans et les 
adversaires de l'existence dune structure optitnale du capital, cela ne les 
einpCche pas dc s'accorder sur Ia rCfCrence a la maxirnisation de Ia valeur dc 
I'enlreprise. La richesse de l'actionnaire apparaIt comnie un élCment intégra— 
leur dc Ia finance. 
C'est thins cc cadre ciue s'inscrit Ic ratio "q" dc Tobin (I comine 
cl'ailleurs Ic modèle d'équilibrc des actifs financiers Capital Asset Pricing 
Mac/el clui rassemble et synthétise l'ensemble des travaux les plus rCcents dc 
Ia thCorie financière moderne. Ces modèles se situent clans Ic droit fil de 
l'analyse oCoclassique, clont ils permettent Ic prolongenient et l'application a 
l'équilihre sur Ic marchC des actifs financiers. Toutes les decisions visant a 
l'allocation efticiente des ressources sont prises en tonction dc Ia norme tinan— 
cière clu coul du capital. 
II y a lieu de remarquer qu'au clelà des critiques d'ordre general relatives aux 
Lcs analyses contemporaines de I'dTht du coOt du capital s'appuient targenient slir Ic rho "cf 
ile Thbiii. qlii net cii elation a valorisation Ii lancicre au inoyen de Ia bourse. clu capital physique 
ci de son cout de replaceinent. Vojr V. Reiflers Goui'nay, "Uric Reinise en Cause des 
I crud saul s (Ic liii vest issei iient: Le ROle d u 'q' de Tobi n sw Ia I 972— I 99 en France''. 
claus Docunu',,Is dc' Truroi/. ('DC. N, /992 - 32/I', Novenibre 992. 
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hypotheses ties modCles classiques (maximisation du protit), nCoclassiques 
(maximisation de Ia valeur boursière), ou ceux issus de Ia thCorie managCri— 
ale (niaximisation dune tonction dutilité a partir du profit), cest le 
principe mCme dLIn choix de financement optimal quil convient de 
recherchcr qui est en cause. Cette constatation ne signifie pas que lapport de 
a theoric financière doininante est néghgeable. Elle conduit simplement 
sinterroger sur ladCquation de cette théorie et de ses prolongements actuels 
avec un financement intermédié qui sest progressivetilent impose dans cer- 
tains environnements econolniques. Avec Ic recul du temps, ii est devenu évi- 
dent que ces theories sont relativement coherentes dans Ic cadre des 
economies oü Ic marchC des titres negociables est dominant. En revanche, 
dies doivent Ctre sérieusement amendées clans ies economies ou les titres de 
crCances ne sont pas negociabies sur Ic marchC. Or, Ia determination ties 
nécanismes de fonctionnement du marché' du credit, qui est un cas type tie 
concurrence imparlaite, différe considérablement des analyses ayant pour 
rCférence commune les notions tie marché efficient et de rationalité ties 
agents. 
On salt hien qua partir du moment Ion intioduit Ia subjectivité des com— 
portelnents, lajustement par Ic marché perd unc part importante tie sa signifi- 
cation. Cest au travers dune nCgociation bilatCraie entre Ia firme et Ia banque 
laquelle cue sadresse quc sCtablissent les conditions du hnancement. Cest 
icur comportement propre qui est pris en consideration, et non leur simple 
appartenance a lune ties dccix entités abstraites que sont lolire et Ia demande. 
Soulignons que Ia notion même du marché est discutable, dans Ia inesure of 
Ic prix du credit nCquilibre pas les quantités offertes et demandCes. La 
demande de credit ne sera pas lorcCment accordée, en raison des comporte— 
ments tie rationnenient et dencadrement ties distributeurs de credit. En cc 
sens, on pent dire que les firmes ne peuvent optimiser leur endettement auprCs 
ties banques. Laccès aux credits se fait non pas aLissi longtemps qLiil y a des 
projets rentables au taux dintérCt du credit, mais aussi longtemps que lendet- 
tement reste en deçà dun certain ratio de structure linancière. 
Cette constatation met en evidence que Ic niveau de iautofinancement nest 
plus jugC en relation a une analyse retrospective de rentabilité, mais en liaison 
avec Ic comportement des banques qui modulent leurs en fonction ties mises 
propres tie lentreprise. On se trouve ainsi ramené an problCme de Ia hiCrar- 
chisation ties objectifs tie lentreprise, of lactionnariat apparaIt comme une 
contrainte a laquelle ii convient dassurer un taux rninimuni. La pohtique tie 
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lentreprise est alors orientée vers Ia recherche de léquilibre entre autonomie 
et croissance. II sagit done dune logique de maximisation de pouvoir que 
décrivent mal les modèles doptimalité bases sur une logique de maximisation 
du profit. Ces remarques nont pas pour objectif de remettre en cause Ic con- 
cept de marché. Elies entendent surtout a mettre en evidence les iiniites du 
doinaine de validité des theories dominantes, qui sont fondCes exciusivement 
sur Ic role des marches de titres, dans Ia recherche de loptimum financier. 
Cela revient a constater que les questions poSéeS it la finance de lentreprise se 
presentent en termes singulièrement différenciés, scion I'environnement 
financier thins iequei ientreprise est insérée. 
Or, Ic système financier présente dans Ia plupart des pays des formes d'or- 
ganisation typiques pius on moms specifiques. Cest cc que suggère i'idée 
avancée dans ies travaux visant a établir une typologie des systèrnes 
financiers. Cette question est dimportance ii partir dune intuition de John 
Hicks.7 Pour Ia premiere fois, Ic mode de financement des entreprises deter- 
mine Ic classement des economies: soit en economic de marches financiers, 
soit en economic dendettement. II sagit dun ciassement qui determine it son 
tour Ic type de politique monCtaire qui Se rattache ii chaque cas de figure. 
Economie de marches financiers et économie d'endettement 
A partir dune distinction opérée par lCconomiste anglais flicks, ii a été 
dCveloppé au coors des années 1970 une typologie opposant de façon 
dichotomique les economies de marches financiers et les economies dendet- 
tement.5 
Schema d'économie de marches financiers 
Dans cc schema, les marches de capitaux trés intégrés sont ouverts a tofls les 
agents Cconomiques au sens de Ia comptabilite nationale. Ii sagit dun cadre 
dans lequel ics entreprises financent Icur investissement prioritairement par Ic 
recours a leur épargne rCahsCe (autofinancement). A cela sajoutent des 
moyens de tinancement externes, issus pour lessentiel de titres longs (actions 
1. R. I-licks. Keynesian kco,,o,nhs, Ox lord, Blackwcll, 1974. 
Ce type d'analysc qui a a peine vingt ans a trouve un echo notainment chci les 
français Ch. De Boissier. "Economic d'Endettement, Economic dc March6s Financiers ci Taux 
d' dans Keynes Aujouid'hui: Theories ef Poliliques, Etudes par A. Barrere, 
Econon,ira. 985; et Lcvy-Garboua, "Notes sur les Taux d'lnlCrêt dans line Economic 
ci' Endcttcinent'', clans Formation et Roles des Taux din tCrCi, Econo,nica, 1982. 
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ci obligations) queues émettent sur Ic inarché financier et qui sont souscrits 
par les agents a excédents dc liquidités, notamment les inénages. Le credit 
hancaire joue un role marginal dans le financement des entreprises dans ce 
schema de Ia finance directe. Les banques elles-mémes ont une structure de 
hilan qui fait apparaItre en portefeuille une importante composante en valeurs 
mobilières. Le marché financier est, dans ces conditions, un vaste marché 
Ic taux dintérët est Ic taux dequilibre des fonds prëtables. Dans ce cas de fig- 
ure, Ia transmission des impulsions de Ia politique monétaire se fait genCrale- 
ment au marchC ouvert. 
Force est de constater que les enseignements traditionnels de Ia politique 
monétaire cadrent parfaitement avec ce contexte dans lequel, par les actions 
indirectes (action par les taux), les autorités atteignent des résultats escomptCs. 
Schema d'économie d'endettement 
Par rapport aux comporternents financiers observes dans les economies dc 
marches fInanciers, Véconomie dendettement a cette particularitC d'être un 
système clans lequel Ic financement des entreprises soriente peu ou pas vers 
Ic marché financier, mais se realise gréce au credit bancaire. Les banques ont 
elles-mêines une structure de bilan les credits (actif) et les depOts (passit') 
sont prépondCrants. Dans cc contexte, ofi Ia capacité de financement interne 
des entreprises est relativement Ic credit bancaire apparaIt comme une 
solution dc sLibstitution a un marché financier Ctroit, et oO les titres Cons par 
les entreprises sont peu abondants. Au principe de Ia finance directe se sub- 
slime donc celui de Ia finance indirecte, qui fait de lintervention des banques 
une nCcessitC absolue. 
Finançant linvestissenient, les banques se trouvent, après consolidation de 
Icur hilan, globalement déficitaires sur Ic marchC interbancaire. Le recours au 
refinanceinent de Ia Banque Centrale apparait comme une nCcessitC qui con- 
ditionne Ic fonctionnernent dc lappareil tinancier et Ia rCalisation des Cquili- 
bres inacro-economiques. Une economic dendettement, a un premier niveau, 
est done une economic dans laquelle les entreprises non-financières ne trou- 
vent pas auprès des ménages Ic complement nécessaire au financement de leur 
investissement, et sont obligCes de recourir, a cet Cgard, au credit bancaire. 
Le deuxièine niveau vient de cc clue Ic système bancaire, dans sa globalité, est 
endetté vis C vis de Ia Banque Centrale. Dans Ia mesure oU Ic niveau dactiv- 
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ité cle l'économie est clépendant en partie clu volume du credit offert, ii est très 
clifficile a Ia Banque Centrale de refuser, ou méme de limiter, ses interven- 
tions. Elte se trouve contrainte dentériner une situation de creation de mon- 
naie a un niveau qui lui échappe. Rappelons ciue clans one éCoflomie de 
marches financiers, Ia demande de refinancement des inStitUtiOnS financières 
structuretleinent dCticitaires trouve contrepartie sur Ic marché interbancaire. 
Si intervention de Ia Banque Centraie ii y a, cite rCpond davantage a des objec- 
tifs de politique monétaire, scion ciue tes autorités veulent réduire 00 aug- 
menter Ia liquidite bancaire. 
Dans Ic système déconornie dendettement, oü Ia contrepartie Ia pius impor- 
tante dc Ia masse monétaire est Ic credit a I'économie, Ic coritrôle de Ia masse 
monCtaire passe par Ic contrôle direct clu credit. Ainsi, a une politique monC- 
taire par taux ctintCrêt et liquidite bancaire interposée se substitue une poli- 
tique par les quantités. Cct état de fait nautorise quune gestion administrCe 
dc finance nient dc téconoinie, tant au niveau dc Ia determination des taux qua 
celui do volume dc credit distribué. 
Les economies recites soot naturellement situées au milieu des deux cas 
polaires ciue 000s avons étudiés, mais certaines sont plus proche de leconomie 
de marches financiers. Cest Ic cas des Etats-Unis, oa Ics credits bancaires 
rcprCsentaient, clans les annCes rCcentes, moms de dix pour cent do passif des 
entreprises. En revanche, dautres economics sont plus proches de léconomie 
clendettement. Tel est Ic cas de Ia France et du Japon, au moms jUsquau 
milieu des annecs 80. Lappel au credit dont it est question ici est un appel a 
Iinicrmedianon financière, non pas comme one transformation des échéances 
— contormément a Ia théorie de Gurley et Shaw — mais vCritablenient comme 
Ia creation dc inoyefls dc paiement qui anticipent Ic produit. Dans ces condi- 
tions, Iépargne nest pius quune grandeur déterminCe. Linvestissemnent pelt 
Ctre bloquC par on manque de liquidité, mais it ne peut jamais Ctre bloqué par 
inanque dCpargne. Le credit bancaire permet clone dabolir Ia contrainte de 
tonds prCtabtes. It compense leffet depressif de tepargnc des mCnages. 
Les limites et les conditions de texpansion tiennent aux nCcessitCs dc vérifi- 
cation de solvabilité de ceux qui font promesse de paiement. Tout manque- 
inent a cette règle induit Ia faillite du système de credit. En fait, les consicl- 
Crations de risque et dc degrC dinformation, ainsi quc les besoins de liquiclite 
des prCteurs, peuvent limiter loctroi tic credit supplCmentaire. La prise en 
conipte clone telle situation interdit de considérer que Ic marché ciu credit 
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obéit aux mêmes regles de fonctionnement quun marché Wairassien (Jaffee et 
Stiglitz 1990). Sans remettre en cause les principes de rationalitC des agents 
écononhiques, lexciusion des emprunteurs potentiels risquant de ne pas rem- 
bourser les sommes empruntCes se presente comme Ia strategic Ia plus rentable 
pour les banques. Signalons que Ic rationnernent du credit (Jaffee et 
Modigliani 1969) est inherent a Ia regulation nionétaire dans une economic 
dendettement. Ce phenomène permet de comprendre Ia relative rigiditC des 
taux dintérèt et le caractère structurel de Ia situation dexcès de Ia demande 
dont souffre le marché du credit. 
Cette analyse en termes déconomie dendettement que Ion vient de caractéris- 
er brièvement a pour principal mérite davoir montré comment le financement 
externe des entreprises commande un type de formation de lCquilibre du sys- 
tème monétaire. Faute de saisir cette base réelle, on peut apprehender Ic mode 
de financement externe des entreprises dans une écononhie dendettement 
comine un choix alternatif de techniques de financement, alors quil sirnpose 
conime nécessitC fonctionnelle. Cest pourquoi il nous seinble que cette 
approche marque une étape importante dans les recherches récentes menées 
pout intégrer Ic fait financier et echapper au cadre thCorique dominant dans 
lequel se trouvent, sans doute, les tenants de Ia rationalité maximatrice qul 
articulent la politique financière de lentreprise sur Ia logique du marché 
financier. Ce constat nous interpelle et nous oblige poser Ia question de 
savoir laquelle de ces deux configurations sapplique, ou du moms sadapte, 
Ic fonctionnement dune economic en developpernent, en loccurrence, Ic cas 
du Maroc. 
Les traits généraux du système de financement 
El est bien connu que les spécificités des structures productives et financières 
des pays en développement - en particulier linsuffisance de lautofinancement 
et les contraintes attenantes au développement du marché financier - rendent 
Ic financement de Ia croissance de lentreprise par recours partiel ou total au 
credit bancaire inevitable. La question posée est de savoir en quoi ii Ctait 
inadéquat, pour ne pas dire nocif, dutiliser Ic schema dominant pour expliquer 
Ic fonctionnement de léconomie marocaine, qui prCsente des similitudes avec 
Ic cas de figure suggérC par Ic professeur John Hicks. 
Pour plus de details, voir Abderrafia El-Bakkali, These d'Etat, "Financement des 
Entreprises, VniversitC Paris X, 1984. 
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Les principales carateristiques du système financier Marocain 
Traditionnellement, Ic système financier marocain Se caractérise par un role 
marginal de Ia finance directe, tandis que Ia finance intermédiée occupe une 
place prépondérante dans Ic financement de Féconomie, notamment dans Ic 
secteur tormel. En remontant a la source, trois causes essentielles sont a l'o- 
rigine de cet état de fait. 
Dune part, malgré un niveau modeste des revenus, les ménages se sont con— 
stitués une épargne non négligeable placée sous forme liquide et peu risquée. 
Comme Ic montre Ic tableau ci-dessous, les depOts auprès des banques et, 
dans une moindre mesure, ceux auprès de certains organismes financiers 
places ou non sous Ia mouvance du TrCsor (Centre des Cheques Postaux et 
Caisse d'Epargne Nationale) ont été préferés aux valeurs mobilières de place- 
ment. Cela a forteinent contribué limiter Ic dCveloppement du marché. 
Thbleau 1. Dépôts Bancaires 
1988 1992 
DepOts auprès des hanques inscrites 72% 73% 
DepOts auprès des organismes financiers 2% 4% 
DepOts et placements auprès du Trésor 13% 11% 
Billets de trésorerie 5% 3% 
Marché 8% 9% 
Sou'cc: Tableau construit paitir des rappolts de Ia Bank Al — Maglirib. 
Y coiupris les emissions du TrmSsor Ct des entreprises publiques CE seimu—publiques. 
Dautre part, les entreprises marocaines, formées dans leur immense majorité 
d'unités Cconoiniques dimension rnodeste, rencontrent des difficultés a 
gCnérer une épargne suffisante pour assurer Ic financement de linvestisse- 
ment nécessaire a leurs activités. Ce problème de rentabilitè est renlorcé par 
un dCsCquilibre financier lie a une sous-capitalisation, en raison du caractère 
traditionnelleinent fermC et ftin ilial des entreprises marocaines. 
Enfin, Ia combinaison dun niveau modeste des fonds propres, dun marchC 
financier très Ctriqué, et hi préférence par les mCnages des placements liquides 
a engendre lessor et Ia prépondCrance dune structure de financement et de 
placement indirects très prononcCe. 
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Ce constat apparaIt, dans sa grande tendance, validé par lobservation du rap- 
port credits bancaires/PIB. Ce ratio traduit assez tidèlement Ic développe- 
ment de ce marché, qui a amoindri, au plan quantitatif, le role joué par les cir- 
cuits de financement non bancaire. Ainsi, Ia part de lintermédiation bancaire 
clans Ic financement dc léconomie sélève a 25 pour cent du FIB en 1992, 
contre 13 pour cent pour les organismes financiers, et seulement un peu plus 
de trois pour cent pour Ic marché boursier. Force est de constater clue, au 
Maroc, le marché financier - et en Foccurrence Ic marché boursier - ne con- 
tribue ciue dc façon très marginale au financement de léconomie nationale. 
On dénomnbre actuellement 68 sociétés cotées a Ia Bourse de Casablanca. Un 
chiffre très faible, surtout en comparaison avec celui enregistre par certains 
pays en développement souvent cites comme modèle de dCveloppement 
econonlique. Cest Ic cas, par exemple, de Ia Malaisie (282 sociétés cotées en 
bourse), de Ia Corée du Sud (668 sociétés), de Ia Thaillande (240 sociétés), et 
de Taiwan (200 sociétés cotées). 
Lensemble de ces observations confirme que le système financier marocain 
est dorninC aujourdhui, comme ii létait dans Ic passé, par Ic financernent 
intermédiC et notamment bancaire. Cest en outre un système extrêmement 
concentré, cloisonné et relativement concurrentiel. 
La contrainte de refinancement de la Banque Centrale 
Cette evolution naurait pas été a Ia base de quclques interrogations si Ic sys- 
tème bancaire équilibrait facilernent son bilan par recours a des liquidités 
trouvées en contrepartie de titres détenus et facilement négociables sur Ic 
marché. Les banques commerciales, vu leur importante activité dc credit 
(plus de 50 pour cent du total du bilan en 1992) et leur participation obligCc 
Ia souscription des efléts publics (30 pour cent clu total du bilan en 1992), 
sont structurellement emprunteuses et sont obligées de se refinancer auprès dc 
Ia Bank A1-Maghrib. 
Le marché monétaire, pour des raisons tenant tant a limportance des concours 
de Ia Banque Centrale quau nombre trCs restreint dintervenants, ne ressem- 
ble ciue dassez loin a Iidée ciuc Ion peut se faire dun marché 50U5 son aspect 
économique dauxiliaire de Ia politique monétaire, dont il est Ia courroie de 
transmission en direction de léconomie. Autant dire que lequivalent dun 
veritable open market nexiste pas au Maroc. Si Ion considère Ia situation qui 
a fini par prévaloir de nos jours, Ic marché monétaire dans son compartiment 
interbancaire (sous tutelle de Ia Caisse de DepOts et de Gestion et du Credit 
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Populaire) ne constituc quune source de financement mineure. Les offres des 
institutions financières structurellement excédentaires ne suffisent pas a 
repondre Ia dernande des institutions structurellement dèficitaires. L'ècart 
structurel observe entre loifre et Ia demande de monnaie centrale traduit len- 
dettement des banques vis vis de Ia Banque Centrale. 
Dans un tel contexte, lexercice de Ia politique monetaire dite "daction sur Ia 
liquiditC' tend ëtre limité, ou du moms a être tenu de prendre des lormes qui 
contrarient Ic libre jeu du marchC. Obligée dassurer Ia liquidité du système, 
Ia Banque Centrale peut difficilement nialtriser Ic retinancement queue met a 
a disposition des banques. Ce refinancement du système bancaire par Ia 
Banque Centrale sopere a travers deux moyens. Le premier est une proCe- 
dure qui fonctionne de façon automatique, soit a taux préférentiel (huit pour 
cent) uniquement pour les effets privilégiés (credits lexportation et 
credits a :noycn et long terine aux PME), soil taux pCnalisateurs pour cer— 
tames avances spéciales. Le second met en oeuvre Ic principe des adjudica- 
lions contre effets publics sur Ic marchC monétaire. 
Ces deux modes de refinancement du système bancaire ont totalisé en 1992 
en moyenne de fin de mois 4,2 milliards de dirhams, soit huit pour cent des 
credits distribués par les banques, contre I ,487 inilliards de dirhams pour Ic 
marché interbancaire. Ces chiffres montrent clairement que Ic marché 
Banque Ccntrale' et soil corollaire lescoinpte constituent Ic moyen de reti— 
nancement principal. Or, ces modalités particulières de couverture du délicit 
font appel dans une large mesure a des mécanismes hors marchC. 
Ce qui diffCrencie Ic mode de concours de Ia Banque Centrale par Ic biais du 
inarché de celui de lescompte cest que Ic marchC monétaire vit au jour Ic jour, 
en attendant que soil annoncé Ic taux dintervention de Ia Banque Centrale. II 
sen suit que lot'fre de refinancement de Ia Banque Centrale sexprime unique- 
ment par Ic taux, Ia quantite accordée étant fixée par Ia demande bancaire. 
Autrement dit, faute de pouvoir faire varier Ic taux du marchC en resserrant ou 
en élargissant sa liquidite a limage de lopen market, Ia Banque Centrale fixe 
elle-mCme Ic taux de ses concours. On retrouve ici lun des ClCments consti- 
tutifs de léconomie dendettement. Cet endettement des banques aupreS de Ia 
Banque Centrale trouve son assise dans lendettement des entreprises auprès 
du système bancaire. II est maintenant chose courante de lire dans des rap- 
ports émanant des organismes autorisés que les pressions exercCes sur Ia dis— 
tribution du credit tiennent en partie linsuffisance des fonds propres des 
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entreprises ainsi qu'au taible developpement du inarché des capitaux. 
En 99 I, Ic Ministèrc du Commerce et Industrie avait agree projets 
industriels dun montant de 11 milliards de dirhams, soit Féquivalent 21 pour 
cent de Ia formation brute du capital fixe au niveau national. Le mode de 
financement sest essentiellement par les tonds propres pour pour cent, 
et les credits bancaires pour 43 pour cent; Ic reste est couvert a part presque 
entre Ic leasing et les credits fournisseurs. Tout semble indiquer que Ic 
nancement externe des entreprises marocaines est articulé sur Ic credit ban- 
caire. II en sera ainsi tant que les données du financement des entreprises, et 
notamment leur rentabilitC, imposeront cc mode de financement. 
Le credit OctroyC aux entreprises par Ic système bancaire se retrouve dans ac- 
tifdu bilan dccc dernier et constitue lune des contreparties de a masse moné- 
taire. A Ia suite de Ia suppression du contrOle quantitatif du credit en janvier 
199 I, cette contrepartie est redevenue Ic moteur principal de laccroissement 
de Ia masse monetaire. Ainsi, en 1992 les credits a téconomie représentent 
43 pour cent des contreparties de Ia masse monCtaire, contre 35 pour cent pour 
es créances sur Ic Trésor. 
Ce rapide survol qui vient d'être fait montre clairement que les deux condi- 
tions inhérentes aux economies dendettement se trouvent véritlécs pour Ic cas 
du Maroc. Le système clevrait donc Ctre apprChendé au travers dune analyse 
en termes déconomie dendettement. 
Les effets pervers de l'imitation du schema de l'économie de 
marches financiers 
Les conditions inhérentes aux economies dendettement - lendettement du 
secteur productif envers les banques et Ic refinancement contraint de ces 
dernières auprès de Ia Banque Centrale - se trouvent vériliCes pour Ic cas du 
Maroc. Or, léfticacitC de cc système a été entravéc, non seulement par Ic 
comportement irrationnel des banques, mais aussi par Ia conduite des 
autorités, tant en termes de decisions que daction. Les consequences sont 
importantes, et on pent énumérer les principales. 
Tout dabord, au travers dune analyse du cadre institutionnel et réglementaire, 
on peut dCceler que lexistence dun centre de decision public important agis- 
sant directement on par voie reglementaire fait du système bancaire un auxil- 
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iaire tie iadniinistration. En effet, si les banques restent maItresses de leur 
risque, elles ne sont pas totalement libres daccorder leurs concours. Une partie 
importante des ressources est dirigee dans le sens oü Ia puissance publique le 
juge contorme a lintérêt général. On eSt bien oblige de reconnaItre que ban- 
clues, faisant piLls une politique de distribution du credit qu'une politique de 
credit, ne peuvent pas avoir le comportement ne monitoring queues auraient 
dans un système plus liberal. Rappelons que le système financier français a 
hérité cet avantage informationnel de sa tradition déconomie dendettement. 
Ensuite, Ia politique inonétaire effectivement appliquCe nopère pas Ic choix 
entre les deux grandes categories daction. Elle applique simultanément les 
actions directes et indirectes sans intCgrer dans sa preoccupation Ic cadre insti- 
tLitionnel très particulier mentionné ci-dessus. La raréfaction du credit na pas 
contribué a relancer lactivité boursière ni suscitC Ic dCveloppement des activités 
financières hors banques tel que les billets de trCsorerie ou Ic credit interentre- 
pnses. Aussi, malgré une modification toujours en hausse des taux dintérCt 
déhiteurs, les credits léconomie augmentent continue! lement. Comment en 
serait-il autrement dans une economic qui noffre pas aux entreprises des solu- 
tions alternatives par rapport a celles proposCes par les Ctabiissements de credit? 
Ccci tend montrer que lendettement bancaire des entreprises marocaines est 
une contrainte structureile, et non une variable strategie comme Ic laisse a penser 
Ia lhéorie financière. Cela est dautant plus vrai que Ia dette est C court terme au 
regard de cc que pourrait Ctre une strategic dendettement. En effet, si dans les 
pays développés les credits a inoyen terme constituent Ia part prépondérante 
dans ioffre de credit des banques, au Maroc Ia part de ces derniers est nettement 
en retrait - dIe ne représente en moyenne que dix pour cent du total des credits 
distribués par les banques. 
Le système bancaire marocain octroje essentiellement des credits C court terme, 
afin de rCduire Ic risque financier. Ce faisant, il oblige Ies entreprises a affecter 
ces credits au financement des investissements. Cette transformation qui sopère 
au scm du système productif crée des difficultés de trésorerie et de rentabilité 
aux entreprises, en raison de Ia difference entre Ic rythme de remboursement des 
credits et Ic moment oü Ia formation du capital fixe débouche sur un accroisse- 
ment de Ia production. 
Signalons encore que cc mode de financement nest pas très developpé en cc qui 
concerne les petites et moyennes entreprises, dont les garanties de rembourse- 
ment sont trop aléatoires pour convaincre les banques C entretenir un courant 
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d'affaires avec ces firmes. Les banques rationnent Ic credit et recherchent davan- 
tage lassise financière de leniprunteur que le potentiel de crOissaflCe ou de prof- 
itabilité des projets. Un tel comportement tavorise encore plus l'élargissement 
du secteur informel. 
Conclusion 
Cette analyse laquelle nous venons de flOUS livrer nontre ben que, pour 
l'essentiel, Si on narrive pas a maltriser les difficultés du financernent des entre- 
prises, c'est parce que le schema économique que nous utilisons est conçu pour 
une economic de marches financiers. II est donc temps quon adopte Ia conduite 
dictCc par hi rCalité telle quelle est, et non pas telle que Ion voudrait quelle soit. 
II est certes souhaitable que Ic financement des entreprises soit fondé sur des 
bases plus stables, par l'accroissement simultané de lautofinancement et des 
créances nCgociables. Or, ii est assez connu, pour diverses raisons tenant pour 
l'essentiel Ia faible productivité des entreprises et des contraintes liCes au 
niveau Ct Ia dispersion des revenus, et a leurs incidences sur les comportements 
financiers des menages, quil y a peu de chances que des résultats tangibles 
soient obtenus dans cc domaine - en tout cas, pas dans un avenir immécliat. On 
doit donc admettre que Ic financenient nonétaire des entreprises conservera, par 
Ia firce des choses, un role considerable. 
II taut prendre garde C ne pas décourager l'investissement privé par Ia diniinu- 
lion dune source de financement aussi importante que Ic credit bancaire. 
Linvestissement est en soi créateur de capacité, et de son niveau depend Ic vol- 
ume des biens utilisables dans léconornie. 
Nous savons aujourd'hui que hi veritable menace pour les economies occiden- 
tales reside dans Ic ralentissement non du rythme de lépargne, mais du rythme 
de l'investissement. II faut cependant se garder de l'illusion que Ia plupart des 
difficultés peuvent Ctre surmontées uniquement par Ic recours au credit bancaire. 
Auss, il existe des limites au delC desquelles Ia surabondance de liquidite risque 
de provoquer des désordres dans Ic courant des Cchanges et dans Ia formation 
des revenus. C'est pourquoi nous ne craignons pas de repeter: si les restrictions 
monetaires sCvères et aveugles sont C proscrire, ii nen reste pas nioins que Ic lax- 
sole rnonCtaire est un moyen Ic sOr de contrarier C terme Ic développement 
economi que. 
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The present paper contains a wide-ranging, interesting, and provocative 
analysis ot corporate financing, with special emphasis on Morocco. The issue 
is addressed on the basis of an approach stressing two factors: first, enterprise 
indebtedness to the banking system; and second, commercial bank relations 
with the Central Bank. This approach is contrasted to that based primarily on 
the role of retained earnings of firms supported by capital market financing. 
The paper views bank credit as the main instrument for covering the gap 
between firms own-generated resources and their investment financing 
requirements. It stresses the role of the Central Bank in refinancing commer- 
cial banks. This function is viewed as essential to the economy's investment 
thereby downplaying the role of traditional open market opera- 
tions in the arsenal of monetary policy management instruments. In addition, 
the favors the use of quantitative credit instruments, as opposed to those 
based on indirect monetary control. Applying this approach to the case of 
Morocco, the paper notes that the absence of sufficient revenue generation 
and the narrowness of capital markets enhance the causal relationship running 
from bank credit to investment. Overall, Dr. El—Bakkali raises some impor- 
tant points about the financial sector. However, several issues warrant further 
consideration and revision. 
The paper rightly points to financial reform as a key ingredient of the policy 
challenges now facing the authorities in many developing countries, Morocco 
included. The banking system is identified as serving an essential role, being 
the main vehicle for the mobilization and allocation of loanable funds. These 
two points, however, are not sufficient to support the argument running 
throughout the paper concerning the importance of relaxing the quantitative 
constraint on bank credit as a means of encouraging investment. Indeed, 
while there is some recognition in the paper as to the need to strike an appro- 
priate balance between the different objectives of credit policy, excessive 
emphasis is placed on its utilization as an instrument to encourage private 
investment. Five main factors may be cited in support of the concern regard- 
ing Dr. El-Bakkali's analysis. These factors also call into question the practi- 
cal application of the paper's characterization of the financial system and the 
desired policy implications. 
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First and foremost, the theoretical conditions for a strong linkage between 
credit and efficient investment activities are numerous and impinge greatly on 
the factors intiLlencing the enabling macro and microeconomic environment. 
These factors need to be considered carefully before credit policy is put for- 
ward as both necessary and sufficient to encourage higher investment. 
Secondly, the risks of increasing financial imbalances are considerable, as 
demonstrated by the experience of several developing countries, especially in 
the late I 970s and throughout the I 980s. Indeed, even if the role of credit in 
facilitating investment is satisfactorily established, this does not mean that 
policymakers can ignore the other aspects of the policy instrument, particu- 
larly its role in supporting a sound and sustainable macroeconomic environ- 
ment. In addition, as the literature has demonstrated — including the often— 
quoted work by Stiglitz and Weiss as well as Hasan Ersel's paper on Turkey 
(see Chapter Three) - relaxing the quantity constraint on banks through more 
liberal Central Bank policies need not necessarily lead to higher flows for 
investment activities. There are significant problems related, inter Lilici, to 
information, moral hazard, and adverse selection. 
Moreover, the paper too easily rules out the potential role of bond and equity 
markets as well as external sources of financing, in fact, the experience of 
Morocco itself clearly illustrates how external funding on appropriate terms 
can facilitate investment and growth. Finally, the central key issue remains 
the productivity of the firms. This determines not only their creditworthiness, 
but also their ability to generate their own resources for investment; bypass- 
ing this through bank credit does not provide the conditions for sustainable 
investment and growth. In sum, several factors need to be further analyzed in 
order to shed light on whether the type of credit policy advocated by Dr. El- 
Bakkali is either necessary or sufficient for sustainable investment growth. 
7 
Emerging Equity Markets 
in Middle Eastern Countries 
Mohammed El Erian and Manmohan Kumar 
Introduction 
Several developing countries have succeeded in recent years in attracting con- 
siderable external private inflows, thereby providing an important supplement 
to domestic savings in financing productive investment activities. When 
compared to other episodes of large private capital flows to developing coun- 
tries in the last 20 years, the phenomenon differs in one basic aspect: the dom- 
inant role of foreign portfolio flows as opposed to bank financing. Indeed, it 
has been part of a broader process of internationalization and integration of 
capital markets. Overall, this process has contributed to large voluntary finan- 
cial flows from industrial to several developing countries, a surge in some 
developing countries' placement of equities in industrial country markets, and 
increased institutional linkages - including mergers and strategic alliances - 
between financial firms in industrial and developing countries. 
The process of development of equity markets and their integration with inter- 
national capital markets is less advanced in most Middle Eastern countries, 
especially when compared to economies in Latin America and Asia. Yet, cap- 
ital markets provide an important instrument for mobilizing resources — from 
domestic, regional and international sources - and for allocating them to pro- 
ductive investments. The need to exploit the potential offered by capital mar- 
kets assumes greater importance in view of the possibility of downward pres- 
sures on development assistance to the capital-scarce countries in the region, 
as well as greater international competition for foreign direct investment. It 
is also consistent with the emphasis currently being placed increasingly in the 
region on the private sector as the main engine for investment and growth. 
The aim of this paper is to review the status and role of equity markets in 
selected Middle Eastern countries. To this end, the paper explores the poten- 
tial benefits of these markets - both direct and indirect. These include the 
availability of a larger pool of investibie capital, as well as positive external- 
130 El-Ericin and Kuinar 
ities in the form of enhanced access to market-based hedging instruments, 
larger foreign direct investment inflows, and expanded export market oppor- 
tunities. Attention is also drawn to the implications for economic and finan- 
cial policies, including the challenges associated with capital market integra- 
lion with industrial countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: The introduction is followed by a broad 
Iramework developed for interpreting the current phase of private flows to 
developing countries. Within this framework, the paper will then undertake a 
comparative analysis of markets in six capital-scarce MiddleEastern countries 
(viz., Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey).' The analysis is 
based primarily on a range of quantitative indicators including market capi- 
talization and concentration, price earnings ratios, price volatility, and the 
extent of corTelation with industrial country markets. It also identifies the 
main differences within the selected set of markets and relative to interna- 
tional comparators, and examines the associated structural factors. This is fol- 
lowed by a quantitative analysis of the efficiency of selected markets in the 
region. Given the severe data limitations, the discussion must he viewed as 
tentative at this stage. Nevertheless, it provides a basis for the subsequent 
review of policies br enhancing the role of equity markets in the niacroecon- 
omy of Middle Eastern countries. The paper concludes with a summary of the 
findings. 
The process of capital market internationalization and 
developing countries 
Foreign capital provides a supplement to domestic savings for fInancing pro- 
ductive investment activities. As such, the appropriate use of foreign capital 
has the potential to enhance growth and development. Foreign capital may be 
said to be used efficiently if it is associated with activities whose rate of return 
equals or exceeds the annual cost of 'servicing" the inflows. 
The fulfillment of this condition requires the satisfaction of two related crite- 
ria - yield and transfer. The yield criterion refers to the return obtained on the 
In line with the coverage ot the Economic Research Forum. Turkey is included in the broad dcl- 
lOtion of Middle Eastern countries. Oilier active regional equity itiarkcts include Babrain. 
Kuwait. Israel, and Oman. Although there arc no formal stock markets in Saudi Arabia and the 
litiitcd Arab Emirates, equity transactions take place through the banking system. The establish— 
oem of equity markets is under consideration in Lcbanon, Sudan, and Syria. 
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financed activities, whereas the transfer criterion refers to the ability to trans- 
form the returns into foreign exchange to meet contractual obligations. 
Meeting these two related criteria implies that the foreign exchange equiva- 
lent of the marginal return on the borrowed funds exceeds the value of the ser- 
vicing. Non-fulfillment of these criteria results in the debt-servicing capaci- 
ty falling short of debt-servicing obligations, thereby leading to liquidity 
and/or solvency problems. 
The main sources of foreign capital available to developing countries have 
traditionally included commercial bank loans (voluntary and concerted), 
bonds, foreign direct and portfolio flows, as well as official bilateral and mul- 
tilateral assistance. Notwithstanding this range of sources, certain types of 
flows have tended to dominate in particular periods — particularly in the Case 
of private flows. Indeed, as discussed below, the environment for external pri- 
vate intlows currently facing developing countries is dramatically different 
from that prevailing in the 1 970s and 1 980s.2 
Background discussion on the nature of private flows to developing 
countries 
In contrast to the l990s, the external private financing environment faced by 
developing countries in the l970s and 1980s was dominated by activities relat- 
ed to international commercial banks. Specifically, the l970s and early 1980s 
were characterized by large flows to developing countries in the form of vol- 
untary commercial bank loans, mainly through syndications. These loans 
declined sharply with the onset of the debt crisis triggered by Mexico's August 
1982 announcement that it was unable to meet scheduled debt service obliga- 
tions. Several other developing countries followed suit shortly thereafter. 
The associated debt crisis reflected the growing imbalance between contrac- 
tual obligations and countries' servicing capacity as a result of inappropriate 
domestic policies and unfavorable exogenous factors (including adverse 
terms of trade, higher international interest rates, and sluggish external 
demand conditions). These factors resulted in a decline in the ability of coun- 
tries to meet the related yield and transfer criteria. The financial difficulties 
of developing countries were compounded by the sharp reduction in new bank 
2 
A historical ovclview of flows to developing countries, with emphasis on the late 9th century 
and the first 30 years of the 200i century. is contained in Eichengrcen and Lindert (I 
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flows, and the related curtailment of access to other international private cap- 
ital flows. 
With the drying up of new voluntary flows to many developing countries in 
the early l980s, the emphasis shifted to relaxing liquidity pressures through 
concerted financing from private creditors.3 This emphasis was part of the 
broader "international debt strategy which sought to strike an appropriate 
balance between adjustment and financing while ensuring relatively equitable 
burden-sharing among creditors. The strategy was based on two key elements, 
namely: the implementation by developing countries of adjustment programs 
aimed at restoring domestic and external financial stability; and the provision 
of financial support by official bilateral and commercial bank creditors. 
The provision of financial support from commercial banks initially took the 
form of rescheduling of principal obligations and concerted new money loans 
to refinance interest payments. While this approach was broadly successful 
in meeting the immediate liquidity needs of developing countries well as in 
preserving the financial integrity of the international banking system, its sus— 
tainability was uncertain. Specifically, developing country growth perfor- 
mance emained sluggish, while the mobilization of concerted bank loans 
became more difficult as a result of weakening creditor cohesion and associ- 
ated free-rider problems. En recognition of these factors, the emphasis in the 
international debt strategy shifted away from liquidity support toward more 
Fundamental restructuring of contractual debt obligations (i.e., addressing sol- 
vency issues). A key notion underlying this move was the need to address 
debt overhan concerns as a precursor to the reestablishment of developing 
countries access to voluntary international capital market financing.4 
In practical terms, this evolution in the international debt strategy was reflect- 
ed in greater use of debt and debt-service reduction instruments. Through a 
reduction in the contractual loan amount and/or interest rates, these instru— 
ments provided for a more fundamental restructuring of external liabilities 
consistent with both immediate liquidity considerations and longer—term 
external solvency issues. As of the second half of last year, an estimated 
In several cases. this was in conjlinclion with lending by international inancia! instilutioiis and 
rescheduling of official bilateral debt. 
Dooley ci. al 1990) contains a useful discussion of the debt overhang concept. 
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US$116 billion of developing country sovereign debt had been restrLtctured 
under debt and debt—service reduction resulting in an estimated 
gross reduction in the present value of obligations amounting to some US$51 
bill ion at a cost of US$1 S 
The use of debt and debt-service reduction instruments was facilitated by 
developments in the secondary market for bank claims. The initial expansion 
in this market in the second half of the 195()s was due to three thctors: banks 
swapping assets as a means of rationalizing their loan portfolios; purchases of 
debt claims for use in officially sanctioned debt-equity conversion programs; 
and retirement by corporation own-debt at a discount. The sharp increase in 
market activity, however, followed official support for debt and debt-service 
reduction operations under the Brady Plan.7 These operations greatly 
expanded the liquidity of the market through, inter alia, the creation of new 
instruments (the so-called 'Brady bonds"). While reliable data are not avail- 
able, rough estimates suggest that the size of the market grew from less than 
US$Sbillion in 1955 to US$70 billion in 1990; it expanded further to around 
US$500 billion in 
Debt and debt-service reduction operations also played a critical role in defin- 
ing the nature of the subsequent private flows to developing countries. By 
alleviating concerns about debt overhang effects and by reducing the risks of 
disruptions in creditor/debtor relations (and related adverse externalities 
the trade and payments pattern), this fundamental restructuring of 
debt liabilities was an important contributor to the success of the initial phas- 
es of the restoration by developing countries of access to the broader range of 
voluntary market financing (viz., equity and bond 
In 1994, Brazil finalized a commercial bank debt and debt-service reduction package covering 
some billion of obligations. 
See Coilyns and El-Erian (1993), who review the ham lessons for developing countries from 
the cxpencnce to date with comprehensive debt and debt-service reduction packages with coin- 
mercial hank creditors. A discussion of the restructuring of official bilateral claims on develop- 
I ng countries is contained in Kuhn et. al (1994). 
A discussion of the origins and elements of the plan is contained in Griffith-Jones (1959). 
Based on est mates reported in Leipold ci. al. (199 I). and Collyns ci. al. (I 993). 
This is discussed in El-Erian (1992). 
134 El-Erian and Kurnar 
A second factor was the impact of domestic adjustment and reform policies 
on investors perceptions of developing country risk. Indeed, this was the 
most important pull factor contributing to enhancing the profitability (in 
absolute terms) of investing in developing countries. Thus, while the 
specifics vary, the policies contributed to: (i) improved prospects for invest- 
ment and sustained economic growth due to the implementation of structural 
reforms and reduced domestic and external financial imbalances; (ii)- 
alleviation ol private sector concerns about transfer risk as the reform of the 
exchange and external payments regimes provided greater assurances on the 
availability and pricing of foreign exchange; and (iii) opening up of domestic 
capital markets to foreign investors as part of the broader program of eco- 
nomic and financial liberalization. 
It may be noted that appropriate macroeconomic policies proved essential not 
only for the initial phases of market opening and integration but also to min- 
imize the potential adverse implications of surges in capital flows. The analy- 
sis of this issue has attracted growing attention recently. Most studies confirm 
that a prompt adjustment in macroeconomic policies and flexibility in the 
domestic cost-and-price structure hold the key to avoiding the overheating 
and the loss of competitiveness that may result from such surges.IU 
The third factor contributing to renewed market access for developing coun- 
tries related to their ability to tailor financial instruments - particularly in the 
initial stages of the process of market re-entry. As illustrated by the experi- 
ence of Latin American countries in particular, key aspects (i) the 
placement of an appropriate benchmark instrument on the basis of which sub- 
sequent issues were priced off; (ii) targeting specific markets or investor seg- 
ments; and (iii) incorporating features that address particular credit risk con- 
cerns. Among the latter, several developing countries resorted to credit 
enhancement techniques.' Among such techniques, the most commonly-used 
one was that of collateralization which, by linking payments to a more secure 
source (e.g. receivables held in industrial countries), provided a means of 
reducing credit risks as well as transfer risks. 
The role of international equity flows 
Notwithstanding the return of voluntary flows to several developing coun- 
tries, there is a marked difference vis-a-vis the earlier episode of the l970s. 
II) 
For exaniple, Schadler ci. al. (I 993) 
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Thus, while there has been some resumption of voluntary bank lending to 
developing countries, its quantitative importance remains limited. 
Specifically, voluntary bank lending flows to developing country market re- 
entrants amounted to only US$2.9 billion in 1990-92, compared to US$32- 
billion in the form of international bond and equity flows." The contrast is 
even more stark for 1993, when voluntary bank loans amounted to only 
US$0.5 billion in the first half of the year compared to US$14 billion for other 
flows. 
The share of developing countries in total international bond issues in inter- 
national markets rose from a negligible level in the l980s to 2.7 percent in 
1990 and 7.1 percent in 1992; it amounted to 8.7 percent in the first half of 
1993 (Table I 12 Similarly, the share of developing countries in global equi- 
ty issuance rose from a negligible level in the 1980s to 15.5 percent in 1990 
and 40.9 percent in 1992; it totalled 32.5 percent in the first half of 1993. In 
terms of contribution to total external capital flows to developing countries, 
the share of portfolio equity and bond financing rose from 3.1 percent in 
1982-88 to 16.0 percent in 1992 (Table 2). This share varied considerably 
among developing country regions, ranging from 28.8 percent for Central and 
South American countries to 3.3 percent for Africa. 
Equity-related flows to developing countries have taken a number of forms. 
These include direct investor flows to equity markets in developing countries, 
purchases of developing market equities through pooling vehicles (such as 
country, regional and sector-specific mutual funds), and placement of devel- 
oping country equities on industrial country markets. In some cases, the asso- 
ciated inflows were facilitated by the large pool of capital owned by residents 
which had previously been held outside the developing countries. Indeed, 
return flight capital has tended to exhibit the most rapid response to improve- 
nients in the economic and financial situation of developing countries. Also 
noticeable is the widening in the coverage of international equity flows in the 
Collyns Ct. at. (1993). 
2 
The process was facilitated by the increase in the nutnbcr of developing countries that were 
assigned credit ratings by the major and most market-credible rattng agencies. As detailed it, 
Collyns Cl. al (1993). eight countries i-eceived first—tune ratings in the 18-month period ending in 
June 1993, of whtch live were investment grades. This trend has hicilitated liows from indus- 
I oat coltntry investors subject to tnternal restrict ions or prudential regulations regarding ungrad- 
ed instruments. 
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Table 1. International Bond Issues by Developing Countries and Regions 
(In millions of U.S. Dollars) 
First Half 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
l)eveloping countries 
and regions 5,487 6,164 12,428 23.526 21,718 
Africa 159 90 236 725 
Algeiia 159 90 -- -- 
South Africa -- 236 725 -- 
Asia 1,601 1,630 3,000 5846 5,430 
China -- -- 115 1289 1,057 
Hong Kong 193 66 tOO 185 657 
India 450 274 227 -- -- 
Indonesia 175 80 369 493 30 
Malaysia 425 -- -- -- 501) 
Philippines -- -- 345 
Singapore -- 105 -- 
South Korea 258 1,105 2,012 3,208 2,014 
Taiwan Province of China 100 -- 160 60 36 
Thailand -- -- 17 612 79! 
Europe 2.171 1,856 1,960 4.562 4,12(1 
Bulgaria 1(11 —— —— —— —— 
Cteehoslovakia, lorrner -- 375 277 I 29 -- 
Czech Republic -- -- -- -- 375 
Hungary 879 888 1,186 1.242 .642 
Turkey 1,190 593 497 3,191 2,1(13 
Middle East 723 -- 400 -- 1,00)) 
Israel 723 -- 400 -- 1,000 
Western Hemisphere 833 2,589 6,832 12,392 11,167 
Areentina -- 21 795 1,570 941 
Brazil -- -- .837 3,655 2,962 
Chile -- -- 200 20 333 
Colombia -- -- -- -- 325 
Mexico 570 2,306 3,373 5,916 5,932 
Panama —— —— 50 —— — — 
Trinidad and Tobago —— —— —— l()0 —— 
Uruguay —— —— —— 100 40 
Venezuela 263 262 578 932 535 
Memorandum Items 
Issues under Euro-medium term note 
(EMTN) programs -- -- 375 1.165 711) 
Argentina -- -- -- 40 50 
Brazil —— —— —— II)) 110 
Mexico -- 375 615 550 
Venezuela -- -- 400 -- 
'I'otal bond issues in 
international bond market 255,800 226,556 297,588 333.693 249,317 
Share of developing countries 
and regions in global issuance 
(in percent) 2.1 2.7 4.2 7.! 8.7 
Source: Private Market Financing for Developing Countries, IMP, 1993. 
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Table 2. Developing Countries: Capital Flows 1/ 
(In percent of total unless otherwise noted) 
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1971-76 1977-81 1982-88 1989-92 99! 992 
All developing countries 
Foreign direct investment 
Portlolio eq u it)' 
Bonds 
Coniniercia! hank loans 
Suppliers and export credits 
Official baits 
Graitts 
Total in billions of USS 
Total iii billions of 
constant dollars 2/ 
Africa 
Foreign direct investment 
Port fob io equity 
Bonds 
Commercial hank loans 
Suppliers and export credits 
Official loans 
Grants 
3otal in billions of US$ 
Total in billions of 
constant dollars 2/ 
Asia 
Foreign direct investment 
Portfolio equity 
Bonds 
Cot ninercial hank loans 
Suppliers and export credits 
Official loatis 
Grants 
Total in billions of US$ 
Total in billions ol 
con stant dollars 2/ 
Middle East and Europe 
Foreign diicct investment 
Portfolio equity 
Bonds 
Conii nercial bait k loans 
Suppliers and export credits 
Official loans 
Grants 
Total in billions of US$ 
total in billions of 
constant dollars 2/ 
Western Hemisphere 
Foreign dit'ect investment 
Portffilio equity 
Bonds 
Coot itiercial hank loans 
Suppliers and export credits 
Official loans 
Grattts 
Total in billions of US$ 
Total in billions of 
constant dollars 2/ 
10.8 8.5 10.6 17.7 18.8 18.0 
-- -- -- 3.3 4.0 5.8 
1.4 2.5 3.1 5.7 6.2 10.2 
35.8 43.5 27.9 16.2 16.6 9.6 
9.2 10.3 11.7 11.4 9.4 16.1 
30.9 26.4 35.7 31.9 29.3 28.9 
11.9 8.8 10.9 13.8 15.7 11.4 
41.2 lto.9 125.5 175.3 77.7 218.4 
78.1 117.6 117.6 138.1) 138.6 167.5 
13.3 4.7 4.4 5.8 5.2 5.4 
-- -- -- 0.3 0.5 0.9 
0.3 0.9 0.7 1.0 t).8 2.4 
18.0 23.4 16.5 9.6 9.6 7.3 
13.2 20.4 20.1) 18.2 16.9 16.0 
43.7 39.0 4(1.1 35.4 33.5 37.2 
11.4 11.7 8.3 29.7 33.5 311.8 
8.1 22.0 24.9 30.4 29.6 30.8 
14.9 22.3 22.3 22.3 21.3 21.9 
8.9 8.9 13.2 22.7 24.! 22.7 
-- -- -- 3.9 1 .6 7.5 
0.7 1.4 5.2 3.9 4.2 6.5 
21.3 30.9 31.5 23.0 25.5 14.7 
9.2 11.9 10.2 10.9 8.8 19.6 
42.2 36.)) 32.7 29.8 29.8 24.5 
17.7 10.8 7.2 5.7 6.0 4.6 
10.5 24.6 43.3 73.8 73.7 92.8 
19.8 25.7 40.8 59.8 59.0 73.4 
1.4 5.8 7.0 8.5 5.9 8.1 
-- -- -- (1.3 0.3 t).4 
0.6 t).3 1.9 6.3 3.8 9.5 
lt).0 16.2 15.4 8.6 2.3 2.1 
4.4 5.8 11.4 11.7 14.0 17.3 
43.1 43.5 40.9 30.6 3(1.0 35.3 
40.5 28.5 23.4 34.1 43.8 27.3 
5.t) 14.6 20.5 25.5 23.6 33.6 
8.8 14.9 19.1 18.9 17.2 24.0 
12.6 10.7 14.0 22.6 25.1 22.5 
-- -- -- 5.8 11.3 8.8 
2.6 4.5 2.2 10.7 13.5 20.0 
59.3 66.7 36.2 14.2 14.2 7.3 
8.7 6.2 8.8 7.3 3.7 10.2 
15.8 11.1 35.2 34.4 25.7 27.9 
1.1 0.8 3.5 5.0 6.6 3.2 
17.6 49.7 36.8 45.6 50.8 61.2 
36.6 58.1 36.0 37.8 42.5 49.6 
Soui'ce: IMF Staff estintates: atid World Batik. 
I / Gross flows (excluditig short-term loans). These data should be regarded as illustrtttive of the 
broad (tends of flows to developing countries. 
2/ I )e Paled using 1985 = IOU unit value of total imports. 
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last Couple of years in terms of borrowers and sources of funds. Thus, the 
flows of funds to developing countries in the l990s have been part of the 
broader process of internationalization and integration of capital markets. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that this process has not yet significantly 
affected countries in certain regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and, to a 
lesser extent, the Middle East. 
Emerging equity markets (especially in Asia and Latin American countries) 
have experienced sharp increases in capitalization and trading activity. The 
combined capitalization of traded equities on the 3.8 emerging stock markets 
has risen from under US$100 billion at the end of 1983 to nearly US$1 tril- 
lion by the end of October, 1993. As detailed in Feldman and Kumar (1994), 
capitalization in relation to GDP is now larger in sonie developing countries 
than in the United Kingdom and the United States. The increase in trading 
activity has also been noteworthy, amounting to some twenty—fold or more in 
Argentina, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand. 
In addition to the general issues discussed above - especially, the role of 
appropriate macroeconomic policies — several factors may be identified as 
accounting for the growth in emerging equity markets and the importance of 
international equity flows. These include structural and regulatory changes 
in the international investment process as well asdevelopments ill industrial 
country markets.t5 Overall, there has been an increase in expected returns 
from investing in developing country credit and equity instruments, combined 
with a decline in the cost of doing so; the latter was also favorably influenced 
br some time by lower opportunity costs associated with investments in 
industrial countries. 
The improvement in developing-country "fundamentals" discussed previous- 
ly has been accompanied by structural and regulatory changes facilitating the 
response of international investors. Technological progress, particularly that 
which affects information flows as well as payments and settlement systems, 
See Goldstein et. al. (1993). 
14 Indications of a correlation between economic lundamentals and cumulative equity returns 
nay he found in MuIlin (1993), including a statistically significant positive correlation with 
export growth rates. 
Sec El-Erian (1994). 
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has reduced transactions costs. This has been reinforced by increased liquid- 
ity and improved regulatory regimes. Indeed, important steps have been taken 
in several developing countries to reduce investors' risks associated with lim- 
ited liquidity, inadequate investor protection, weak accounting and informa- 
tion disclosure systems, and vulnerable payments and settlement regimes. 
The availability of investment paper in some countries has also been enhanced 
by the modalities of privatization programs. Finally, several developing coun- 
tries have rationalized the domestic taxation of equity returns, including the 
treatment of dividend income and capital gains. 
Regulatory changes in industrial country markets have also played an impor- 
tant role by lowering regulatory costs. They include rationalizing procedures 
governing registration, disclosure, and minimum credit rating standards, as 
well as the relaxation of restrictions on investment abroad by institutional 
investors and the emergence of a broader range of vehicles for such invest- 
nients (e.g. mutual funds). Particularly relevant are operations associated 
with the so-called American and global depository receipts systems (ADR and 
GDR, respectively), which provide for international trading of developing 
country stocks through trust arrangements, with the clearance and settlement 
handled by custodian banks in industrial countries.'7 Overall, the increased 
accessibility of equity markets in developing countries provided for a process 
of adjustment in the appropriately—diversified international portlolios. 
The response of investors was also affected by an important push factor - 
developments in expected common currency returns on alternative invest- 
ments. Thus, particularly in the context of expectations of relatively stable 
bilateral exchange rates, the reduction in nominal yields in industrial country 
markets in the early 1990s - especially in the United States - and, more gen- 
erally, subdued economic activity, induced investors to seek opportunities in 
developing Conversely, the increase in industrial country nomi- 
nal rates in the first half of 1994 contributed to a sharp correction in emerg- 
ing equity and bond markets. 
I)elails nay he found in International Finance Corporation (I 993). 
Sec Collyns ci. at. (1993). 
is . . - 
See Cafvo, Leideri nan and Rci uhart (1993). 
140 El-Erian and Kuniar 
Economic benefits of equity market growth and internationalization 
The process of capital market growth and internationalization provides devel- 
oping countries with a larger pool of capital which can assist in financing pro- 
ductive investment activities.'9 Indeed, recent studies document the impor- 
tance of equity financing for firms in the rapidly-growing economies of East 
Asia, even when compared to industrial countries.20 This comes at a time of 
increasing pressures on industrial country aid budgets and growing interna- 
tional competition tar the relatively less divisible foreign direct investment 
flows. 
In addition to expanding the channels for financial holdings to be harnessed 
to productive investments, the process of capital market growth and interna- 
tionalization facilitates the operation of price signals in lieu of market clear- 
ing through quantity rationing, which has proven to be more disruptive. 
Moreover, a well-functioning price mechanism, and the related potential for 
efficient mergers and acquisitions, can strengthen market discipline in devel- 
oping countries and contribute to a more efficient allocation of capital.2' The 
corollary at the macroeconomic level is the potential for the enforcement of 
greater discipline on policies through more immediate costs to policy slip- 
pages in terms of market reaction, thereby also providing for enhanced poli- 
cy credibility. 
There is a growing literature on the specific role of equity markets in eco- 
nomic development. The consensus view, as formalized by Atje and 
Jovanovic (1993), is that these markets can potentially have a beneficial 
effect, and may even lead to an increase in the steady-state growth path of an 
economy. This is so in part because they are conducive to the development 
of venture capital and, hence, technical progress. They can raise the fraction 
of financial resources available for investment by increasing liquidity, and by 
See l)ailaiiii and Atkin (1990). While the focus here is on developing Countries. It should be 
noted that there are also several benefits for industrial countries. Thus, developing country equi- 
ty markets allow or risk reduction through greater portfolio diversification. For example, the 
analysis carried out by Feldman and Kumar (1994) for the period Deceiober 1988-June 1993 
point to a low and sometimes negative correlation between stock prices in the large emerging 
markets and those in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
211 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Siagh (1994). 
21 
See Kumar (1984). Sctileifer and Vishny (1986), and Feldman and Kumar (1994). 
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enhancing the set of financial instruments available to savers seeking to diver- 
sify their portfolios. The limited availability of debt finance in many devel- 
oping countries, including bank loans which may be limited to a select group 
of companies, can also make equity finance highly attractive.2 
In part, equity markets can have a beneficial effect because by eliminating the 
likelihood of premature withdrawal of capital from firms, they can accelerate 
the growth rate of human capital production, which plays a crucial role in 
determining growth in the long run. In this context, it has been noted that high 
capital gains taxes, or taxes on equity market transactions, can directly affect 
growth rates. These taxes alter resource allocation by reducing the expected 
after-tax resale value of companies stock. This reduces the fraction of 
resources invested, and may thus have adverse consequences for growth. 
It should he noted, however, that the use of equity markets is also known to 
entail a number of potential costs. For instance, the managerial and financial 
resources required for instituting, regulating, and operating these markets 
could bear high opportunity costs. More importantly, there may be costs due 
to the separation of management and ownership, the efficiency with which 
project risks are diversified and priced and, possibly, excessive volatility. 
Particular attention has been drawn to the role of these markets in takeover 
activities and their impact on the competitiveness of companies. It is sug- 
gested, for instance, that takeovers, whether actual or potential, may reduce 
long-term investment and hence competitiveness by inducing a bias towards 
short-term profits and financial returns. In this context, the performance of 
companies in the United Kingdom and the United States is contrasted with the 
so-called bank-based systems in Germany and Japan, but without yielding 
convincing results (see Singh 1994). Evidence on this issue is even less sys- 
tematic for developing countries, but what little evidence there is does not 
sLiggest that the takeover mechanism significantly affects firms' operating 
lion zons. 
As far as the magnitude of equity financing is concerned, recent evidence 
would tend to suggest that developing country corporations use non-internal 
22 This Imniitation can reflect endogenous constraints in credit markets, resulting from adverse 
selection and incentive problems. See Feldman and Kuinar (1994) for further (liSCliSSiOfl of these 
Issues. 
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finance (such as long-term debt and equity) to a far greater extent than in 
industrial countries. While growth in industrial countries is financed over- 
whelmingly from internal sources (that is, retained profits), in the case of 
some developing countries such as Korea, Mexico, and Thailand, the median 
corporation in the top 50 financed over 80 percent of its growth from external 
sources.23 Within non-internal sources, it is shown that equity finance is a 
very important source of funds among the listed large conipanies, accounting 
in the 1980s for as much as 50 percent of corporate growth in Jordan and over 
60 percent in Turkey. In industrial countries, by contrast, net new issues on 
equity markets usually make a small contribution to corporate growth. 
The heavy reliance of these developing country corporations on equity mar- 
kets may appear surprising given the level of development of these markets 
and the fact that few listed firms actually have a long enough track record. 
Singh (1994) olfers two main explanations to account for this phenomenon. 
First, governments in several developing countries have played an active role 
in encouraging equity funding to deepen and broaden stock markets, in part 
to accommodate privatization programs and, in the case of Latin American 
countries, to attract foreign portfolio investment. Many restrictions on mar- 
ket activities have been removed, and tax incentives as well as a variety of 
non-tax benefits have been provided in order to induce firms to seek stock 
market listing and for individuals to purchase shares. For instance, in Jordan 
companies are allowed the use of the limited liability construct only if they 
oiler a minimum proportion of their equity to the general public (25 percent 
for financial institutions and 50 percent for industrial and commercial com- 
panies); in India, non-residents of Indian origin have been given special tax 
incentives to invest in the stock market; in Korea, the government has set up 
a stabilization fund in order to provide price support as well as place a statu- 
tory ceiling on debt-equity ratios for firms, thereby forcing them to seek equi- 
ty market financing. 
The second explanation for firms reliance on equity markets relates to the 
sharp decline in the cost of capital following the increase in the price-earnings 
ratios during the I 980s. For instance, in 1980 the average price-earnings ratio 
on the Korean market was about 3. By 1989, price-earnings ratios had risen 
more than fourfold (average 14), and thus the cost of equity capital fell 
Siiigh and Hamid (1992), and Singli (1994). 
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sharply. In terms of cash flow, taking into account taxes, the cost of equity 
capital to Korean corporations in 1989 is estimated to have been only three 
percent, as dividend yields were only two percent. This compares with a fig- 
nrc of 12.5 percent for commercial bank loans. Singh (1994) notes that there 
appears to be some positive relationship between equity financing and the 
long-term price-earnings ratios in a sample of developing countries. 
The internationalization of developing countries' equity markets entails three 
important indirect benefits which also warrant mention at this stage. First, it 
enhances developing countries' ability to use market-based risk management 
techniques so as to reduce the cost of unfavorable international price devel- 
opments. This is particularly important for countries with limited trade diver- 
sification. Thus, the reduction in country-specific risk perceptions provides 
several developing countries with access to cost-effective hedging tools that 
limit the impact of unanticipated adverse developments in both commodity 
prices and international interest rates.24 Secondly, as investors learn about 
investment opportunities in developing countries, there is a range of potential 
positive externality effects. These include improvements in the financial 
intermediation process resulting from the increased liquidity and efficiency of 
developing country financial markets, as well as potential transfers of exper- 
tise and technology. In addition, by reducing the so-called "recognition prob- 
letii," there is scope for larger foreign direct investment and higher exports. 
Thirdly, by increasing the immediate costs of policy slippages and thereby 
providing for a more etfective disciplinary instrument on policy-makers, 
greater integration with international capital markets can play a decisive role 
in enhancing policy credibility. 
As is the case with other types of financial inflows, the use of equity financ- 
ing may be deemed efficient if, as discussed earlier, it is associated with activ- 
ities whose rate of return equals or exceeds the annual cost of "servicing" the 
inflows. An important aspect of equity finance is that its "servicing" (through 
profit transfers and dividend payments) is linked directly to the performance 
of the underlying investment. As a result, in assessing the yield criterion, there 
is a more direct correspondence between the capacity to meet the payments 
and contractual obligations. This may be compared to loans where payments 
are not directly linked to the performance of the financed activity. In partic- 
24 
Mathieson ct a!. (1989) n2views the actual and potential use of market-based management 
Instrulnents by developing Countries. 
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ular, the attractiveness of loreign direct and portfolio investment increases in 
the context of a relatively high stock of debt. 
The internationalization of equity markets entails important challenges for 
policy-makers. With a more open capital account, the economy becomes more 
vulnerable to shifts in investors sentiment. Hence, policy slippages translate 
more quickly into capital outflows and currency substitution. Moreover, the 
capital markets of developing countries may become more sensitive to price 
instability in industrial country markets — the so—called 'contagion effects" of 
financial market instability. Surges in external capital inflows may also corn— 
plicate economic management through increased inflationary pressures and 
appreciations in the real effective exchange rate, with potential adverse effects 
on international competitiveness.25 The associated risks are more pronounced 
in cases where push-induced flows - as well as associated "bandwagon 
effects" - are important and result in "bubbles" (that is, price levels that are not 
sustainable by the economic 
Analysis of equity markets in selected Middle Eastern countries 
Following the general discussion of equity financing in developing countries, 
the paper will now review the status of equity markets in the Middle East, 
locusing on six countries, namely: Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Turkey. This set covers relatively active markets (Jordan and Turkey), an 
established but less active market (Egypt), and more recently-established ones 
(Iran, Morocco, and Tunisia). The discussion below first provides general 
background infarmation, and then, using quantitative indicators, compares 
equity markets in these countries with other emerging markets. 
Some general features of the marketplace 
The financial sector in Middle Eastern countries is dominated by commercial 
banks. Securities markets in these countries are relatively small, despite the 
fact that the region contains some of the developing world's largest institu- 
tional investors in the international bond markets. For instance, the total cap- 
italization of the Arab securities markets, reflecting mainly loan rather than 
risk finance, is around US$50 billion, compared to the region's !rivate sector 
25 
Sec Schadler ci. at. (1993). 
2(, 
See, foi example. the (IISCUSSIOI1 on Hong Kong contained in Kumar (1994). 
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foreign asset holdings of over US$700 billion.27 Foreign participation, even 
in government bond markets, is practically non-existent. Similarly, there have 
been few direct placements of Middle Eastern equities on foreign markets. 
Moreover, the use of market-based risk management instruments by countries 
in the region has been extremely narrow, despite the relatively limited degree 
of export diversification. 
While there are considerable differences across countries in the importance of 
equity markets, with Jordan and Turkey having thriving markets, the supply of 
corporate securities remains generally limited, both in absolute terms and rel- 
ative to the size of the economies. As discussed below, this reflects several fac- 
tors which have constrained demand for, and supply of, equities, including the 
closed, family-owned nature of many companies in the region. Moreover, in 
several countries public sector enterprises continue to play a dominant role in 
a wide range of economic activities. The number of effectively-quoted com- 
panies has thus been relatively small, while shares available for trading have 
been limited, and the markets have, in general, remained thin and illiquid. 
Due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of equity markets, the region has 
attracted a disproportionately small share of recent international flows to 
developing countries. Thus, according to the data compiled by Fleming 
Investment Management Limited, Arab countries received around US$0.2 bil- 
lion out of the total of US$52 billion that flowed into developing country 
equity markets in 19932S The region's share of inflows associated with new 
issues was also negligible. More broadly, IFC data indicate that Arab coun- 
tries accounted for only about two percent of total flows of foreign portfolio 
and direct investment in developing countries in 1989-92, with the bulk of the 
Arab country share reflecting foreign direct 
in Middle Eastern countries other than Jordan and 
Turkey are small, the provision of risk finance and the tradition of market 
trading is hardly new. In Egypt, for instance, the Alexandria and Cairo stock 
exchanges are both over one century old, and the Cairo stock market was one 
of the most active in the world in the 1940s. Other countries have also had 
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stock exchanges for many years: an exchange was set up in Iran in 1966, and 
in Tunisia in 1969. 
It is increasingly recognized that, given the competition br foreign sources of 
funding and the limited availability of domestic finance in some countries rel- 
ative to their developmental needs, equity markets could play an important 
role in providing capital to productive sectors, as well as in facilitating the 
of privatization. As noted above, the experiences of other developing 
countries is encouraging in this regard. They demonstrate that if conditions 
are right, relatively dormant markets can become relatively liquid and func- 
tioning quickly, with considerable potential. These issues are discussed below. 
Development of nzarkets3" 
Jordan has a relatively highly developed equity market which plays an impor— 
tant part in the economic life of the country.3' Instruments traded on the stock 
exchange include private corporate equities and bonds, Jordanian government 
bonds, and Jordanian dinar certificates of deposits issued by commercial 
banks. The bull market of the early I 980s was associated, inter aim, with an 
influx of remittances trom workers in the Arab oil countries following the 
sharp rise in international oil prices. With the fall in oil prices, remittances 
declined sharply, and funds were withdrawn. A second generalized surge was 
recorded starting in 1992, consistent with the marked improvement in eco- 
nomic and financial performance. Activity was well above all previously 
recorded levels, with a daily volume averaging about US$5 million and daily 
trading levels exceeding US$10 million on several occasions. 
Concerning the institutional environment, the government promulgated in 
1986 the Encouragement of Investment Law, in which it provided numerous 
tax exemptions and holidays for any investment in the securities industry. 
Capital gains, earned interest, profits and dividends are all tax-exempt. There 
are no special regulations affecting foreign investors; Arab and non-Arab 
investors aye all treated on an equal footing with Jordanian investors. In addi- 
tion, the repatriation of investment income (in any convertible currency) out 
For a detailed discussion of Arab equity markets in general. see Ahisourour ((994). which 
part 01 an ongoing project by the Arab Monctary Fund. 
See Toiikan (1994). who details the structure of the Atnttian Stock Exchange cstahlrshcd 
197S. 
Emerging Equity Markets 147 
of Jordan by non-residents is free of restrictions. 
In the case of Turkey, although securities trading has had a long history (the 
first securities market was established in the late I 860s), the equity market in 
its present form is recent. Centered around the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE), it dates back to the enactment of a capital market law in 1983. This was 
associated with the governments broader policy of financial and economic 
liberalization. In part, the governments desire to develop a deeper capital 
market stemmed from a decision to privatize the large and inefficient state 
enterprises. The privatization program was launched in 1986, but experience 
with privatization has not been entirely successful, leading to public sector 
shares being offered outside the stock exchange. The operational elements of 
the exchange have been significantly improved during the last few years. 
Since 1989, foreign investors have been permitted to trade in listed securities 
with no restrictions, and pay no withholding or capital gains tax provided they 
are registered with the Capital Markets Board (CMB) and the Treasury. Also, 
there is considerable information available on the stock market and its con- 
stituent stocks on a regular basis. 
Listing requirements are quite stringent in Turkey: for securities to be listed 
on the ISE, the company must offer at least 15 percent of the companys 
shares to the public; have some trading history; be in a sound financial con- 
dition as determined by the exchange; and present a detailed prospectus for 
public offering. Reporting requirements for companies that are listed on the 
exchange are twofold: those imposed by the CMB, which governs stock mar- 
ket activities, and those imposed by the ISE. CMB regulations require regu- 
lar independent external auditing of companies listed in the ISE, as well as 
special audits conducted when the company is going through a public offer- 
ing, merger, acquisition, or liquidation. Listed companies are under an oblig- 
ation to provide the ISE with information concerning their operations, includ- 
ing such aspects as annual financial statements; minutes of general assembly 
meetings; account statements; and changes in shareholders owning 10 percent 
or more of the companys stock. 
In Egypt, the Cairo Stock Exchange was founded in 1883. As early as 1906 
there were over 300 quoted companies. Activity remained relatively brisk 
until the nationalization program of the early 1960s, when trading volumes 
virtually collapsed and only about 30 companies remained listed as compared 
to 925 in the late 1950s. The exchange was never closed, however, and as the 
148 El-Erian and Kumar 
market shrank, the government subsidized the remaining brokers whose com- 
missions had fallen sharply. Greater attention has been devoted recently to the 
potential role of equity markets within the context of Egypt's adjustment and 
structural reform program. Specifically, the equity market is viewed as pro- 
viding an important instrument for mobilizing domestic and external 
resources; indeed, it is reported that without access to a well-functioning cap- 
ital market, many otherwise viable firms may not be able to continue operat- 
ing in the face of increased foreign competition. Moreover, equity markets 
would facilitate the privatization of state-owned enterprises, as well as broad- 
en the economy's ownership base.32 In addition, there is growing interest 
among market operators in expanding the range of instruments (including the 
introduction of mutual funds). This is accompanied, as discussed below, by 
greater efforts on the part of market authorities and regulators to reduce insti- 
tutional, legal and other impediments. 
The institution of stock exchanges in the other three countries is more recent 
as compared to Egypt and Turkey: Iran in 1966, Tunisia in 1969, and Morocco 
in 1973. In these countries, the bourses did not play a major part in econom- 
ic life in the l970s and 1980s, reflecting, jilter alia, the role of government- 
directed credits and concessional facilities. With the reform of the financial 
sector, more emphasis is being placed on equity markets. 
Comparative market indicators 
Before examining the factors which may explain why Middle Eastern markets 
have in general remained small and the differences among them, one should 
consider a number of indicators of market activity and performance, and com- 
pare them with other countries. Table 3 provides data on market capitalization 
of equities for two benchmark years (1983 and 1992). In 1983, the equity mar- 
ket in Egypt was larger than that in Turkey, as well as several other emerging 
markets, when judged by capitalization (in U.S.dollar terms) as well as in rela- 
tion to GDP. However, by the end of 1992, while the Egyptian market had 
increased roughly two and a half fold, other emerging markets, including the 
Turkish one, had increased by a factor of JO or more. It is also noticeable that, 
at the end of 1992, the ratio of Jordan's market capitalization to GDP exceed- 
ed the ratios of most emerging markets, and was similar to that in industrial 
countries. 
32 
Fag FI-Nour (I 994). 
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Table 3. Market Capitalization of Traded Equities 
(Millions of U.S. Dollars and Percent of GDP) 
1983 1992 
Milhons of Percent of Millions of Percent ol 
U.S. Dollars GDP U.S Dollars GDP 
ERF 1/ Countries 
Egypt 1106 3.0 2594 6.2 
Iran —— —— 1157 0.1 
Jordan 2713 56.7 3365 73.9 
Morocco 253 2.1 1876 6.6 
Tunisia -- -- 46 0.3 
Turkey 968 2.0 9931 8.9 
Other Emerging Markets 
Argentina 1386 1.3 18633 8.2 
Chile 2599 13.2 29644 78.1 
Colombia 857 0.9 5681 11.6 
Greece 964 2.76 9489 12.2 
India 7178 7.2 65119 26.7 
Kenya -- 607 7.5 
Nigeria 2970 3.7 1243 4.5 
Philippines 389 1.4 13794 26.2 
Thailand 488 1.5 58259 55.4 
Industrial Markets 
Japan 565164 47.6 2399004 65.4 
United Kingdoiii 225800 48.9 838579 79.8 
United States I 898063 55.7 4757879 78.8 
Sources: IFC Emerging Markets Fact books and International Financial Statistics. 
I / Econ olnic Research Forum. 
—— I ud cates dat a not avai able. 
In terms of the numbers of listed companies and value traded, the picture 
looks rather different. As Table 4 illustrates, the number of listed companies 
in Egypt increased from 154 to 656, compared to a much smaller increase in 
several other countries and a decline in others. However, if one considers 
activity on the market as measured by value traded, Egypts increase was lim- 
ited when compared to other markets. Consequently, value traded remains 
small relative to the number of companies quoted. In the case of Morocco and 
Tunisia, the average value traded has increased, but it remains relatively 
small, especially in the case of the latter market. Trading volume in the 
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1978 to US$640 million in 1989, and further to US$1.5 billion in 1993 (the 
largest in all Arab countries). During the same period, the number of listed 
companies rose from under 70 to almost 1 
The interpretation of some of these raw data needs to be qualified with a num- 
ber of observations. In Egypt, for instance, the 674 shares listed include over 
400 that are closed companies, with the rest seldom trading. Companies, 
including those that are fully owned by state entities, choose to list in order to 
take advantage of tax breaks. It is estimated that the shares of only about 80 
companies actually trade, even though this represents an increase from 40 in 
Similarly, market capitalization data, which show the nominal value 
of all listed shares, should also be interpreted with caution; indeed, the exclu- 
sion of listed shares that are not available for trading sharply reduces the total. 
At the same time, those few shares that do trade usually do so at a multiple of 
their nominal value, thereby raising the total. After taking these factors into 
consideration, it has been estimated that market capitalization of the stocks 
that trade is probably around U$0.5billion.35 
Finally, it is worth noting that in both Jordan and Turkey, market concentra- 
tion (defined as the share of capitalization held by the ten largest stocks), 
albeit high compared to industrial country markets, is by no means out of line 
with market concentration in other emerging markets (Table 5). Moreover, 
capitalization concentration has declined over the last few years in both coun- 
tries. There has been an even more significant decline in the share of value 
traded by the most active stocks, which attests to the increasing breadth and 
depth of these two markets. 
Determinants of stock equity development 
Consistent with the general analysis presented above, the absolute and rela- 
tive developments of Middle Eastern equity markets are related to a range of 
economic, financial, institutional and legal factors. Market deepening and 
related international linkages have progressed furthest in the context of sus- 
Toukan (1994). 
Fag El-Nour (1994). 
See Morland (1993). The unadjusted market capitalization amounted to some US$3 billion at 
the end of 1992. 
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Table 5. Market Concentration 
1988 
Share of Capi- Share of 
talization Value Traded 




Share of Capi- Share of 
talization Value Traded 
held by len by ten roost 
largest active 
Stocks Stocks 
tamed implementation of financial sector reforms and, more generally, poli- 
cies aimed at liberalizing economic activities and reducing financial 
imbalances. The sustainability of normal financial relations with existing 
external creditors, characterized by timely payment of scheduled contractual 
obligations, has also been an important factor. 
Historically, the financial sector in many Middle Eastern countries (especial- 
ly the non-oil economies) was characterized by strict controls over rates of 
returns and administrative allocation of credit through the banking system 
and specialized public sector financial institutions. In recognition of the 
adverse impact on the overall process of financial intermediation - in the 
domestic mobilization and allocation of loanable funds as well as in the com- 
petition for international funds - several Middle Eastern countries have 
undertaken financial liberalization efforts. Measures included greater price 
tiexibility, reduction of preferential credit facilities, and a move towards indi- 
rect monetary control instruments. In some countries, efforts were also 
directed at deepening domestic capital markets. 
Joi'dan 62.2 46.0 49.4 31.6 
Turkey 43.6 65.5 39.9 11.4 
Argentina 53.2 78.5 68.8 72.5 
Colombia 64.4 60.1 78.5 62.9 
Greece 44.8 60.3 43.6 50.4 
India 22.6 56.6 22.6 32.2 
Nigeria 49.4 48.8 48.5 53.6 
Philippines 54.6 56.8 22.6 32.2 
Japan Il 24.6 -- 16.5 -- 
United Kingdom 22.7 -- 24.2 -- 
United States 13.7 -- 14.9 -- 
Sources: IFC 
I! I)ata for industrial markets arc for April 1988 and April 1992. 
-- Indicates data not available. 
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As noted earlier, the development of equity markets and their international- 
ization have also been adversely affected by investors concerns regarding 
structural inadequacies in the legal and regulatory framework. The impact of 
financial sector reforms aimed at addressing these aspects has differed among 
countries due to two sets of factors. First, progress in the implementation of 
market-enhancing measures, such as: (i) improvements in trading, reporting 
and accounting systems; (ii) strengthening of legal procedures; and (iii) 
removal of' fiscal distortions which discourage equity financing. Secondly, 
progress in the broader program of economic and financial liberalization, par- 
ticularly in the areas of: (i) liberalization of regulations governing foreign 
direct and portfolio investments, including ownership, market access, and 
repatriation of capital, dividends and profits; (ii) privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, especially in the industrial, telecommunication, and financial sec- 
tors; and (iii)liberalization of the domestic investment regime, including the 
dismantling of government monopolistic and oligopolistic structures.36 
As noted in our previous analysis, there is also a need to consider the status 
of financial relations with existing creditors. After rescheduling in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Turkey met scheduled debt payments without recourse 
to debt restructuring, thus enhancing during this period the domestic and 
external private sectors positive perceptions of that country's transfer risks. 
Jordan recently concluded a commercial bank package incorporating debt and 
debt-service reduction elements.37 Anticipations of the beneficial impact of 
this package and, more importantly, the accompanying adjustment and reform 
policies, were reflected in a sharp increase in the secondary market valuation 
of Jordan's debt and is expected to facilitate its tapping of international finan- 
cial markets. Egypt, whose debt is predominantly to official creditors, has 
completed two of the three stages of debt forgiveness with the Paris Club. 
Interestingly, reaction in the secondary market prices for Egypt's bank claims 
has been relatively more subdued.35 Iran has achieved some progress in nor- 
malizing its external payments situation through bilateral refinancing arrange- 
A review of structural reform policies in Arab countries may be found in El-Erian and Tareq 
(1993). The Tunisian experience is discussed in Nsouli et. al.(l994). 
Debt restructured under debt and debt-service obligations amounted to some US$735 million, 
resulting in an estimated reduction of US$360 million in the present value of the debt at a cost of 
some US$150 million. 
This partly reflects the operation of the debt.equity program which provided for conversions 
at a price of 50 cents on US$1 of face value of external private debt liabilities. 
154 El-Erian and Kurnar 
ments. Finally, in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, external financial relations 
do not seem to have been the binding constraint on the expansion of equity 
markets. Thus, both countries have maintained normal payments relations 
with external creditors in recent years, with Morocco experiencing a sharp 
Chart 1: Secondary Market Rates 
40 
38 
naker IS 13d 
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increase in secondary market prices (Chartl).35 
Market volatility and informational efficiency 
Stock market efficiency plays an important role in enhancing the contribution 
of equity markets to the economic growth of countries. There are two related 
types of issues which are important with regard to the functioning of emerg- 
ing equity markets in general, and which are specifically explored below for 
Jordan and Turkey (the two most developed equity markets in the Middle 
East): the extent of volatility and the information content of prices. 
The first issue relates to the short-term volatility in stock prices, which is said 
to be 'excessive. Such excessive volatility would tend to discourage the par- 
ticipation of risk-neutral and risk-averse investors. In theory, while it is diffi- 
cult to have a clear criterion for defining the degree of "excessiveness", in 
practice, the standard usually adopted is that of the volatility of the established 
industrial country stock markets.4° To the extent that emerging markets are 
more volatile, the reasons are considered to lie in the relative illiquidity in the 
markets and the sporadic availability of adequate information about quoted 
companies. The excessive volatility, in turn, is thought likely to lead to a 
weakening of investors' confidence, thus setting up a vicious cycle. 
At first sight, the two Middle Eastern markets above differ considerably from 
each other, with a measure of volatility showing the Turkish market to exhib- 
it considerably greater volatility than the Jordanian market (Table 6). 
Compared also to other emerging markets, the volatility in the Turkish mar- 
ket has been high. In general, emerging markets have been more volatile than 
industrial country markets. It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that as 
emerging markets develop and as information is reflected more quickly and 
efficiently, one should expect some increase in volatility initially. This, how- 
ever, would be a short-term phenomenon related to the developmental nature of 
Morocco's last bank-debt rescheduling dates back to September 1990; it last rescheduled its 
official bilateral debt in 1992 under the auspices of the Paris Club. Tunisia has not rescheduled 
in recent years. 
40 
A framework for assessing volatility was provided by Shiller (19S1), who showed that varia- 
tions in aggregate stock market prices were much too large to be justified by the variation in sub- 
sequent dividend payments. However, other studies have suggested that Shiller's tests depend 
crucially on the correctness of his model of the dividend process (see Marsh and Merton [1986]). 
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Table 6. Volatility in Selected Equity Markets, 1983-93 1/ 
1983-93 1983-88 1989-93 
Chile 7.6 7.9 7.2 
Colombia 9.3 6.3 11.6 
Hong Kong 8.! 10.0 6.8 
India 10.0 7.5 2.8 
Jordan 4.6 3.9 5.3.. 
Korea 8.2 7.5 9.0 
Mexico 13.8 16.4 7.9 
Pakistan 6.7 2.8 8.8 
Thailand 7.7 7.1 8.7 
Turkey 21.2 24.3 19.8 
Zimbabwe 8.9 9.5 7.7 
Japan 0.9 3.8 5.7 
United Kingdom 1.1 4.7 3.9 
United States 1.0 3.8 2.9 
I! Measured by the standard deviation of the percentage change in equity prices (at end- 
month) in domestic currency: data for 1993 are up to August. 
the market rather than an element that is intrinsic to underlying economic and 
financial factors. 
The second issue concerns the information content of prices and the possibili- 
ty of speculative bubbles. A bubble exists if the only reason for the stock price 
to be higher today is that investors believe that the price will be higher tomor- 
row, that is, when economic fundamentals do not justify such a price.4' In this 
situation, prices can keep increasing for considerable lengths of time relative to 
the levels warranted by fundamentals, only to fall sharply upon abrupt changes 
in market sentiment. There is a large literature in this area, and the discussion 
below first briefly summarizes some of the key issues concerning the related 
concept of market efficiency, and then presents some empirical evidence for 
Jordan and Turkey, as well as for some other emerging equity markets. 
Efficient Equity Markets 
The main issue examined here is the degree to which emerging equity mar- 
kets are efficient in pricing securities. The market is said to be efficient if it 
See Stiglitz (1990). 
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fully and correctly reflects all relevant information in determining security 
prices.42 In other words, in a free and competitive market the prices of finan- 
cial securities should generally reflect all publicly-available information, and 
these prices should adjust rapidly to new information. Thus, there are two 
aspects to market efficiency: the type of information that the market is react- 
ing to, and the speed with which the market reacts to that information. Since 
in an efficient market prices are assumed to reflect all available information 
at any given time, the current price of an asset would be a good estimate of its 
intrinsic value owing to competition among market participants. 
In a world of uncertainty, however, the intrinsic value cannot be properly 
determined. Hence, there will be differences of opinion among market partic- 
ipants as to the value of each share, so that actual prices will wander around 
the intrinsic value. According to the efficient market hypothesis, however, 
competition among investors will ensure that these discrepancies are not too 
large to be profitably used. In a dynamic economy intrinsic values can them- 
selves change as a result of new information. In case new information is 
gradually known to market participants, successive price changes will 
exhibit dependence. However, if the adjustment to new information is instan- 
taneous successive price changes will be independent. 
Thus, the issue becomes whether successive price changes over a short pen- 
0(1 exhibit any systematic patterns or whether they are indistinguishable from 
random walks.43 A random walk implies that a series of stock price changes 
has no memory, that is, the past history of the series cannot be used to predict 
the future in any meaningful way. With the independence assumption, it is 
assumed that successive price changes or changes in returns are identically 
distributed according to some stationary distribution. 
42 Theie is a very large literature in this area. For a summary of the key issues, see Fama (1976), 
and Fama and French (1988). 
The random walk hypothesis is. with the so-called 'weak' form of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH). It asserts that prices fully reflect the information contained in the his- 
torical sequence of prices. Thus, investors cannot devise an investment strategy to yield abnor- 
nial profits on the basis of an analysis of past price patterns. The "semi-strong" form of EMH 
asserts that current stock prices reflect not only historical price information but all publicly-avail- 
able information. The "strong" form of EMH asserts that all information that is known to any 
market participant is fully rellected in market prices. (For details, sec Famna [l976], and 
Kaminsky and Kumar [I 9901). 
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where Pt is the spot price of the stock at time t; also, is assumed to be a 
sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables so that the 
joint density f(e1 = )i(e5) for s t. 
It can easily be seen that the random walk model implies several testable 
restrictions on First, it follows from (1) that 
I 
= (2) 
and hence the conditional expectation based on information available at time 
and denoted by is 
= Pt (3) 
If prices do follow a random walk, it means that past prices contain no useful 
information regarding their future movements. This would mean that prices 
adjust rapidly to new information. So the independence of price changes is 
consistent with the efficient market. 
The random walk hypothesis is borne out, to varying degrees, in active indus- 
trial country markets, indicating that only competitive rates of returns are like- 
ly to he earned over time, and that prices in such markets adjust instanta- 
neously to new information as SOOfl as it is publicly available.44 In emerging 
markets, there may be dependence in prices for several reasons: Companies 
divulge far less information to investors compared to that available to 
investors in industrial countries; companies are subject to less investment 
As noted above, there is a large empirical literature in this area. The basic conclusion is that, 
while there certainly are instances of departure from the Efficient Markets Hypothesis in indus- 
trial country markets, in general these markets are extremely efficient in utilizing information. 
Sec Malkiel (1991). 
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research; and small markets are technically less elaborately organized. In 
addition, there are other structural and institutional factors involved: Markets 
have difficulty in detecting and discriminating among investment opportuni- 
ties; capital markets are fragmented; a dichotomy exists in financial activities 
between organized and unorganized money markets; and investors have short- 
er horizons because of greater political and economic uncertainties. 
Moreover, there are many potential and actual imperfections creating ineffi- 
ciencies even in the most researched and regulated stock exchanges arising 
from transactions costs, speculative bubbles, disinterested shareholders, and 
information that is not freely available. In the case of emerging markets, the 
likelihood of these inefficiencies is higher, thereby rendering share prices 
temporarily dependent. 
The goal of the econometric exercises reported below is to assess whether stock 
prices in Jordan and Turkey displayed any systematic patterns or whether they 
are indistinguishable from random walks. The results have interesting impli- 
cations for portfolio management and the allocative efficiency of securities 
markets, as well as several related issues. 
Empirical evidence for Jordan and Turkey 
There are three methodological points which should be considered before test- 
ing the hypothesis of market efficiency: the level of disaggregation; the time 
interval over which prices are analyzed; and the standard of comparison. The 
analysis below uses indices of equity prices for the stock markets as a whole, 
rather than data on individual share prices. Although there are well-known 
problems in using an index rather than data on individual shares - an aggrega- 
tive index may behave more systematically than its components due to the 
reduction of the random elements by averaging - data on individual series were 
not available. With regard to the time interval, the ideal would have been the 
information on transactions. Since this was not available, daily and weekly 
data were used. Daily data has the advantage of providing contiguous obser- 
vations, although these data suffer from institutional cycles, such as no trading 
on weekends. 
In order to provide some basis for comparison, the analysis was undertaken for 
three other countries in addition to Jordan and Turkey, namely: Greece, India, 
and the Philippines. This comparison also allows for an assessment of the 
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effect of short-term co-variation in the Jordanian and Turkish stock markets on 
the one hand, and the markets of the three other countries on the other. Greece 
was chosen because of its proximity to Turkey, as well as the similarity in the 
capitalization of Greek and Turkish markets both in 1983 and 1992. The 
Philippines also had similar capitalization, while India was chosen to compare 
with a market with a significantly larger capitalization. 
The empirical evidence is based on the serial correlation as well as on the non- 
parametric 'runs techniques. The serial correlation analysis follows directly 
from equation (1) to (3) and tests the linear independence of log price changes. 
It indicates whether price changes at time (t) are influenced by price changes 
occurring (k) period earlier, where k indicates the lag length. It would be 
expected that if there is to be any correlation in log price changes, the most like- 
ly would be between successive terms, that is, k = I, rather than with k> I. 
The results of the serial correlation analysis, for k= 1 to 10, for both daily and 
weekly prices, are provided in Table 7. For the daily series, the results indi- 
cate that for both Jordan and Turkey as well as the Philippines, the first-order 
serial correlations are highly significant. In other words, there is serial depen- 
dence among day-to-day price changes in the stock markets in these countries, 
and the random walk model does not hold. With regard to higher order coef- 
ficients, the third, fi.urth and the sixth-order are significant for Jordan, while 
in the case of both Greece and India, some higher order coefficients are also 
significant. This suggests that not only successive price changes are related 
but distant lagged changes also exhibit some association. In general, howev- 
er, for longer lags the coefficients are relatively small, and there is very little 
pattern in the signs of serial correlations. 
In the case of weekly data, the pattern is somewhat different. The first order 
coefficients are statistically significant only for Greece, but several of the 
higher order coefficients are significant for the other countries. Taken togeth- 
er, both daily and weekly price series suggest some departures from the ran- 
dom walk hypothesis. It should be emphasized, however, that while a quan- 
titatively small serial correlation coefficient could be highly significant statis- 
tically, it may imply dependence which has limited economic significance. 
Thus, the serial dependence displayed by some of the indexes can hardly be 
used for predicting the future course in a meaningful manner. This is so 
because the proportion of variance in current price changes explained by past 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































162 El-Erian and Kumar 
investors, dependence of such a low order may not be enough to increase their 
expected profits. 
Next, a statistical exercise was undertaken in order to examine the efficiency 
hypothesis using runs analysis. This is important as it captures the possibili- 
ty that share prices may be random most of the time but may become serially 
correlated for varying periods of time, and such dependence may not be 
detected by serial correlations.45 Moreover, serial coefficients may be domi- 
nated by a few unusual or extreme price changes, so that a tendency towards 
a coherent pattern of price changes is obscured by one or two instances. 
Further, the runs tests, non-parametric in nature as they are, do not depend on 
the finite-variance assumption of price changes. A runs test is performed by 
comparing the actual number of runs (defined as a sequence of price changes 
of the same sign preceded and followed by price changes of different signs) 
with the expected number of runs ott the assumption that price changes are 
independent. If the observed runs are not significantly different from the 
expected number of runs, then the inference is that successive price changes are 
independent. 
The results of the runs analysis for both daily and weekly data are provided in 
Table 8. The first and fifth columns in the table indicate the number of times 
when there were positive, negative or zero changes in prices. The second and 
fourth columns indicate the number of positive, negative or zero runs, while the 
third and sixth columns indicate the total number of runs. It should be noted 
that runs were calculated up to a lag of 10. For instance, a positive run of lag k 
indicates a sequence of k positive price changes preceded and succeeded by 
either negative or zero price changes. 
The expected number of runs of all types can be computed under the hypothe- 
sis that successive price changes are independent, and on the assumption that 
sample proportions of positive, negative and no-price changes are unbiased 
estimates of the population proportions.46 The expected value of total runs is 
given in columns 4 and 8. In the case of Turkey, for example, the expected 
Statistical tests based on the theory of runs ignore the absolute values in a lime series and 
obscive only their signs. That is, they are concerned with the direction of changes in a given time 
series (see Baillie and McMahon t19891). 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































164 El-Erian and Kumar 
number of total runs (positive, negative, and zero) for daily data was 142.5, as 
compared with the actual number of runs of 127. The normalized test statistic 
showed that the null hypothesis of independence of runs could be rejected at the 
10 percent level of' significance. Similarly, for Jordan the null hypothesis could 
be rejected at the I percent level. As for the other three countries, the differ- 
ences between actual and expected runs were also highly significant for Greece 
and the Philippines. Therefore, with the exception of India, in each case the 
actual number of runs fell significantly short of the total expected number, thus 
implying positive serial correlation. 
A comparison of' the total number of observed and expected runs for weekly data 
series reveals a rather different picture. While for Jordan the null hypothesis is 
again rejected at the 1 percent level, for none of the other countries is the differ- 
ence between the actual and the expected number of runs statistically significant. 
To sum up this section, the results of the econometric exercises suggest that 
there are some differences between the operational efficiency of the two most 
active Middle Eastern equity markets. While the Turkish market exhibits 
greater price volatility, it also appears less likely to have serial dependence in 
prices, that is, the behavior of equity prices provides greater support to the 
weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. These results are consistent 
with the increasing depth and liquidity of the Turkish market. However, tak- 
ing all the statistical results together, it is also the case that the behavior of 
both markets is not markedly different from that of a sample of other emerg- 
ing markets. This, in turn, suggests a number of similar underlying factors 
impinging on the operational efficiency of emerging equity markets. Such 
factors are discussed below. 
Developing and improving equity markets in Middle 
Eastern countries 
Notwithstanding their relatively limited development to date in most Middle 
Eastern economies, there is increasing recognition among policy-makers as to 
the beneficial role of equity markets in enhancing the process of mobilizing 
and allocating resources in support of growth and development, If one con- 
siders the experience of emerging markets in other regions, there are two 
broad types of conditions which are important in this regard. First, the macro- 
economic environment has to be conducive to the development and growth of 
private sector enterprise. Secondly, the structure of equity markets must be 
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strengthened through appropriate policies in the areas of information and 
accounting mechanisms, market regulation and supervision, property rights, 
pricing efficiency, and taxation regimes. 
Given the considerable economic potential of the Middle East and the valua- 
tion adjustments in many of the other emerging equity markets, there would 
appear to be favorable prospects, a priori, for significant mobilization of funds 
from domestic, regional and external investors. Indeed, not only are there 
indications of a significant amount of portfolio funds in the hands of industri- 
al country investors which could move into these markets, there is also a pool 
of offshore Middle Eastern savings that could be expected to be reflected in 
inflows to equity markets in the region. Finally, equity markets could provide 
the scope for increased trading of Islamic-based financial instruments. 
Despite differences among countries in the region, there are indications that 
several of the factors that contributed to the growth of stock markets in Asia 
and Latin America are present in the Middle East region. Thus, there have 
been efforts in several countries in recent years to implement reforms in the 
fiscal and monetary sectors, reduce inflationary pressures, and strengthen 
external sector performance. Moreover, some countries have experienced sig- 
nificant private capital inflows as well as reverse currency substitution (e.g. 
Egypt during 1991-93). 
It is clear from the earlier analysis that, from a macroeconomic perspective, 
the key factors determining the future evolution of equity markets in Middle 
Eastern countries and their relation with international capital markets are the 
domestic macroeconomic policy stance and the status of external financial 
relations. These will remain the key issues in influencing investors percep- 
tions of credit and transfer risk. To this end, appropriate aggregate demand 
management policies must be accompanied with greater emphasis on struc- 
tural reforms so as to enhance the supply responsiveness of Middle Eastern 
economies, thereby reducing their vulnerability to unanticipated exogenous 
shocks and improving their social sector performance. 
In light of the analysis attempted in this paper, it is also evident that Middle 
Eastern countries need, in addition, a set of policies aimed specifically at 
enhancing demand for and supply of equities. Even if there are few Western- 
style share offerings, stock markets could receive a boost from a privatization 
process whose raison detre lies in the need to address public sector inefti- 
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ciencies as well as to progress towards a level playing field for public and pri- 
vate sector activities. Indeed, as illustrated by the experience of other devel- 
oping countries (especially in Latin America), the successful implementation 
of privatization programs may be viewed as having a two-way causal relation 
with equity market developments - acting both to facilitate and to require the 
growth of domestic equity markets and their internationalization. 
Other types of policies would entail improving the efficiency of intermedia- 
tion; reducing tax-induced distortions; improving the flow of information; and 
strengthening market surveillance.47 Basically, policy must be directed at 
establishing the conditions for clear property rights; having effective settle- 
ment and custody systems; implementing transparent trading conditions and a 
level playing field among financial instruments; and providing for appropri- 
ate capital and dividend repatriation. 
To this end, company laws and stock market regulations need to be clarified 
and overhauled in several Middle Eastern countries. Share transfer procedures 
also need to be simplified. In several countries, steps are needed to reduce 
distortions arising from the differentiated tax treatment of financial instru- 
There is also need for a comprehensive review of factors affecting 
the participation of non-residents.47 The lessons from Turkey are instructive 
in this regard. As in several other countries, a significant feature of the devel- 
opment of the Turkish market has been the willingness of the government to 
encourage foreign investor participation in support of equity market broaden- 
ing and in channeling resources to productive investment activities. First, the 
CMB, which governs stock market activities, has eliminated limits on foreign 
holdings in listed companies. This also applies to privatized state-owned con- 
cerns. Secondly, since 1986 stock dividends to both domestic and foreign 
shareholders have been tax-exempt. Capital gains tax rates for foreign 
investors have been reduced so that the same rates and regulations apply as 
Several of thcse issues are discussed in Abisourour (1993). The specific cases of Egypt and 
Jordan are discussed in Fag El-Nour(1994) and Toukan (1994), respectively. 
Interestingly, equity is at a disadvantage in Morocco compared to investment in Treasury 
instruments, while the opposite situation prevails in Tunisia. 
Bates (1994) classifies the major markets in the Middle East as follows: Egypt, Iran, Israel, 
Jordan, and Turkey as open to foreigners; Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates as being 
'restricted markets"; and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as being closed markets. His analysis does 
not cover the Maghreb countries. 
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for domestic investors. Both the stock and bond markets are open to foreign 
investors with guaranteed repatriation of proceeds, so that shares can be sold 
and proceeds and dividends repatriated without restrictions. However, for- 
eign shareholders must obtain government permission in order to exercise 
voting rights with respect to shares in Turkish companies. 
In the case of Egypt, as part of the economic reform program, a comprehen- 
sive Capital Market Law was promulgated in June 1992 and became effective 
in April 1993. This law has revamped the legal framework for the securities 
market, thereby facilitating the participation of foreign investors and allowing 
competition in the provision and pricing of market services.50 For example, 
in order to increase confidence on the part of investors, provisions have been 
made which forbid insider trading, cornering trading practices and price 
manipulation. Companies issuing new securities to the public are also 
required to apply international accounting standards. In addition, regulatory 
framework and arbitration procedures have been improved significantly as a 
result of the establishment of the Capital Market Authority as an independent 
authority entrusted with all matters related to the development and regulation 
of the securities market. There are also considerable operational improve- 
ments underway in both primary and secondary markets. 
In the case of Morocco and Tunisia, the supply of securities is likely to 
increase significantly in the near future as a result of the commitment to pri- 
vatization assumed by the government in both countries. In Morocco as well 
as Tunisia, the regulatory regime has also been changed so as to attract both 
domestic and foreign capital to the stock market. Particularly in Tunisia, 
existing private companies gain tax advantages if they list, the capital gains 
tax has been abolished, and dividends are free from income tax.5' 
Equity flows to emerging markets in the Arab countries will also be influ- 
enced by geopolitical conditions in the Middle East. Specifically, foreign 
capital inflows may be expected to respond positively to the achievement of 
a comprehensive, just and durable peace in the region. The economic ratio- 
nale for this is based on three main elements:52 First, a comprehensive, just 
Fur detads, see Fag El-Nour (1994). 
Morland (1993). 
52 El-Naggar and El-Erian (1993). 
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and durable peace provides the possibility for a simultaneous cross-country 
reduction in military expenditures. With the potential for countries in the 
region to achieve the appropriate level of security at a lower resource cost, 
such freed resources may be directed to more productive activities, thus con- 
tributing to further improvement in the economic environment. Secondly, a 
comprehensive and durable peace would also impact favorably on country- 
specific risk through the ensuing reduction in the geopolitical risk component. 
Finally, these direct benefits may be expected to enhance the potential for 
joint ventures as well as for the development of regional infrastructure - fac- 
t()rs which could contribute to an expansion in foreign trade and investment. 
In concluding this section, it is important to stress the need for the simultane- 
()US strengthening of the banking market; notwithstanding the relatively more 
developed nature of this market, such an initiative would avoid the lopsided 
development of the financial sector. Indeed, a sound and competitive bank- 
ing system plays an important role in fostering the development of efficient 
capital markets. Hence, policy efforts to develop capital markets should not 
come at the expense of the strengthening of the banking system. Interestingly, 
several of the measures required for the latter - especially those affecting the 
enabling environment - are also essential for capital market deepening and 
broadening. 
Concluding remarks 
Given the external financing environment facing developing countries in the 
l990s, equity markets may be expected to play a major role in mobilizing 
resources in support of growth and development efforts. Indeed, several 
developing countries in Latin America and Asia have succeeded in the last 
few years in improving the operation of their domestic equity markets as well 
as in attracting funds in the form of both capital repatriation by residents and 
external portfolio investments. In addition to direct benefits in the form of a 
larger pool of investment capital, this process has led to a number of indirect 
benefits, such as opening up a larger set of financial facilities (including mar- 
ket-based hedging instruments); improving the operation of price signals; and 
enhancing the disciplinary role of market forces at both the micro and macro- 
economic levels. The process has also entailed certain risks that require the 
concurrent strengthening of economic policy, prudent debt management, and 
appropriate prudential regulation and supervision. 
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There is increased recognition in Middle Eastern countries as to the need to 
broaden domestic equity markets significantly and to intensify their process 
of internationalization. This comes at a time of pressures on aid flows, 
increased international competition for private capital, and an uncertain envi- 
ronment for the region's terms of trade. The historical experience of countries 
in the region, as well as the more general experience of developing countries, 
suggest that there is a clear and strong potential for Middle Eastern equity 
market development and internationalization - a process that would be 
enhanced by, and contribute to, the beneficial medium-term economic impact 
of a comprehensive, durable and equitable peace in the region. Indeed, qual- 
itative and quantitative analyses of these markets point to a number of simi- 
larities with other emerging markets. Moreover, as Middle Eastern markets 
develop and broaden, the speed with which they react to new information 
would increase, thereby enhancing their efficiency and, more generally, 
increasing investors' confidence as well as strengthening the role of such mar- 
kets in the mobilization and allocation of funds. 
The success of Middle Eastern countries in enhancing the role of equity mar- 
kets in support of growth and development efforts depends on four key fac- 
tors internal to the economies of such countries: First, their success in reduc- 
ing perceptions of country-specific risk through the sustained implementation 
of adjustment and reform policies; secondly, maintaining progress in strength- 
ening the external payments regime, including normalized relations with 
creditors; thirdly, specific investment opportunities associated with the imple- 
mentation of privatization programs in the region; and finally, the ability of 
authorities to address institutional and legal rigidities inhibiting capital mar- 
ket deepening arid, more generally, the balanced development of financial 
markets. 
170 El-Erian and Kuniar 
Appendix 1 
Stock Prices and Price-Earnings Ratios 
With regard to the behavior of stock prices, data are only available on a suf- 
ficiently systematic basis for Turkey and Jordan. In the case of the other 
countries, the limited availability of regularly traded stocks undermined, until 
recently, the construction of relatively representative price indices.1 
The stock price index and the index of total returns in Jordan declined during 
the late 1980s. Since 1990, however, the performance of the ASE index has 
been improving sharply, with the index registering significant gains in 1991 
and 1992. In addition, the index of total returns also improved markedly.2 In 
1992 the stock price index increased by 3 I percent, making the ASE one of 
the best performers among the emerging stock markets. The increase in the 
index was broad based, with the industrial sector registering the best perfor— 
mance, followed by banking, insurance, and selected services. Total value 
and volume of transactions also increased almost threefold to the equivalent 
of about JD 880 million in 1992. These developments were associated with 
the marked improvement in economic and financial performance and indica- 
tions of considerable repatriation of capital by residents. Indeed, it appears 
that most of the market participants were Jordanian (85 percent), although res- 
idents of some neighboring countries also participated in the stock market. 
Foreign participation of residents from non-neighboring Arab countries was 
relatively limited. 
The price and total return tendencies continued into 1993, with increased 
influence on the part of foreign investors. In domestic currency terms, the 
stock price index increased by nearly 24 percent, with an increase in the total 
return index of nearly 27 percent. The continuation of high activity in the 
market has also been related to the leveling off of real estate prices. It is 
expected that the legalization of mutual funds will provide a further impetus. 
With regard to price-earnings (PE) ratios, the Jordanian market was selling at 
a PE of 12 3/4 on the basis of estimated 1992 earnings. Unlike Egypt, and to 
Some illustrative, albeit partial, data on equity prices in Egypt are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
2 Toukan (1994) provides a detailed assessment of the ASE's performance and market evolution. 
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a lesser extent Morocco and Tunisia, the Amman market did not have to com- 
pete against rates of return on fixed interest deposits well in excess of the rate 
of inflation. By the end of January 1994, the price-earnings ratio in the ASE 
amounted to 22. 
In the case of Turkey, share prices on the ISE declined sharply in 1992, with 
the local composite index falling 46 percent in US dollar terms. The weak- 
ness of the equity market was due, in large part, to the high real returns on 
bank deposits and Treasury issues, continuing high budget deficit, and politi- 
cal uncertainties. Favorable corporate earnings, along with reforms to the 
Capital Markets Law, had little immediate impact in terms of higher share 
prices. In 1993, however, the Turkish market soared, with the price index 
increasing by nearly 215 percent in US dollar terms. The markets extraordi- 
nary upturn was due to a number of factors, including the lagged effects of 
capital market reforms, continuing favorable corporate earnings, and expecta- 
tions of a major privatization drive. In addition, the announcement of tax and 
expenditure reforms gave rise to expectations of improved fiscal performance 
and a reduction in domestic financial imbalances. These factors led to strong 
institutional interest, with considerable inflows of foreign portfolio capital 
moving into equities. The process was given further impetus by the clear evi- 
dence that over several preceding years there had been zero, or even negative, 
correlation between price changes in industrial country markets and in Turkey 
(Appendix Table I), thereby providing a strong basis for risk reduction 
through portfolio diversification. The price-earnings ratios in Turkey 
increased from 7 at the end of 1992 to nearly 18 by the end of June 1993 and 
36 by the end of December 1993. This tendency was reversed in the first half 
of 1994, during which time the market experienced a sharp correction in the 
context of a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate, mounting financial 
imbalances, and concerns about increasing country risk.3 
Turkey's credit rating was downgraded in 994, 
March 994 
I! Data are for end of period. 
Source: Fag El-Nour (1994). 
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Appendix Table 1. Correlation Coefficient Matrix of Price Indexes 





Greece 0.14 0.37 1.0 
India -0.10 0.15 0.06 
Philippines 0.22 -0.05 0.20 
Japan 0.1S 0.01 0.06 
United Kingdom 0.34 -0.04 0.12 
United States 0.26 -0.15 0.0 
Jordan Turkey Greece 
Sources: IFC Global Price Index Databank. 
1.0 
-0.08 1.0 
-0.14 0.16 1.0 
-0.03 0.24 0.52 1.0 
-0.16 0.42 0.30 0.57 
India Philippines 
United 
Japan Kingdom U.S.A 
Appendix Table 2. Egyptian Capital Market Price Index 1/ 
General Price Subscription 
Index Public Closed 
1985 58.9 60.4 57.9 
1986 62.8 70.1 56.5 
1987 64.2 73.2 56.4 
1988 64.0 72.8 56.4 
989 64.4 72.4 57.5 
1990 63.1 68.4 58.5 
1991 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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The remarks in this essay will focus on the potential role of equity markets in 
developing countries as discussed in the paper by El-Erian and Kurnar. A few 
brief comments will then be made regarding other aspects of the paper, fol- 
lowed by a discussion of some more general issues. 
El-Erian and Kumar propose three main kinds of benefits that could be 
expected from the development of equity markets. First, they argue that stock 
exchanges can generate a larger pool of capital to finance productive invest- 
ments. While it is common ground that the existing financial institutions and 
markets in many Middle Eastern countries are imperfectly effective in inobi- 
lizing domestic savings, it is not clear whether stock exchanges could tap 
additional domestic savings beyond those that would be tapped by an efficient 
banking system. The authors argument for placing the emphasis of policy on 
the development of equity markets rather than the upgrading of the banking 
sector therefore hinges on the ability of emerging Middle Eastern equity mar- 
kets to attract large international capital flows. However, some caution is 
surely required here: much of the growth of flows to emerging capital markets 
in recent years has been due to conjunctural factors (many of them mentioned 
in the paper), and much of the Middle Eastern capital held abroad does not 
originate from, and cannot therethre return to, those countries where the 
shortage of funds for industrial and other development is most pronounced, so 
that flows may be a great deal smaller than El-Erian and Kumar envisage. 
Secondly, the authors argue that stock markets are more conducive (than 
banks) to the financing of venture capital and technical progress. Casual 
empirical evidence at least suggests that this is far from obvious: in the 
United Kingdom, for example, banks and institutional investors have been 
encouraged by governments to set up special venture capital institutions pre- 
cisely because of the perceived inadequacy in this area of both stock markets 
and conventional banking. In addition, El-Erian and Kumar argue that equi- 
ty eliminates the probability of premature withdrawal of capital from firms; 
but if this is actually the case, lenders' control over borrowers will be weak- 
ened, and that will allow managers greater freedom to pursue their OWfl objec- 
tives instead of policies that would maximize profits for the firm and (in prin- 
ciple) maximize the social returns on capital. 
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Thirdly, the authors present some indirect benefits of equity market develop- 
nient which also need to be more firmly based. For instance, while a reduc- 
tion in country risk perception is desirable, it is not obvious that it requires a 
major growth of equity markets rather than sound macroeconomic policies 
coupled with the rationalization of the banking system. 
At the same time, El-Brian and Kumar ignore some possible disadvantages of 
the developments that they suggest. Large inflows of international capital 
would surely create pressure on firms for the kind of dividend smoothing that 
exists in Anglo-Saxon stock markets, but then the principal attraction of equi- 
ty finance to firms (that the recurrent cost varies with the firms profits) would 
disappear. Similarly, while international equity flows obviously cannot lead 
to an international debt crisis, there are some alternative disadvantages: on the 
one hand, equity finance requires more intensive screening and monitoring by 
the lender, so that initial flows are likely to be smaller and/or more volatile 
than the corresponding debt flows (where the debt contract minimizes moni- 
toring costs); on the other hand, changes in international confidence may 
severely affect not merely the flows into LDCs, but also the prices of assets 
and the wealth of LDC shareholders. 
In addition, El-Brian and Kumar show no awareness of the extent to which the 
Egyptian stock markets prior to the nationalizations of the 1960s functioned 
as mechanisms bound up with the foreign sector in a highly-segmented econ- 
omy. The significance of this is not straightforward, but at the very least it 
means that the privatization of previously nationalized enterprises will not 
necessarily create a new demand for the services of stock exchanges.The 
comparative market data provided by the authors are interesting as far as they 
go, but stock market comparisons are particularly subject to qualifications. It 
is worth noting that turnover in the London Stock Exchange is heavily con- 
centrated in a few hundred shares, while at the other end of the scale the 200- 
300 'smallest shares can be traded through the LSE's market-maker system 
only with great difficulty and cost. This is, of course, not just a statistical mat- 
ter, but rather a more fundamental point: even well-established stock markets 
function efficiently only for a relatively small number of heavily-traded secu- 
rities. At the same time, the authors failure to provide data for the medium- 
size stock markets of Germany and France is consistent with an implicit 
assumption about the importance of equity markets in developed countries 
which ignores the very minor role which they played in the industrialization 
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of these countries (or that of Japan, where the stock market is perhaps best 
described as idiosyncratic). 
An important omission is the lack of any data on spreads between bid- and 
ask-prices. Roe and Popiel (1988) refer to spreads of 10-15 percent in LDC 
stock markets.' If such figures are typical, then it is not worthwhile for 
investors to shift their funds from one company to another unless there are 
very large differentials in returns and dividends, but in this case stock markets 
are unlikely to be efficient in allocating financial resources to the best invest- 
ment opportunities. Efficiency of this sort, it may be suggested, is much more 
important in evaluating the contribution that equity markets can make to 
development than the standard efficient markets hypothesis tests carried out 
in the paper. 
Subsequently, El-Erian and Kumar discuss policies that could help to devel- 
op and improve equity markets in Middle Eastern countries: stable macro- 
economic policy; privatization; and what might be called the establishment of 
"basic conditions" such as property rights and company law, settlement pro- 
cedures, capital market regulation, and so on. They also note the importance 
of 'geopolitical conditions. The experience of the transition economies of 
Eastern Europe shows that the establishment of such "basic conditions" is 
much more difficult and problematic than many economists had imagined, 
though it should be noted that many of these conditions need to be fulfilled 
even if major equity developments are not envisaged. 
However, the authors could well have mentioned also the somewhat nebulous 
factor of "financial market culture: the experience of Western European 
countries demonstrates that, while technical improvements such as the intro- 
duction of efficient settlement systems have been implemented more easily 
and rapidly in Germany and France than in London, German and French 
attempts to generate the kind of financial market culture that is so prominent 
in London have been much less successful. 
Finally, it would be fitting at this point to return to the wider question of mar- 
ket-based versus bank-based financial systems. It is important to emphasize 
that this question is not just about the size of stock exchanges. Indeed, one of 
Roe, A., and P. Popic! (I 9t 8) Managing Financial t in Middle—Income Countries 
Washington, I).C.: Economic 1)evclopment Institute, World Bank. 
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the worlds largest stock exchanges can be found in the most unequivocally 
bank-based financial system (Japan). Instead, the key issues in the relations 
between banks and non-financial firms lie elsewhere, namely: corporate gov- 
ernance; informational imperfections; and the position and role of stakehold- 
ers other than shareholders. If bank-based systems are to be preferred to mar- 
ket-based systems for LDCs, it is for reasons connected to such matters; but 
on these issues El-Erian and Kumar are silent. 
Saad Andary 
The comments that follow revolve mainly around the purpose of this paper as 
stated in its introduction. In reviewing the role of equity markets in Middle 
Eastern countries, the aim of the paper is purportedly to analyze potential ben- 
efits, such as the availability of a larger pool of investible capital, enhanced 
access to market-based hedging instruments, and larger foreign direct invest- 
ment inflows. It also points to the economic and financial implications of 
challenges arising from capital market integration with industrialized coun- 
tries. 
Concerning the larger pool of investible capital, there seems to be a discrep- 
ancy in the data, which in itself has been extracted from secondary sources. 
The two figures quoted in the paper need reconciliation: while the first figure 
estimates the Middle Eastern private sectors foreign asset holdings at over 
$700 billion, the second figure places the pool of offshore Middle Eastern 
savings at only $350 billion. 
The mere availability of a larger pool of investible capital in the Middle East 
is not sufficient to induce the expansion of local markets. Indeed, the latter 
are narrow and shallow, and market deepening cannot proceed in the absence 
of a productive base, which is not clearly identified in the paper. The result 
seems to be market concentration and riskiness, as evidenced in the excessive 
volatility of prices; for instance, prices of stocks in Turkey declined by 46 per- 
cent in 1992 and increased by 215 percent in 1993, as noted by the authors. 
Associated with this volatility is the question of whether the resulting high 
risks may attract external savings which are non-speculative and more per- 
manent in nature than those of bank financing. It is not enough to present a 
correlation coefficient matrix; in view of the absence of a representative sam- 
ple of Middle Eastern countries, the latter does not say much about potential 
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gains from diversification at the regional level, but rather supports interna- 
tional diversification. The fact that capitalization relative to GDP in some of 
the emerging markets is larger than in the United Kingdom or the United 
States signals the strength of speculative forces rather than the emergence of' 
a healthy development. 
One should therefore be careful when emphasizing the benefits to industrial- 
ized countries arising from 'higher returns on developing country equity mar- 
kets." All these account for implicit costs which, if the bubble does not burst, 
may have to be borne by future generations in these developing countries. 
The international debt crisis of the past two decades might well turn into an 
emerging country equity crisis. Portfolio risk reduction currently achieved 
through greater diversification may sow the seeds for future risk maximiza- 
tion unless it is controlled by appropriate tax and regulatory regimes specifi- 
cally relating to capital gains and anti-trust laws. 
The paper states that "active regional equity markets include Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Oman." This is not totally accurate; indeed, the 
equity market in Iraq is known to have been activated only recently. 
Likewise, that of Lebanon remains closed; however, an informal secondary 
market was set up in late June 1994 to provide liquidity to the shares of 
Solidaire - the real estate development company operating in downtown 
Beirut. This market is being fashioned along the lines of the OTC markets 
currently in operation in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
Overall, one very positive attribute of the paper is that it raises many ques- 
tions and outlines a body of related issues that will constitute useful topics for 
future research. 
8 
Gulf Capital Markets: 
Development Prospects and Constraints 
Henry Azzam 
Introduction 
Rather than being a luxury, capital markets are an essential pre-requisite for 
the financial and economic development of any country. This is especially 
true for those countries where the dominant role of the state in economic and 
corporate life is gradually being reduced, and where there are plans to priva- 
tize several public sector companies, as is the case in the various Gulf states. 
However, a privatization drive cannot succeed without a fully-functioning 
stock market supported by the necessary legislative infrastructure and the 
availability of sophisticated financial services. 
The impetus for equity markets in the Gulf region is coming from local 
investors looking for new investment channels as well as from financial, 
industrial, utilities, and services companies for which public issues have 
become a realistic option to raise money for expansion plans. Furthermore, 
the development of equity markets is being actively encouraged by the gov- 
ernments of Gulf states currently experiencing tight budgetary conditions. 
The privatization of public sector companies is proving to be a viable option 
to reduce the financial burden on governments, mobilize private sector 
resources, and increase the efficiency of several public sector institutions. 
In terms of capitalization, Saudi Arabia has the largest stock market in the 
Arab world, with a market capitalization of $51 billion in 1993, but it is like- 
ly to remain closed to foreign investors for the time being. The smaller stock 
market of Bahrain is the most sophisticated in the region and has plans to 
become an international exchange. Oman's stock market is relatively small, 
but it is gaining depth and is becoming more accessible to foreign investors. 
The Kuwaiti market has become active once again; however, turnover volume 
has shrunk considerably, down to one-third the level that prevailed before the 
Gulf crisis. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates - the two Gulf countries with- 
out formal stock trading systems - have recently announced plans to establish 
stock exchanges. 
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SaudiArabia 120.1 51.0 66 702 47.562 165,226 
Kuwait 21.5 10.1 47 3,786 7.245 7,986,649 
Bahrain 4.0 5.6 33 5,000 1.036 1,600,000 
Oman 9.9 1.6 68 220 0.199 108,982 
UAE 35.9 9.2 77 n.a 0.272 75,000 
Source: MEES, 9 May 1994, and information from various stock exchanges in the region. 
By the standards of emerging capital markets, the stock markets of the Gulf 
region are still small (Table I). The combined capitalization of 38 emerging 
markets in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe reached $1,000 
billion last year, from less than $100 billion in 1983. By contrast, total capi- 
talization in the Gulf region was estimated at $77.4 billion in 1993, with the 
Saudi market accounting for 65 percent of that. As a percentage of GDP, the 
market capitalization of the six Gulf states stood at around 40 percent in 1993, 
as compared to 50 percent in other developing countries and 80 percent in the 
developed world. The number of active investors in the Gulf region as a per- 
centage of the total population is still very small (less than 5 percent on aver- 
age), as compared to 20-30 percent in the developed world. Nonetheless, the 
experience of other countries shows how stock markets can easily come to life 
within a relatively short period of time (e.g. Turkey, Indonesia, and 
Argentina), provided economic conditions are right and the necessary legisla- 
tion is implemented. 
Gulf governments have for sometime now been issuing public debt instru- 
ments in one form or another. The aim is not only to help finance budget 
deficits, but also to make available an effective tool of monetary policy and to 
create new investment channels for banks and the private sector at large. The 
viability of public sector borrowing has already been tested. The years ahead 
should see an increase in the volume of various government bonds and bills 
issued, the fine-tuning of flows into primary and secondary markets, and a 
refinement of prices. As the regions financial markets gain depth, and fol- 
lowing the pricing benchmarks that have been established by government sec- 
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tor banks, other public and private sector corporations may be encouraged to 
issue their own debt instruments. 
Bahrain and Kuwait are leading the way in this respect. The Bahrain 
Commercial Facilities Company (BCFC) has launched in May 1994 a public 
bond issue worth BD 7 million ($18.6 million) to finance local credit activi- 
ties, and incidentally, this was the first corporate issue of bonds in Bahrain. 
Likewise, the Kuwait Real Estate Bank issued a bond worth KD 20 million 
($66 million) in May 1994, and Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) is planning to 
launch later this year a $50 million corporate bond. 
Gulf capital markets: signs of change 
Over the last two years, Gulf equity markets have emerged as a serious force 
within the regions capital market structure. A series of public share issues in 
Saudi Arabia (12 issues since the beginning of 1992), Bahrain (seven issues), 
Oman (two issues), the UAE (one issue), and Qatar (one issue) has shown that 
private capital can be raised to fund the expansion of local industries (Tables 
2 and 3). 
For the moment, the amount of capital raised on the regions stock markets is 
not large. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, SR 1.26 billion ($336 million) were 
raised through either public offerings or capital expansion over the past three 
years. In Bahrain, publicly-quoted companies have raised $82 million since 
the beginning of last year, while the corresponding figure in Oman reached 
$150 million. However, such modest amounts contrast sharply with an almost 
total absence of public offerings in previous years. When Emirates Bank 
International floated the United Property Company in Dubai in December 
1993, it was the first public offering since the new UAE Companies Law was 
passed in 1984. Similarly, when the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) 
launched its KD 25 million ($82 million) local investment fund in May 1994, 
it was the first public offering in Kuwait since 1983. 
The massive oversubscription of the few offerings that came to the market in 
the last few years indicates that ample equity funds are available for invest- 
ing. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the amount actually subscribed by 
investors was as high as SR 9 billion ($2.4 billion) - over seven times the 
amount offered, namely SR 1.26 billion ($336 million). 
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Table 2: Public Share Issues in Saudi Arabia, 1992 - 1994 
Name of Comany Date of Amount* 
Issue 
Tabuk Cement Company Mar 1994 SR374 million 
Al-Riyadh Development Company Nov 1993 SR668 million 
A1-Ahsa Industrial Development Company Jun 1993 SRI1O million 
Al-Jizan Agriculture & Development Company Apr 1993 SR 156 million 
Saudi British Bank Feb 1993 SR684 million 
Saudi French Bank Dec 1992 SRI,140 million 
Saudi Cairo Bank Nov 1992 SR 1,680 million 
Bank Al-Jazira Sep 1992 SR750 million 
Al-Bahar Investment Company Apr 1992 SR3O million 
Saudi Industrial Development Company Apr 1992 SR246 million 
Riyad Bank Jan 1992 SR3,800 million 
Saudi Pharmaceutical Industries and Aug 1992 SR545 million 
Medical Appliances (SPIMACO) 
Source: MEES, 9 May 1994, and information from various stock exchanges in the legion. 
* The amounts quoted do not take account of bonus or rights share issues. Qassim Cement 
Coinpally raised its paid-in capital in June 94 by 50 percent through a one for two rights issue 
funded fi'om reserves. At the same time as shares were offered to the public, Saudi British issued 
SR40() million in bonus shares, Saudi French SR300 million, SPIMACO SR50 million and 
Riyadh Bank SR I billion. 
At present, regulations in Gulf equity markets restrict investment to Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) citizens. However, this is changing fast. For 
example, resident expatriates are allowed for the first tune to invest in the 
fund launched by KIA, and the fund itself will be listed on the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange. In Oman, other GCC nationals are allowed to purchase up to 49 
percent of the shares of listed companies. In addition, non-GCC nationals 
will be able to invest in the local stock market for the first time through the 
$45 million Oryx Investment Fund launched by an offshoot of Baring 
Securities and the local Oman National Insurance Company. Two Japanese 
banks - including Nomura Securities - have approached the Muscat Stock 
Exchange with a view to establishing similar funds. 
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Table 3: Public Share Issues in Bahrain, Oman, UAE and Qatar 
(1993 - 1994) 
Name of Comany Date of Amount* 
Issue 
Oman Cement Company July 1994 OR 15 million 
Bahrain Leisure Company June 1994 BD2.75 million 
Commercial Bank of Qatar April 1994 QR35.2 million 
A1-Ahli Commercial Bank of Bahrain May 1994 BD1O million 
Bahrain Hotel Company Mar 1994 BD3.08 million 
Gulf Trading & Food Processing Co. 
((Trafco) of Bahrain Jan 1994 BD3.9 million 
National Bank of Oman Feb 1994 0R3.8 million 
United Property Company of UAE Dec 1993 Dh140 million 
The Oman-Emirates Investment Company Dec 1993 OR9 million 
Bahrain Insurance Company Sep 1993 BDI.2 million 
Bahrain Commercial Facilities Company Apr 1993 BD7.875 million 
Bahrain Aluminium Extrusion Company May 1993 BD2 million 
Source: MEES, 9 May 1994, and information from various stock exchanges in the region. 
In Bahrain, new regulations have recently been introduced which allow for- 
eigners to own shares on the local stock market. Expatriates who have resided 
in the country for more than three years are allowed to own shares up to one 
percent of the capital of a single company on an individual basis. 
Collectively, such investors may own up to 24 percent of a company. 
Investors may be either individuals or companies. The shares of four institu- 
tions listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) were already open to for- 
eign investors, including non-residents. These are the Arab Banking 
Corporation, Bahrain International Bank, Investcorp, and TAIB Bank (TAIBs 
shares were listed on the exchange for the first time in April 1994). The Saudi 
market, however, remains closed to non-GCC investors. 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia has the largest stock market in the Gulf region in terms of capi- 
talization, at around SR 191 billion ($51 billion) at the end of 1993, and the 
paid-up capital of listed companies was around SR 65 billion ($17.3 billion). 
As a percentage of GDP, Saudi Arabia's market capitalization reached 42 per- 
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cent last year. Electricity companies account for the biggest share, with 44. I 
percent of total market capitalization, followed by industry firms, including 
cement companies (33 percent), services (12.3 percent), banks (7.9 percent), 
and agricultural companies (2.7 percent). There are 78 companies listed on 
the Saudi exchange, but only 66 are publicly tradable. Only shares of Saudi 
companies may he traded in the Kingdom, and these are normally acquired by 
Saudi citizens. In special circumstances, specified portions of floated shares 
were made available to other GCC citizens, such as the 1984 Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC) issue, and more recently the Tabuk Cement 
Company, among 13 other Saudi companies. 
Close to 288 million shares -41 percent of total shares listed - are held by the 
Saudi government, while foreign entities hold 27 million shares, or 3.8 per- 
cent of the total. Most shares held by the Saudi government and by foreign- 
ers are not traded in the market. This means that only 396 million shares - 55 
percent of total shares outstanding - are actually available for trading. Even 
among those shares available for trading, one finds a concentration of large 
blocks in the hands of investors who are less likely to sell their holdings 
because they do not wish to lose board representation or voting influence. 
The depth of the Saudi stock market, that is, the value of shares traded as a 
percentage of the total market value of shares outstanding, has generally been 
small. In 1993, the total number of shares traded was around 60 million, or 
8.5 percent of the number of listed shares. 
The official stock market index was down 5.05 percent in 1993, following a 
rise of less than 1 percent in 1992 and a 91 percent increase in 1991 (Table 4). 
By the end of June 1994, the index stood at 138.01 -23 percent lower than its 
level at the end of 1993. The index dropped 9.5 percent in the second quar- 
ter, after having declined 15 percent in the first quarter. The slowdown in 
overall economic activity, tight liquidity conditions in the country, and the ris- 
ing SR interest rates since the beginning of the year have all contributed in 
varying degrees to the slump in stock prices. The policy of Saudi banks to cut 
down on their financing of speculative share-buying added to the stampede. 
With share prices Ofl the decline and in an effort to salvage the value of the 
collateral held in the form of stocks, banks tend to sell shares whenever there 
is a buyer at a reasonable price. The 23 percent decline in share prices in the 
first half of this year has undervalued many stocks at current levels. 
Furthermore, the share prices of many companies have now dropped 
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The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) requires that all trading in 
Saudi stocks be conducted through banks. The opening of a central trading 
hall in May 1987 was abruptly cancelled. A computerized screen trading sys- 
tem - the Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS) - was introduced in 
1990. Share ownership is transferred electronically from the seller to the 
buyer through the Saudi Shares Registration Company. Officially, brokers are 
not allowed to be active participants in the Saudi market, and banks are for- 
bidden to act as market-makers. 
A recently-issued royal decree amending the companies law in the Kingdom 
has made it possible for corporations to issue preferred stocks, contingent 
upon the approval of the Commerce Minister. Such non-voting preferred 
stocks give shareholders the right to receive a certain percentage of the com- 
pany's net profit of not less than 5 percent of the nominal value of the shares 
before the profits of the corporation are distributed to other shareholders. It 
also gives shareholders of preferred stocks priority in the recovery of share 
capital upon liquidation. 
Since 1988, SAMA has been offering a total of SR 1.5 billion of two-year to 
five-year government development bonds every two weeks. These are offi- 
cially linked to the profits of unspecified development projects. They have 
been sold at a discount, and the yield has corresponded closely to a small mar- 
gin over like-date US Treasury bonds. The spreads for Treasury instruments 
are approximately 30 basis points in the two-year tranche, rising to 50 basis 
points fir the five-year issue. Other market conditions were taken into con- 
sideration when setting the yields. The minimum denomination of bonds 
offered through the primary market is SR 1 million for banks, dropping to a 
minimum of SR 50,000 for individual buyers. 
Primary distribution is undertaken on a subscription basis, that is, SAMA 
posts the yield (via the 'earnings' mechanism) at which bonds will be sold in 
the primary market and at which eligible investors can subscribe any alloca- 
tion. No actual physical securities are issued. As fiscal agent, SAMA 
employs a book-entry mechanism specifically to register bond ownership. 
This pertains to banks and autonomous government bodies, while other retail 
buyers are deemed to be beneficial owners of the bonds, with registration 
remaining in the bank's name. 
Saudi Arabia started to issue Treasury bills in November 1991. Weekly issues 
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have maturities ranging from one to 12 months. No actual physical securities 
are issued (that is, it is a book-entry mechanism), and the amount raised may 
vary from one week to another. Both bills and bonds can be sold in the sec- 
ondary market, with banks able to sell them on to customers. Residents and 
institutions incorporated in GCC countries are permitted to acquire bonds in 
the secondary market. Saudi banks are allowed to offer mutual funds to the 
public, either exclusively in government bonds or in a mixture of bonds, bills 
and stocks. This development has enabled investors with much smaller bal- 
ances to acquire securities in the Saudi market. 
Following the tightening move by US monetary authorities in February 1994, 
yields on one-month, three-month, six-month, and one-year SR Treasury 
instruments started an upward trend in tandem with corresponding US dollar 
rates. Yields on three-month SR Treasury instruments reached 4.95 percent 
by the end of June, as compared to 4.63 percent for three-month dollar 
deposits. As a matter of fact, the gap between SR and US dollar interest rates 
widened in the second quarter, reflecting tighter liquidity conditions in the SR 
market. This was mostly due to the decline in deposit creation associated with 
the general slowdown in economic activity. 
Yields across the maturity profile of Saudi Arabia's Government Development 
Bonds (GDBs) assumed a rising trend from mid-February until the end of 
June 1994. For example, yields on three-year GDBs declined from 4.9 per- 
cent in the beginning of the year to 4.71 percent in the first week of February 
before rising to 6.73 percent at the end of June, the six-month increase in 
yields being 183 basis points. This was in line with rising yields across the 
maturity profile of US Treasury bonds. During the first half of the year, yield 
differentials between Saudi Government Development Bonds and US 
Treasury bonds of corresponding maturity remained constant. 
The beginning of a bear cycle for bonds in February 1994 has provided a chal- 
lenging test for the Saudi government bond market. In a scenario marked by 
rising interest rates, and in the absence of a more developed fixed-income 
market with a less rigid pricing mechanism, demand for Saudi government 
bonds has been on the decline. Tighter liquidity conditions have prompted 
banks to invest more money in Treasury bills - where they can repo 75 per- 
cent of their holdings - and less in government bonds, where repo facilities are 
limited to 25 percent. Moreover, rising short-term yields partially compensate 
banks for the loss of income generated by holding longer maturities with high- 
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er yields. Higher short-term rates also raise the cost of positive carry, thus 
discouraging banks from borrowing short term in order to lock higher yields 
on longer maturities, as they have been doing in the past two years when 
short-term rates have been on the decline. 
For the first time in the Gulf region, the Saudi government started issuing 
floating-rate notes (FRNs) on August 15, 1994. The first $280 million FRN 
issue was well received in the market, and there are indications that more of 
such issues will be forthcoming. In a scenario marked by rising interest rates, 
as is the case now, lending at floating interest rates will be more attractive to 
banks than government bonds with fixed interest rates. 
There is flO private bond market to speak of in Saudi Arabia. A domestic SR 
bond existed until 1978, when SAMA imposed a moratorium on SR issues. 
In the mid-1980s, afew dollar-denominated floating-rate notes were arranged 
by Saudi banks and offshore banking units in Bahrain for local borrowers in 
the Kingdom. In addition, a few Saudi banks are exploring the possibility of 
floating Certificates of Deposit (CDs). If a market for CDs does develop in 
Saudi Arabia, it will greatly enhance the process of financial deepening in the 
Kingdom. 
Kuwait 
Kuwait had the most sophisticated capital market in the Gulf region before 
the onset of the 1990 Gulf crisis, with active trading in both stocks and bonds. 
The stock market was reopened in September 1992, and by the end of 1993 
there were 47 institutions registered for trading (of which seven were Gulf 
companies), as compared to 54 before the Iraqi invasion. Total capitalization 
is estimated at around $10 billion, down from a pre-crisis level of around $12 
billion. After a boom year in 1993, when record levels were achieved in the 
share-price index as well as in the volume of trade, the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange trended lower, and was down by 8.5 percent in the first half of 1994 
(Table 1). Market participants reduced their holdings of shares because of 
concerns that the implementation of the debt-settlement law could lead to a 
sharp decline in asset values in the country. 
Approved in 1993, Ministerial Law No. 235 allows citizens of GCC member- 
countries to own and trade in the shares of Kuwaiti companies listed on the 
exchange. The laws most important provision is that GCC citizens cannot 
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hold more than 49 percent of the total shares outstanding of banks and insur- 
ance companies. Several public sector companies are targeted for privatiza- 
tion next year, and investment funds have been established to acquire assets 
in these companies. The first of such funds was launched by KIA in May 
1994, with total capital amounting to KD 25 million ($82 million). Resident 
expatriates are allowed to own shares in newly-privatized companies by hold- 
ing units in this investment fund. Foreigners from outside Kuwait who are 
interested in joining the fund can do so indirectly, through a locally-estab- 
lished company which will invest on their behalf. Another fund - the Real 
Estate Investment Fund - was launched on June 20, with total capital amount- 
ing to KD 20 million ($67.7 million). This fund provides the first opportuni- 
ty for non-Kuwaitis to buy into the local property market. 
The Central Bank of Kuwait started in 1987 to issue Treasury bills and bonds 
with maturities ranging from three months to 10 years. Any person or insti- 
tution - resident and non-resident alike - can purchase instruments, but it is 
estimated that 90 percent of the issues stayed with Kuwaiti banks and invest- 
ment companies. A total of 58 issues of Treasury bills were floated in 1993, 
with a total value of KD 5.3 billion ($17 billion). Most issues have a maturi- 
ty of three and six months. Only one issue of bonds with a one-year maturi- 
ty has been made since liberation. 
Corporate bonds denominated in Kuwaiti dinars and issued in favor of inter- 
borrowers emerged in 1986 and were listed on the stock exchange. 
However, since 1988 a moratorium has been placed on new issues of corpo- 
i-ate KD bonds to foreign borrowers. The issuance of KD bonds to domestic 
corporate borrowers resumed last year, with the Kuwait Real Estate Bank 
issuing KD IS million ($49.5 million) in five-year bonds in order to replace a 
maturing KD 12 million ($39.6 million) bond issued in 1988. This bank 
issued another bond worth KD 20 million ($66 million) in May 1994 which 
was managed by the National Bank of Kuwait (NBK). Bonds with a three- 
year maturity have a coupon of 6.5 percent and were issued at a small discount 
to yield around 6.6 percent. The only other bond issued in Kuwait over the 
past three years was offered by the local Commercial Facilities Company. 
Bahrain 
Bahrains capital and financial markets are generally considered to be the 
most advanced in the Gulf region. Indeed, shares had been traded informally 
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br several years before an official stock exchange was opened in June 1989. 
At present, 33 companies are listed on the exchange; 21 of these are Bahraini 
companies, while 12 are offshore entities. Total capitalization in 1993 was 
estimated at around BD 2.12 billion ($5.6 billion). Share prices in Bahrain 
trended lower last year, and dropped further - by around 12 percent .. in the 
first half of 1994. 
Among the companies which have recently raised capital through public 
floatation is the Bahrain Leisure Company, a new company founded to pro- 
mote tourism. A BD 2.75 million ($7.3 million) public share was issued on 
June 6, 1994. The rights offer by Al-Ahli Commercial Bank of Bahrain was 
fully subscribed. In May 1994, the bank offered shareholders 40 million 
shares (one for every two already owned) priced at BD 0.25 ($0.66) each, in 
order to raise a total of BD 10 million ($26.5 million). The Bahraini govern- 
ment is planning to sell about 500,000 shares in the Bahrain Aluminum 
Extrusion Company (Balexco) by the end of 1994, thereby reducing its hold- 
ings to 25 percent from the current level of 45 percent. This is part of a drive 
by the government to privatize profitable firms. 
Foreign residents in Bahrain are allowed to invest in the shares of local com- 
panies through mutual funds. These funds will eventually be opened to non- 
residents, and will be listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. Market-makers 
are expected to join stock brokers soon, thereby helping to enhance the liq- 
uidity of the market. One initiative currently under study is to permit other 
GCC companies to list their shares and bonds on the Bahrain Stock Exchange, 
and this could be followed eventually by the listing of bonds and shares of 
non-GCC companies as well. Another important initiative under considera- 
tion is the cross-listing of private companies by the Bahrain and Muscat 
Exchanges. This measure would provide investors in both countries with 
equal access to the two markets. 
Bahrain was the first Gulf country to issue government development bonds in 
1977. However, by 1986 the need to help finance the country's budget deficit 
prompted the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) to launch an elaborate sys- 
tern of Treasury bills and bonds, with a debt ceiling set at BD 300 million 
(US$797 million). In October 1988, the BMA started to accept tenders for 
dinar-denominated bills from offshore banking units domiciled in the country. 
The first corporate bonds were issued in May 1994 by the Bahrain 
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Commercial Facilities Company. The three-year bonds were sold to 
Bahrainis, other GCC nationals, and expatriate residents. A minimum invest- 
ment of BD 500 ($1,326) is required, and interest is paid every six months at 
two percent above the local interbank rate, the minimum rate being five per- 
cent. Bonds are traded on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. Later this year 
Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) is planning to launch a $50 million bond to 
finance some of its maturing debt. Bonds will have a seven-year maturity and 
will be listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. 
Oman 
Oman's stock market is relatively small. When the Muscat Stock Exchange 
was established in May 1989, there were 71 companies listed. Today there 
are 93 companies, with a total capitalization of $1.6 billion. Thirty of these 
companies are not yet publicly traded and, of the remaining 62 companies, 39 
are listed on the main board and 23 on the secondary or parallel market. In 
addition, companies which incur losses for two consecutive years are auto- 
matically demoted to the secondary market. 
Financial institutions in the Sultanate have recently been allowed to set up 
mutual funds in order to invest in the country's stock market. Foreigners can 
have up to 49 percent ownership in the funds; for tax purposes, such funds are 
treated in the same way as companies fully-owned by Omani nationals. The 
tax rate on these companies is five percent on income ranging from OR 
30,000 to OR 200,000 ($78,000 to $520,000), and 7.5 percent on taxable 
income in excess of OR 200,000. 
A 91-day Treasury bill scheme was introduced for the first time in June 1987. 
Oman's Central Bank has been dealing only with banks who can bid for their 
own account or on behalf of their corporate customers. Treasury bills are sold 
at a discount, and the Central Bank is prepared to buy back bills prior to matu- 
rity. Oman issued its first government bonds on July 20, 1991. Five-year 
development bonds are traded on the Muscat Stock Exchange and are offered 
to banks and financial institutions in the Sultanate, as well as to all other 
Omani and foreign residents, whether individuals or institutions. 
Oman has started a large-scale program to privatize its public institutions in a 
bid to absorb excess liquidity, generate additional revenues for the govern- 
ment, and boost the Muscat Stock Exchange. Oman's Ministry of Finance 
/94 Henry Azzam 
and Economy floated its l9 percent stake in the National Bank of Oman ear- 
lier this year. In 1993, the government sold its shares in the Oman National 
Insurance Company and Gulf Hotels Company, and it is planning to dilute its 
holdings in other services and industrial companies as well. 
The Oman Emirates Investment Company raised OR 15 million ($39 million) 
in a Iloatation concluded early this year. Similarly, the state-owned Oman 
Cement Company launched in July 1994 a OR 15 million ($39 million) pub- 
lic share issue in order to fund expansion plans. This will boost the compa- 
ny's capital to OR 35 million, of which 41.7 percent will be owned by the pri- 
vate sector. Regulations in the Sultanate specify that any company with cap- 
ital exceeding OR 500,000 must make 40 percent of its shares available to the 
public when making an initial public offer or when increasing capital. 
United Arab Emirates 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is expected to have a stock exchange later 
this year. There are now 77 banks and joint-stock companies trading their 
shares in the unofficial market, with a paid-up capital of 14.5 billion dirhams 
($3.95 billion). This figure is far lower than their market capitalization of 
nearly $9.2 billion, which has steadily grown over the past five years due to a 
sharp increase in share prices caused by an economic upturn. Share dealing 
in the UAE is conducted by telephone through a handful of brokers, who often 
complain of manipulation. 
The absence of a formal exchange, high rates of government ownership in 
listed institutions, and the restriction of dealing to nationals have all kept 
turnover in the UAE very low - not exceeding one million dirharns ($272,000) 
per day. Share prices and movements are tracked by an unofficial stock index 
set up by the National Bank of Abu Dhabi in 1989, with a base of 1,000 
points. The index dropped 10 points (0.5 percent) in the first half of 1994 to 
2012.7, as compared to a rise of 4.3 percent in the same period last year. The 
Central Bank of the UAE started issuing 9, 12 and 18-month certificates of 
deposit (CD5) on April I, I 994. A discount facility has also been introduced, 
whereby banks are able to sell CDs to the Central Bank at any time. The 
Central Bank currently issues CDs denominated in the local currency for one, 
two, three and six months; these, however, are not considered to be liquid 
instruments because of the absence of a repurchase facility. The introduction 
of both longer-term instruments and a repurchase facility will undoubtedly 
provide a boost to the capital markets of the UAE. 
Gulf Capital Markets 195 
Qatar 
Qatar has recently approved plans to set up a stock exchange in order to orga- 
nize share dealing and attract investment. Such plans have been on the draw- 
ing board for several years, but they have been delayed by the small number 
of trading institutions as well as the large ownership of shares held by the gov- 
- ernment and members of the ruling family who do not trade. Indeed, among 
the challenges facing a stock market, one should stress both the small number 
of companies and the uneven distribution of share ownership, which occurs 
when a disproportionate number of shares are held by a few wealthy individ- 
uals and large corporations. 
Shareholders at the Commercial Bank of Qatar took up 95.7 percent of a 
rights issue held between April 18 and May 2, 1994. A total of 336,496 shares 
were offered at a price of QR 200 ($55) each, of which QR 100 is a premium. 
The remaining shares were sold through public subscription during June. The 
increase will raise the bank's paid-in capital by 50 percent, to QR 105 million 
($29 million). 
Qatar has around 20 banks and companies trading their shares in an unofficial 
market, in addition to the giant Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Company, 
which trades its shares in all Gulf markets. In view of the small number of 
trading institutions and the absence of an exchange, turnover has remained the 
smallest in the Gulf. Moreover, there is no discipline in Qatar's market, nor 
is there any system to track the moves of shares and their prices. Such a state 
of affairs has given rise to manipulation, and has thus scared away small 
investors. At present, there are no short or long-term government bonds in 
Qatar, but the government is planning to launch a Treasury bill program later 
this year. 
Conclusion 
The markets in the Gulf region are still several years away from becoming 
truly emerging markets. Financial deepening requires a high degree of exper- 
tise among investors, borrowers, and supervisory agencies. In addition, cred- 
it-rating agencies are needed, both to carry out periodic analyses of local com- 
panies and to provide investors with a ready supply of reliable business infor- 
mation. More stringent reporting practices should also be implemented, 
together with an adequate legal system that fully recognizes the rights of cred- 
itors and protects those of savers and investors. Given that Gulf investors 
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have been active internationally and are therefore familiar with the intricacies 
of financial instruments, such measures will eventually open up greater scope 
for them to participate in the capital markets of the region. 
The GCC countries must actively encourage the trading of shares across 
boundaries, thereby forging an effective regional capital market. A regional 
market would symbolize economic cooperation (as called for in the Unified 
Economic Agreement). It would also pool resources, help to avoid problems 
stemming from the small size of local markets, and provide financial institu- 
nuns with greater placing power. In short, it would help mobilize resources 
at the regional level. Gulf governments should be able to sell their bonds and 
bills not only within their own domestic markets, but also throughout the 
region. This would increase the amount that can be borrowed and further con- 
tribute to the development of domestic capital markets. 
To give added depth to Gulf stock markets, one could also promote the idea 
of opening these markets to international investors. As long as this measure 
is adopted with safeguards, such as limits on the amount that foreigners can 
jointly hold in any company (as is the case in Bahrain and Oman), or the chan- 
neling of foreign investment through mutual funds (e.g. Kuwait), it would 
boost demand for equity as well as encourage capital inflows. 
The size of assets controlled by pension funds and unit trusts in the US, Japan, 
Canada, and Europe exceeds $20 trillion. Only 0.2 percent ($40 billion) were 
invested last year in the emerging stock markets of Asia, Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and Africa. If institutional investors decide to raise their hold- 
ings in emerging-market equities to 1 percent, this will bring $200 billion to 
such markets around the world. Hence, Gulf countries should be poised to 
benefit from such capital inflows if and when they materialize. 
Furthermore, Gulf banks have an important role to play in the development of 
the regions capital markets. They are expected to become the main interme- 
diaries between capital-starved businesses and the risk-taking public. Both 
businesses and investors need specialized institutions to help them plan the 
start up of companies, as well as to assist them in raising the required capital. 
The instruments of such intermediation will be shares, bonds and all related 




The paper by Dr. Henry Azzam is a thorough yet fairly concise exposition of 
the structure of capital markets in the GCC countries and of recent develop- 
ments therein. By focusing on the constraints that hinder the development of 
capital markets in each of the GCC countries, the encouraging prospects for 
further development and integration of these markets become clearer. In view 
of positive current conditions, the paper also seems to suggest that the time is 
now ripe for government measures aimed at facilitating the evolution of these 
markets. The suggested measures include making local stock markets fully 
functioning, supporting them with the necessary legislative infrastructure, and 
ensuring the availability of sophisticated financial services. To this end, the 
concluding section of the paper proposes further deregulation in order to 
attract non-GCC capital; improved accounting and disclosure standards; 
increased depth and breadth of capital markets; and regional integration of 
these markets. 
It is imperative to point out a few remarks that would help improve the under- 
standing of the subject. To begin with, the relatively small bond market with 
almost non-existent private bonds in the GCC countries may be attributed to 
several factors. Since bonds are debt instruments used mainly by large enter- 
prises to raise capital for their expansion projects, bonds are rarely issued 
because most large enterprises in the GCC countries are government-owned 
and rely on public expenditure outlays for their expansion projects. 
Meanwhile, smaller private enterprises often resort to either self-financing or 
borrowing from the banking sector for their capital investment plans. 
Moreover, in order to promote corporate culture, the privatization drive 
should be intensified so as to stimulate the private sector and increase its role 
in the GCC economies. Also, the direct role of the government in the man- 
agement decisions and policies of public shareholding companies should be 
curbed or even eliminated, because in many instances it breeds inefficiencies 
and thus affects public confidence in such companies. This in turn discour- 
ages the public from investing their savings in local stock markets. 
In addition to transforming public enterprises into private corporations, close- 
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ly-held private companies and closed corporations should be encouraged to 
turn themselves into true public shareholding companies, which entails reduc- 
ing block ownership of stocks as well as encouraging wider share ownership. 
For example, there is not a single construction company listed in Kuwait's 
securities market, whereas the construction sector - a major non-oil sector - 
accounts for five percent of Kuwait's GDP on average. 
Furthermore, most stock markets in the GCC countries have witnessed at 
times violent fluctuations in stock prices. The excess liquidity in the econo- 
my coupled with limited investment opportunities encouraged speculation 
and made stock prices overshoot to unsustainable levels. This was naturally 
Ibilowed by a sharp downward price correction to more realistic levels. Small 
investors suffer the most in these cases; as a result, they seldom reenter the 
stock market, thereby discouraging other such investors from entering it. 
The above points clearly indicate the wide scope available for Gulf capital 
markets to gain more depth and breadth, especially if we keep in mind that 
non-GCC nationals are not allowed to own shares listed on GCC stock mar- 
kets (save for a few recent exceptions in some GCC countries). Expatriates 
represent a large portion of the local labor force, reaching up to 90 percent in 
some GCC countries. They either invest in local money markets or channel 
their savings abroad. 
Dr. Azzam's paper, which is more descriptive than analytic, did not include 
any debatable theories or propositions. It therefore gives rise to little contro- 
versy. It appropriately concluded that capital markets cannot be created or 
superimposed on a country, as they evolve from actual need. Since this need 
is currently evident, GCC governments should face up to the challenge of 
facilitating the evolution of their capital markets in the smoothest possible 
way. 
9 
The Istanbul Stock Exchange and the 
Corporate Sector: Reflections on Turkey's 
Financial Liberalization Process 
Güven Sak 
Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to assess the development of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISEX) in regard to its contribution to corporate sector financing, 
given that the stock exchange or stock market is not an indigenous institution 
in Turkey, but was established after 1980 in tandem with public policy mea- 
sures aimed at financial liberalization. 
As with most stock markets, two objectives lay at the root of the establish- 
ment of a stock exchange in Turkey (Lopes 1983). One goal was to devise a 
new mechanism for corporate finance in order to improve the process of fund 
allocation; the second goal was to improve information flows, both in the 
economy and in financial markets as a whole, so as to lower the costs associ- 
ated with the flow of funds. This paper will analyze Turkeys performance 
regarding the first objective, and will attempt to ascertain whether an alterna- 
tive instrument for corporate sector financing could have been developed. The 
performance in information aggregation and transmission related to the 
microeconomic efficiency of the exchange itself will not be discussed.' 
The relationship between primary and secondary markets is noted in the liter- 
ature on financial markets [e.g. Van Home (1978) and Garbade (1982)1. The 
development of a secondary market is viewed as a positive factor for the 
development of a primary market. However, the Turkish experience with 
Four studies exist on the micro-level efficiency of ISEX. Altun (1992) reports results of both 
serial correlation analysis and non-parametric run tests. His results are inconclusive regarding the 
weak-form efficiency of ISEX. The above work includes a survey of three other studies using 
the same techniques which reject the weak-form efficiency hypothesis for ISEX data. Sengul and 
Onkal (1992) report the results of a test for the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypoth- 
esis by using monetary and fiscal variables as the set of publicly available information. The 
results do not support the semi-strong form of the efficiency hypothesis. Aydogan (1994) pre- 
sents a short literature survey of studies on stock market anomalies using ISEX data. It is report- 
ed that the anomalies found in developed markets could also be traced at ISEX. 
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ISEX shows that there is no direct relationship between these two markets. 
As experience demonstrates, the supply side of the stock market does not 
automatically adjust to the developments on the markets demand side. In 
other words, a flourishing secondary market in shares does not necessarily 
entail a growing primary market for shares. 
The development process undergone by ISEX is useful in illustrating the char- 
acter of Turkey's financial liberalization process. As noted above, when con- 
sidered in Hayekian terms, the 1986 reorganization of ISEX was conducted 
through "human design," as opposed to "human interaction." In a country 
which lacks the institutional framework for market-based or market-deter- 
mined changes, the financial liberalization process becomes a government- 
designed or government-induced process of financial change. Hence, there is 
room for public policy in the case of financial liberalization processes in 
developing market economies (Sak 1994). 
This definition raises issues such as policy sequencing and possible policy 
errors in the organization of the financial liberalization process, an example 
of which could be the importance attached to a stock exchange in countries 
like Turkey. The short history of ISEX could help us to consider the policy- 
making framework surrounding the process of financial liberalization. 
The instruments of public policy and their use become an important issue in 
policy-making discussions. If incentives on the demand side of the market far 
exceed the incentives on the market's supply side, then the market will inflate 
and speculative activity will prevail, with no positive contribution to corpo- 
rate sector financing. In other words, when incentives overshadow the need 
for new financial instruments or financial innovations, then the latter will not 
take root in the financial system, and financial deepening will not occur. 
Market development through "bribes" provided by the government will con- 
tinue as long as the mechanism for "bribes" exists. In such a scenario, the dis- 
continuation of government incentives undermines the "new" instrument or 
mechanism supported by them. 
This paper will first present a short chronology of policies geared towards the 
development of a securities market in Turkey. Subsequently, the development 
process of ISEX will be analyzed, and the contribution of ISEX to corporate 
sector financing will be discussed. The paper will then conclude the discus- 
sion with policy lessons for the future. 
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Turkey's experience with financial liberalization and the 
development of securities markets 
The measures adopted during Turkeys experience with financial liberaliza- 
tion are discussed in Cosan and Ersel (1987), Ersel and Sak (1987), Saracoglu 
(1987), Akyuz (1989), and Sak (1994). 
Financial liberalization and financial innovation processes could be viewed as 
manifestations of change in the character of international fund flows in the 
1980s. As noted by the World Bank (1989) and the IMF (1993), internation- 
al fund flows became market-based in the 1980s, in contrast to the allocation 
of funds through government channels prior to that decade. In this sense, 
Turkey's financial liberalization process is domestically-oriented, attempting 
to secure the foreign savings required by the Turkish economy to reproduce 
itself. The financial liberalization process in Turkey has the objective of cre- 
ating secure channels for the flow of foreign savings into the domestic econ- 
omy. 
Turkeys financial liberalization process started in 1980 with the abolition of 
interest rate controls, Subsequently, the Capital Market Law (CML) was 
enacted in 1981, and the Capital Market Board (CMB) was established in 
1982. Comprehensive studies geared towards the development of securities 
markets - including a stock market - were conducted from 1982 onwards. 
Unlike its counterparts in developed countries, CMB is authorized not only to 
ensure the security and integrity of securities markets, but also to establish 
and develop the market itself. This second role is juxtaposed with the nature 
of the financial liberalization process carried out in developing market 
economies. 
CMB first defined the nature of the contracts that could be issued by corpo- 
rations to collect funds, and then the mechanisms for the transfer of such 
instruments. Intermediary institutions and their operating and reporting pro- 
cedures were also defined at the first stage of the development process - 
between 1982 and 1986 - together with the accounting standards and report- 
ing requirements of corporations. This first period of preparation reached its 
climax with the reorganization and reopening of the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
in 1986. 
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Concerning the organization of intermediaries, two important choices that 
marked the beginning of the development process were the merit regulation 
system for securities issues, and the universal banking system. The first 
choice was directly related to those institutions missing from the market 
framework. These missing elements required the government to exercise con- 
trol over the process of development. Given the process of financial change, 
the universal banking system, on the other hand, was meant to strengthen the 
position of banks created in the wake of financial liberalization policies. In 
fact, it was also a manifestation of elements missing from institutional 
requirements. 
The period between 1986 and 1989 witnessed the preparation of the basic 
institutional structure. However, trading and issuing volumes remained low. 
The 1986-89 years could be viewed as a learning period: instruments as well 
as institutions were new, and market participants were still learning the rules 
of the new game. During this period, the objective of CMB was to increase 
the number of participants in the activities of securities markets. 
Turkeys securities markets embarked on a phase of growth after 1989, when 
restrictions on foreign participation in those markets were lifted. This was 
especially true for the stock market. Indeed, only the rumors pointing to the 
arrival of foreign portfolio investors could have given a boost to this market. 
In 1992, financial innovations induced by new regulations were designed to 
sustain the process of development, such as tax incentives granted to long- 
term mutual funds willing to invest 25 percent of their portfolio in shares. 
The volume of' operation at the stock exchange has grown rapidly in the 
l990s. In the following pages, an attempt will be made to analyze the quali- 
ty of this development, as well as to ascertain whether the development in 
terms of operational size also represents a change in corporate finance. 
The performance of the Turkish stock market 
Table I shows the development of the Turkish stock market in the 1986-1993 
period in part A, and compares ISEX with stock markets around the world in 
part B. In part A, the growth of activity at ISEX in the 1986-1993 period is 
identified. The turnover ratio increased from 1.2 in 1986 to 66.5 in 1992, and 
then to 46.8 in 1993. This could be taken as an indicator of the liquidity of 
the market. The volume of trading in 1986 was only US$ 11.5 million, there- 
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after reaching US$ 21.3 billion in 1993. In addition, the average daily trad- 
ing volume jumped from zero in 1986 to US$ 86.5 million. 
Table 1. Main Indicators Regarding ISEX Stock Market 
No. of ISEX Average PIE Turnover 
Corporation General Volume of Daily Ratio Market Velocity 
Listed Index Trading Trading Vol. (%) Capitalization (%) 
A. Domestic Market Indicators (Billion TL) 
1986 348 100 8.7 0 5.! 709 1.2 
1987 414 673 105.4 0.4 15.9 3182 3.3 
988 556 373.9 149 0.6 5 2048 7.3 
1989 730 2217.7 1735.9 6.8 15.7 15553 11.2 
1990 916 3255.7 15313.1 62 23.9 55238 27.7 
1991 1092 4369.2 35487.! 143.6 15.9 78907 45.1 
1992 1238 4004.2 56403.1 224.7 11.4 84809 66.5 
993 1284 20682.9 255627.9 1039.1 25.8 546316 46.8 
B. Comparison with Foreign Stock Markets (Million US$) 
1988 1992 Per Capita 
GNP 
Market Cap. Trading Vol. Listed Corp. Market Cap. Trading Vol. Listed Corp. (1992; US$) 
USA(NYSE) 2366106 1356050 1781 3798238.1 1745466.4 1750 23362 
JAPAN (TSE) 3789033 2234299.5 1683 2318928.6 476976.7 1768 29794 
FRANCE (PARIS) 299892.6 69279.4 676 349608 124879.1 1008 22872 
KOREA (KSE) 94238 79180 502 107448 116138.1 688 6664 
GREECE(ASE) 4285 313 119 9489 8280.2 129 7661 
PORTUGAL (LSE) 7172 1136 171 9213 3469 19! 8504 
BRAZIL (RIO) 30772.1 6882.9 630 45416.4 2819 590 2558 
TURKEY(ISEX) 1141.1 83 556 9902.5 6585.7 1238 1932 
Sources: CMB Monthly Bulletins; FIBV 1993 Statistical Annex; SPO International Economic 
Indicators, Nov. 1993. 
Market capitalization, on the other hand, increased from US$ 938.9 million in 
1986 to US$ 37.8 billion in 1993. However, the latter increase is also related 
to the steep rise in prices. As can be seen in Table 1, in eight years, the 
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general index of ISEX reached 20682.9 in 1993 from its base year in 1986. 
Moreover, the price/earnings ratio, denoting the relation between stock prices 
and the real-sector performance of corporations, increased to 25.8 in 1993. 
Incidentally, this ratio amounted to only 5.1 in 1986. Hence, the price paid 
for a unit of corporate profit received increased fivefold. As noted above, the 
increase in market capitalization is related to the rise in stock prices at ISEX 
over a period of eight years. 
When compared with other stock exchanges, the small size and rapid growth 
of ISEX becomes apparent in panel B of Table I. Note that the figures for per 
capita GNP are also reported in the table. However, in 1992 the figures prove 
that ISEX showed comparative success in terms of growth. Notice, for exam- 
ple, the comparable growth in ISEX and the stock exchanges of Lisbon and 
Athens. While in 1988 the market capitalization of ISEX amounted respec- 
tively to 16, 27 and 1.2 percent that of stock exchanges in Lisbon, Athens and 
Seoul, the relative size of 1SEX in 1992, again in the same order, becomes 
108, 105 and 9 percent. 
When comparisons are made using the ratio of volume of trading to market 
capitalization - that is, the turnover or turnover velocity ratio - respective 
ratios for 1988 were 16, 7, 84 and 7 percent at the stock exchanges of Lisbon, 
Athens, Seoul, and Istanbul. By contrast, in 1992 the respective ratios indi- 
cating the liquidity of the above stock markets were 38, 17, 107 and 84 per- 
cent for Lisbon, Athens, Seoul and Istanbul. 
The performance indicators as well as comparisons with other stock markets 
show development in terms of liquidity and trading volume at ISEX. In what 
follows, the paper will attempt to ascertain whether the performance of ISEX 
denotes a positive contribution to corporate funding and economic growth. 
The contribution of stock exchanges to economic growth 
and corporate funding 
Both financial and non-financial corporations 
Stock markets are expected to contribute to economic growth by providing 
funds to both financial and non-financial corporations listed on the exchange. 
Otherwise, the increase in the volume of trading may only be regarded as the 
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size of the operation of a casino. One objective of secondary market trading 
is to create liquidity in order to encourage primary market participation by 
investors and, hence, fund flows to the corporate sector in the form of shares. 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients calculated for the 1986-1992 pen- 
od. It uses real GNP, real new issues, real market capitalization and real vol- 
ume of trading figures in correlation analysis. The GNP deflator is used in 
finding the real figures. As there are too few points for correlation analysis, 
the results should be analyzed with due care. 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients Between ISEX Indicator 







Market Capitalization - - - 
Trading Volume 0.8402 - - 
New Issues 0.95707 0.75319 - - 
GNP 0.65391 0.82948 0.58222 - 
Source: Author's own calculations based on CMB data. 
The GNP is most highly correlated with the volume of trading. Notice that 
the degree of correlation between GNP/market capitalization and GNP/new 
issues is lower. This shows, first of all, that the volume of activity at ISEX is 
sensitive to the volume of activity in the whole of Turkey's economy. As the 
size of the stock exchange is too small to influence the rate of growth of the 
economy, it could be inferred that the rate of growth of the economy has an 
influence on the volume of activity at the stock exchange. 
The volume of trading, on the other hand, is most highly correlated with mar- 
ket capitalization. Market capitalization has two components. First, it reflects 
price movements and, secondly, it shows the rate of growth of the nominal 
capital of corporations. The latter component is also captured by the new 
issues figures included in the analysis. It may be inferred that the increase in 
trading volume has its first impact upon the level of prices, as the correlation 
coefficient between the volume of trading and the volume of new issues is 
lower. 
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Market capitalization is most highly correlated with new issues, which is quite 
understandable, since it is one of the components of the growth in market cap- 
italization. The market value of corporations grow with new capital injections 
or investments. Furthermore, when the price level rises in response to an 
increase in market liquidity, it becomes cheaper to collect funds through share 
issues. 
A qualitative remark about the nature of new issues must be made at this 
stage. New issues are composed of initial public offerings (IPOs) as well as 
normal capital increases of corporations. IPOs are basically in the form of 
public offerings of existing shares by large shareholders of listed corpora- 
tions. There are also IPOs in the form of capital increases - that is, new shares 
issued and offered to the public. 
Realizing that prices are high, large shareholders collect funds through IPOs. 
However, there are no data on whether funds collected through IPOs are allo- 
cated to new investments. In the case of normal capital increases, buyers are 
for the most part existing shareholders using their preemptive rights, which 
allow them to buy newly-issued shares with priority. 
Another interesting issue relates to the buy-back arrangements used by the 
same large shareholders in order to collect their shares. In this scenario, the 
whole issue of IPOs may be viewed as part of fraudulent activities at ISEX.2 
Non-financial corporations 
The non-financial corporate sector should be regarded as the ultimate target 
of the program for creating alternative sources of funding. In what follows, 
the focus will be on non-financial corporate sector funding through share 
issues. 
Table 3 reports selected ratios denoting the relation between economic growth 
and the performance of ISEX. In all the ratios used, ones attention should be 
2 There ale a few cases inspected at the CMB regarding fraudulent buy-back arrangements. In 
general, the largest shareholder files an application with the CMB to offer IS percent of compa- 
nys shares to the public at a specified price. However, during tile period of the sale or after It, 
s/he continues to sell her/his shares in excess of tile publicly announced IS percent limit. This 
lowers the price of those shai'es at ISEX below the issue price. Then s/he begins to collect pub- 
licly offered shares at prices below the issue price. 
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directed not to absolute values, but rather to opposing trends in secondary and 
primary market ratios. 
The size of ISEX within the Turkish economy grew rapidly during the period 
under analysis. For instance, the ratio of trading volume to GNP grew from 
0.02 percent in 1986 to 19.33 percent in 1993. At the same time, the market 
value of listed corporations in relation to GNP grew from 1.8 percent in 1986 
to 41.3 percent in 1993. Referring back to Table 1, notice that the price level 
at ISEX inflated during the period under analysis. Once it has been estab- 
lished that there was significant growth in the operational size of ISEX, the 
latter is then viewed as an entity in itself. The objective here is to analyze the 
flow of funds to the corporate sector as a result of the operation of ISEX. 
Table 3. Performance Indicators for ISEX and Its Contribution to 
Non-financial Private Sector Financing ( %) 
Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of 
Ratio of Ratio of New Issues New Issues IPO Vol. to New Issues 













1987 0.2 5.4 177.6 5.9 0.0 2.2 
1988 0.2 2.0 243.8 17.7 0.0 2.9 
1989 1.0 9.! 56.0 6.3 0.0 4.7 
1990 5.3 19.2 23.4 6.5 81.9 9.9 
1991 7.9 17.4 10.1 5.6 17.6 7.8 
1992 7.3 11.0 7.8 5.2 9.8 4.7 
993 19.3 41.3 2.0 1.0 22.4 3.! 
Source: Author's own calculations. 
The third column in Table 3 reports the ratio of new issues to trading volume. 
Contrary to the new-issues figures used in the previous correlation analysis, 
only new issues by non-financial corporations are reported at this point, since 
the goal is to underline the importance of direct corporate finance. 
The ratio of new issues to trading volume shows whether an increase in the 
liquidity of the market contributes to the volume of funds collected by non- 
financial corporations through share issues. This is one way of showing the 
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relationship between primary and secondary markets. It is expected that a 
booming secondary market will encourage investment in stocks in the prima- 
ry market, as portfolio reallocations become possible as well as less costly 
(e.g. Ghandhi 1988). 
Given that new issues at market prices and IPOs started only after 1989, pre- 
1989 figures could be misleading. Before 1989, new issues were mainly at 
nominal prices and designed so as to enable existing shareholders to use their 
preemptive rights. Also, the volume of trading was very low in the pre-1989 
period. However, the ratio of new issues to trading volume declined system- 
atically, whether one considers the whole period or only the 1989-1993 sub- 
period. Indeed, it declined from 55.96 percent in 1989 to 2.03 percent in 
1993. The increase in the liquidity of the secondary market for shares did not 
seem to motivate corporations to collect new funds through share issues. 
Another interesting matter is the decline in the ratio of IPOs to new issues 
fi-orn 1990 to 1993 as reported in the fifth column of Table 3. The analysis of 
these figures reveals that not even fraudulent buy-back arrangements should 
be taken as seriously as alleged. Hence, the increase in the liquidity of the 
market did not encourage either new issues or IPOs as theoretically expected. 
In the fourth column of Table 3, the ratio of new issues to market capitalization 
denotes the contribution of the stock exchange to the increase in the capital of 
listed corporations, that is, the rate of funds raised through share issues. Notice 
that the ratio looks stable - around 6 percent - in the 1989-1992 period, but it 
then declines to 1 percent in 1993. Taking into account the increase in market 
liquidity, it can be inferred that funds raised through share issues in the 1989- 
1992 period grew at a six percent rate irrespective of the rise in the liquidity of 
the stock market. Subsequently, in 1993 this ratio dropped to 1 percent. 
Again in Table 3, the ratio of new issues to private fixed-capital investments 
is reported. Shares are regarded as long-term instruments in the literature. In 
light of this characterization, funding through the stock market could then be 
viewed as suitable for long-term investments. The ratio reached its peak - 
9.9 percent - in 1990, and then declined to 3.1 percent in 1993. This ratio also 
shows a systematically-declining trend in the post-1989 period. 
The above analysis does not quite substantiate the assumption that there is a 
relation between the growth rate of the economy and that of the stock market. 
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Although Turkeys secondary market for shares seems to have flourished and 
increased in terms of size, no visible success has been achieved in providing 
funds to the corporate sector. 
Financing flows for non-financial corporations 
Another way of reaching the above result, which points to limited success in 
the development of the Turkish primary market for shares, would be to analyze 
the distribution of net financing flows to the non-financial corporate sector. 
In this regard, Table 4 reports the distribution of non-financial corporate sec- 
tor financing flows in terms of sources of funds. The period under analysis 
goes from 1987 to 1993. One interesting point in connection with Table 4 is 
the parallel movement of the ISEX performance indicators reported in Table 
3 and the percentage share of funds collected through share issues. Notice 
that the ratio of funds collected through shares to total fund flows reached its 
peak - 11.6 percent - in 1990, but it then declined to 3.4 percent in 1993. The 
decline is systematic, as in the case of ISEX performance indicators discussed 
above. 
The second point regarding Table 4 is the continuous dominance of bank 
financing. Despite the reorganization of the stock market after 1986, the 
dependence of the non-financial corporate sector on bank financing persists. 
Notice that this was also the case after 1989, when the Turkish stock market 
is regarded as having taken off. This contradicts the expectations of Lopes 
(1983) in designing the guidelines for Turkeys financial liberalization 
process. 
The figures for corporate sector financing in the 1987-1993 period support the 
finding that the post-1989 growth in stock market trading figures did not have 
a comparable influence on corporate funding. A scenario of flourishing sec- 
ondary markets and shrinking primary markets highlights problems regarding 
financial deepening, in which case the extent of incentives provided must be 
scrutinized more carefully. 
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Table 4. Non-financial Corporate Sector Financing Flows: 
Percentage Distribution 
1987 988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
I. Batik Loans (I) 89.8 88.0 83.2 84.0 81.0 89.2 87.3 
Commercial Banks 84.0 76.4 76.4 79.2 70.5 84.6 83.4 
Development Banks 5.8 11.6 6.8 4,8 10.5 4.6 3.9 
2. Secui'itics 0.2 l2.0 12.6 14.3 12.7 6.4 4.6 
Shares 3.4 5.2 6.0 11.6 9.6 4.6 3.4 
Other (2) 6.8 6.8 6.6 2.7 3,1 1.8 1.2 
3. Other - - 4.2 1.7 6.3 4.4 8.! 
Islamic Banks (3) - - 4.2 .7 2.8 3.5 5.3 
Leasing Co. - - - - 3.5 0.9 2.8 
4. Total 
(Billion TL) 5502.7 7003.3 16131.3 30813.5 45320.8 95857.9 150753.2 
5. WPI 11)0.1) 170.5 279.5 425.7 805.1 1299.4 2082.1 
Notes: 
I) Calculations based upon November figures in 1993. See Sak—Yeldan (1992) for a discussion 
of the composition of banks loan portfolio. 
(2) Coi'porate bond and commercial paper issues are taken into account. 
(3) Named as special finance houses in Turkish legislation. 
Source: Central Bank Quarterly Bulletins. 
Conclusion 
The Turkish experience in the 1990s shows that, in the case of flourishing sec- 
ondary markets and shallow primary markets, speculative activity grows over 
limited shares outstanding when incentives are provided to the demand side 
of the market. The supply side of the market does not seem to be responding 
automatically to the growth in secondary markets. As a result, no automatic 
adjustment takes place in the market. Indeed, a growing demand does not cre- 
ate a growing supply by itself. 
The adjustment problem on the supply side of the market could be analyzec 
in light of the objectives of the program for financial market development. 
noted in the beginning of the paper, two objectives were considered in design. 
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ing the program for stock market development in Turkey. One was to devise 
a new mechanism for corporate finance, and the second was to improve infor- 
mation flows in the economy as a whole. The volume of funds allocated 
through the stock market is not viewed as important in our analysis. The 
point to be made here is that adjustment problems on the supply side of a 
stock market could have distortionary effects on the tatters primary function 
- namely, to improve the process of production and aggregation of informa- 
tion in the economy. This conclusion has important policy repercussions; it 
thus merits further analysis in the context of Turkey. 
At this stage, the paper will not attempt a systematic analysis of the reasons 
behind this phenomenon. However, the absence of automatic adjustment itself 
could lead to policy conclusions. Once it has been ascertained that automatic 
adjustment does not take place, two types of dynamics could be considered 
regarding the adjustment problem on the supply side of the stock market. 
One type of dynamics is related to the ownership structure of corporations as 
well as questions of secrecy and fear of losing corporate control, among other 
factors; these are also discussed in Ramos (1986), and Castaneda (1988). The 
second type, by contrast, is associated with the availability of a sufficient 
number of cheaper sources of funds, thereby strengthening the first set of 
mostly subjective factors. Foreign short-term fund flows into Turkey in the 
1990s could be adduced as a reason impinging on supply-side adjustment. 
In countries like Turkey, where public policy has a strong impact on the 
process of financial liberalization, the design of the policy framework is 
important. Accordingly, the absence of automatic adjustment is of primary 
importance in policy analysis. Notice, in this regard, that there is still no 
coherent framework for policy analysis or policy design in the Economics lit- 
erature, as noted in Stiglitz (1994). 
Nevertheless, three issues should be stressed in connection with the experi- 
ence of Turkey. First and foremost, the decision to establish a stock exchange 
in the beginning of the process of financial liberalization might be viewed as 
ideological rather than economic, if not outright incorrect. A stock exchange 
is a complex collection of institutions pricing heterogeneous claims. 
Therefore, a market for government securities - where the claims to be priced 
are homogeneous - could be a better starting point. 
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The organization of a stock market requires the establishment of accounting 
and disclosure standards, unwritten ethical standards among intermediaries, 
as well as rule-enforcement powers. In addition, all transactions must be 
supervised in light of existing rules, clearing and settlement mechanisms must 
be implemented, depository services provided, and so forth. All the above 
factors require that contract enforcement be guaranteed in a fair trading envi- 
ronment. Indeed, in an environment where trading takes place on heteroge- 
neous claims by heterogeneous investors, a more complex collection of insti- 
tutions is required. 
A second issue to be tackled regards economic incentives, which should be 
carefully analyzed by the government before further incentives are provided. 
In fact, if incentives are excessive, economic agents could enter the related 
area only to benefit from them, in which case no long-term benefits concern- 
ing behavioral change would be achieved by providing extra incentives. 
Incentives should be designed to add momentum to the process. If they 
become the only motive for participation in the process, then their discontin- 
uation would spell the demise of the market thus developed. 
Finally, incentives should be balanced between the demand and supply sides 
of the market; otherwise, new problems could emerge. As in the case of 
Turkey, when demand-side incentives exceed those on the supply side, spec- 
ulative activity prevails in the market. 
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Guven Saks paper is a very interesting account of developments in the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange, which is, along with the Amman Stock Exchange, 
among the most active in the region. The Turkish experience raises many 
issues for other countries on the path of financial liberalization. In particular, 
Saks paper highlights the phenomenon of flourishing secondary markets 
alongside stagnant or shrinking primary markets. The author concludes that 
the rapid growth in stock market activity has not been associated with 
increased reliance by the corporate sector on the stock market for investment. 
There are two sets of issues that need to be discussed in connection with the 
puzzle raised by the author, which is a fairly unique feature among emerging 
stock markets. 
First and foremost, to what extent has the rapid growth in the Istanbul stock 
market been fueled by artificial factors such as regulations and the institu- 
tional characteristics of the market rather than by market forces? By 1992, for 
example, market capitalization and trading volumes in Turkey were equiva- 
lent to or greater than those in Greece or Portugal, even though Turkeys per 
capita income was only about one-quarter the per capita income of those 
countries. Moreover, the number of corporations listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange was 1238, which is closer to the 1750 corporations listed in the 
United States or the 1768 corporations listed in Japan than to the much small- 
er number listed in Greece (129) or in Portugal (191). How can such anom- 
alies be explained? Could the large number of listings reflect tax and other 
incentives aimed at encouraging corporations to list on the stock exchange? 
Could the large growth in trading volume perhaps reflect collusive behavior 
on the part of large market participants? It would be worthwhile to explore 
such non-market explanations for the patterns identified in Saks paper, par- 
ticularly since their significance is likely to reduce the information content of 
stock market developments. 
Furthermore, should this be cause for concern or is the growth in trading 
reflection of the stock market serving other functions that have nothing to dc 
with investment directly? The author makes some interesting points aboul 
corporate finance decisions, such as the importance of secrecy and control ir 
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family business, the availability of alternative financing, and the impact of 
universal banking. These determinants of corporate finance and investment 
decisions at the firm level need to be better understood. Decisions to raise 
capital through the stock market are made within a specific context, and it is 
important to comprehend the incentive regime in which firms operate in order 
to understand why growing demand for equities does not seem to stimulate a 
greater supply. One should be concerned about the slow growth of the pri- 
mary market only if stock market financing of investment is viewed as supe- 
rior or incremental or as embodying externalities relative to other forms of 
investment financing. There may also be indirect effects that increase domes- 
tic capital formation at the margin as Turkish investors are increasingly able 
to diversify risk domestically. 
As a final comment, in addition to the two stock market functions mentioned 
in Saks paper, namely facilitating corporate finance and improving informa- 
tion flows, a third role needs to be discussed - that of providing a mechanism 
that enables risk diversification. Perhaps the real explanation for the boom in 
the Turkish stock market is foreign portfolio investment seeking to diversify 
risk across countries, which has little to do with the need for new equity 
finance by Turkish corporations. There are many reasons why international 
investors wished to hold Turkish assets in the early 1990s, such as the coun- 
try's improved fiscal performance, its capital market reforms, and the oppor- 
tunities for risk diversification as a result of the lack of correlation between 
price changes in the markets of industrialized countries and those in Turkey. 
The difficult question will then revolve around the strategy through which to 
draw upon foreign demand for Turkish equities driven by risk diversification 
motives so as to foster investment and growth in Turkey. It would be inter- 
esting to understand why Turkeys structure of domestic incentives does not 
encourage local firms to tap this external source of capital. 

10 




This paper discusses the background and prospects for the reemergence of 
Beirut as a regional financial market for the Near and Middle East. Starting 
in the 1950s, and especially during the 1960s and 1970s, Beirut had emerged 
as the prominent - if not the exclusive - financial and capital market in the 
Middle East. A combination of factors had contributed to this success,' such 
as the openness of the Lebanese economy to trade in goods and services; the 
absence of controls on capital flows; the unconditionally convertible curren- 
cy; a liberal, laissez-faire approach to economic policy and its implementa- 
tion; a limited role for government in economic affairs; and a favorable regu- 
latory environment as exemplified, inter alia, by the tradition and law relating 
to banking secrecy.2 In addition, the development of the banking and finan- 
cial sector in Lebanon was favored by adverse political and regulatory devel- 
opments in neighboring countries, such as the series of wars, coups d'etat, and 
pro-socialist regulatory regimes and nationalizations that swept across Egypt, 
Iraq, Palestine, Syria and other countries in the region between 1950 and 
1965. These instances of instability and adverse political developments 
resulted in capital flight into Lebanon as well as an inflow of human capital 
represented by entrepreneurs, industrialists, high-skilled labor and profes- 
For a discussion and background on economic and financial conditions and developments dur- 
ing the period of the French mandate, 1920-1943, the reader is directed to the excellent books by 
Sa'id Himadeh, The Monetaiy and Banking System of Syria, American University of Beirut, 
Beirut, 1935 and Economic Organization of Syria, American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1936. 
For the post-mandate period, see A. Badre, "Economic Development of Lebanon", in Cooper and 
Alexander, eds., Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle East, American 
Elsevier, 1972. 
2 
The law relating to Banking Secrecy was enacted in 1956. See Ch. Fabia, "L'lnstitution du 
Secret Bancaire au Liban', in Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Commercial, Beyrouth, Janvier-Mars, 
1957. Also important in assisting the rapid development of the banking sector during this period 
was the law relating to "joint" accounts, passed in 1961, which among other characteristics, 
allows the surviving account holders beneficial ownership in the event of death of an account 
holder. 
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sionals. The results were impressive. During the 1950-1974 period, itis esti- 
mated that the Lebanese economy grew at an average annual real rate of about 
5.6 percent, while the population growth rate was about 2.9 percent. 
Likewise, inflation remained at low levels (ranging from 2 to 4 percent), in 
line with inflation in the major industrial countries. The Lebanese Pound 
(LL) exchange rate varied between periods of stability to slight appreciation 
against the major currencies. There was also rapid growth in the banking sec- 
tor and increased financial deepening.3 However, rapid economic growth and 
prosperity were abruptly interrupted by the onset of civil war and violent 
internal conflicts starting in 1975. By contrast to the earlier period, it is esti- 
mated that the average growth rate of real GDP turned negative at -4 percent, 
while inflation accelerated to an average 28 percent per year.4 Indeed, the 
sixteen years of war and destructive conflicts between 1975 and 1990 
reversed the impressive gains in per capita income that had been achieved in 
the 1950-1974 period. 
This paper will discuss macroeconomic developments following the Israeli 
invasion in the summer of 1982, focusing on recent attempts at economic sta- 
bilization since the end of hostilities in 1990. It should be clear that security 
as well as political and economic stability are pre-requisites for well-func- 
tioning financial markets. The paper will then turn to a brief review of invest- 
ment requirements in the public and private sectors for economic reconstruc- 
tion in Lebanon. The basic message is that the size of capital expenditures 
required over the foreseeable future exceeds domestic savings, thus calling for 
large and sustained foreign capital inflows in order to finance domestic invest- 
ment. Subsequently, the prospective role of Lebanon's financial markets at 
both domestic and regional levels will be outlined. Apart from their obvious 
role in financing domestic reconstruction, Lebanon's financial markets could 
develop a new capacity as a regional capital market, channeling foreign 
For a discussion of monetary and banking conditions during this period. see N. Saidi, Flexible 
Exchange Rates and Competitive Banking: An Interpretation of Lebanon's Monetary Experience. 
1950-1977,' Banquc du Liban, Bulletin Trimestriel, No. 9 .198 and S. Makdisi, Financial Polov 
and Economic Growth: the Lebwtese Experience. Columbia University Press, New York [1979]. 
I discuss the inflationary experience of Lebanon and the underlying factors in N. Saidi. 
"Deficits, Inflation and Depreciation: Lebanon's Experience, 1964-1988", in N. Shehadi & B. 
Harney, Politics and I/ic Economy in Lebanon, School of Oriental and African Studies and Centrc 
for Lebanese Studies, Oxford. 1989. 
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resources into the region's emerging and liberalizing economies. The paper 
will also offer some suggestions regarding the organizational structure of 
Lebanon's financial markets, their potential size, and instruments. A number 
of reforms will be mentioned alongside legal and regulatory innovations 
required to provide a suitable foundation to these markets. Finally, the paper 
will speculate on the future regional role of Beirut, followed by concluding 
comments. 
Macroeconomic developments (1985-1990) and stabilization 
policy (1991-1994) 
In reviewing macroeconomic developments in Lebanon over the past ten 
years, it is useful to distinguish between two sub-periods: 1985-1990 and 
1991-1994. The latter period has been characterized by attempts at econom- 
ic stabilization continuing through 1994. By contrast, the former period, 
ranging from 1985 to 1990, followed the Israeli invasion of 1982. The inva- 
sion resulted in more than 20,000 dead, more than 75,000 wounded and 
maimed, as well as extensive destruction of physical capital and basic infra- 
structure; it also led to a major dislocation of markets, including the defacto 
partition of Lebanon.5 Furthermore, the invasion generated domestic politi- 
cal instability that led to a new wave of violent internal conflicts, thus sub- 
stantially weakening the central government. From a macroeconomic per- 
spective, the 1985-1990 period was characterized by extensive destruction of 
physical infrastructure and capital stocks, the outmigration of high-skilled 
labor and professionals, a decline in real income and labor productivity, 
severe disruptions in the operation of the legal system and the judiciary, an 
accommodating monetary policy, and rising government budget deficits 
resulting from a persistence in government spending while revenues plum- 
meted. In turn, growing fiscal deficits resulted in a large accumulation of 
domestic public debt. The macroeconomic consequences of the above were 
For a more extensive discussion of the economic consequences of the war and the policy 
refonas recluired for reconstruction and modernization, see N. Saidi, "Economic Consequences 
of the War in Lebanon, Centre for Lebanese Studies", Papers on Lebanon No. 3, Oxford 
University, 1986 and, "The Economic Reconstruction of Lebanon: War, Peace and 
Modernization" in D. Collings, ed., Peace ftr Lebanon ? From War to Reconstruction, published 
in association with the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Lynne Riener 
Publishers, Boulder & London, 1994, and references therein. B. Lababki and K. Abou Rjeily's 
Bilan des Guerres du Liban 1975-1990, Editions L'Harmattan, 1993, contains estimates of the 
loss of human life, migration, and other damage. 
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highly visible and hardly surprising:6 high price and wage inflation rates 
peaking at close to hyperinflationary rates in 1986 and 1987, a rapid depreci- 
ation of the LL exchange rate against all major currencies, a highly-dollarized 
economy with a rising proportion of currency in circulation, deposits, credits 
and transactions becoming foreign-currency denominated, a banking sector 
crisis resulting in a number of bank failures, interruptions in the development 
and operation of financial markets, and high nominal interest rates. 
(However, as a result of continuous attempts by Lebanese authorities to con- 
trol nominal rates, persistently high inflation rates and sudden inflation 
upsurges led to negative real interest rates.) 
By the late 1980s it had become increasingly clear that economic stabilization 
required political reform and the restoration of security. With the enactment 
of the Taif Accords in 1989, success was achieved in ending Lebanon's inter- 
nal conflict. Designed to provide the foundations for a long-term political set- 
tlement affirming Lebanon's Arab identity, the Taif Accords were based on a 
redistribution of power among the various communities and religious sects; a 
reform of the presidential system; and a definition of the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon. By October 1990 internal hostilities had come to a halt with the end 
of the Aounist attempt to take power. This led to the reorganization of the 
Lebanese army and the disbanding of the militias, whose members were par- 
tially absorbed into the army. With improved security, the central government 
was able to increase its control over the territory, extend the rule of law, and 
conduct parliamentary elections in 1992. Following the appointment of the 
Hariri government in October 1992, the elements of a heterodox approach to 
economic stabilization took shape.7 Such an approach was a mixture of clas- 
sical ingredients. On the fiscal policy side, the plan encompassed an attempt 
to reduce budget deficits by curbing government expenditures in real terms as 
well as increasing tax and non-tax revenues; investment in tax administration 
and collection; and tax reform, including a major reduction in tax rates.8 On 
the other hand, monetary and exchange rate policies were predicated on the 
adoption of a nominal exchange rate "anchor" policy leading to a stable daily 
N. Saidi, "Deficits, inflation and Depreciation..", op. cit., for a detailed review of this period. 
For futiher discussion of the elements of stabilization, see N. Saidi, "Capital Markets, Economic 
Stabilization and the Reconstruction of Lebanon: 1993 and Beyond", unpublished, Beirut, 
October 1993. 
Personal and corporate tax rates were reduced to about 10 percent. 
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rate with a moderate "crawling peg" appreciation against the US dollar, and a 
non-accommodating monetary policy which, coupled with the partial steril- 
ization of capital inflows, has implied high nominal and real interest rates. 
The government also implemented an incomes policy aimed at restraining 
wage claims, including limitations on the extent of cost of living adjustments 
across the public and private sectors. Such limitations on cost of living 
increases for public sector salaries and wages was critical in restraining the 
growth of government expenditures, since labor costs account for about 70 
percent of non-interest government spending. 
Starting in 1990, renewed confidence in the future of Lebanon brought about 
by political stability and the restoration of security, along with expectations of 
economic reconstruction and improved prospects for peace in the region, has 
led to a surge in capital inflows. The combination of positive security and 
political developments alongside the implementation of the elements of an 
economic stabilization policy, as noted above, have yielded tangible econom- 
ic results. As shown in Table 1, Lebanon's net foreign assets have increased, 
inflation has dropped dramatically to below double-digit levels, and overall 
economic growth has surged. 
Economic reconstruction 
Rebuilding the Lebanese economy from the damage inflicted over the past 
sixteen years of civil war necessarily implies capital accumulation - physical 
as well as human capita]. The accumulation of physical capital is needed to 
replace capital destroyed, to make up for low investment ratios during the war 
years, and to provide capital for a young and rapidly-growing population. In 
particular, increasing per capita real income and regaining the pre-war growth 
path of real GDP will require a substantial rise in the amount of capital per 
head. This process of "capital deepening" will be critical in raising labor pro- 
ductivity during the process of reconstruction. Two related issues are the 
order of priorities and the share of total capital expenditures to be undertaken 
by the public and private sectors. 
The objectives and priorities of Lebanon's economic reconstruction at this 
stage are clear. Attempts must be made to rebuild the economy's infrastruc- 
ture in order to provide basic services relating to power, communications, 
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transport, telecommunications, water and sewage;9 the country's housing 
stock must be rebuilt; and the necessary incentives and conditions to encour- 
age the return of Lebanon's high-skilled migrant population must be provid- 
ed. Investment in infrastructure should take precedence over all other efforts 
because it is complementary to private sector capital expenditures and raises 
the marginal efficiency of such investment. Public sector infrastructure is 
directly productive and raises the marginal productivity of private sector cap- 
ital. The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) has recently 
developed a multi-sector investment plan covering Lebanon's various regions 
and phased through the year 2002.'° 
Table 1: Lebanon: monetary and nominal variables, 1992-1994 
Variable Dec. or Year 1992 Dcc. or Year 1993 June 1994 
Nominal GDP (S, 0/n) 26.5% 14.2% 106% 
Balancc of Payments $54 $1,170 $600 
Inflation Local LL (%) 130% 9% 8.5% 
LL Interest Rates (%) 12.6% 16.5% 14.7% 
LL/$ Exchange Rate 1838 1711 1684 
Net Foreign Assets $6,730 $8,726 $9,182 
International Reserves $1,448 $2,220 $3,429 
Sources: line (1): own estimate; lines (2), (4), (5), (6), (7): Banque du Liban; line (3): Consultation 
and Research Institute, Beirut. Variables are in $ millions, unless otherwise indicated. 
As shown in Table 2, the CDR plan calls for up to $11.6 billion (at constant 
1992 prices) in public investment to be spent over the next ten years distrib- 
uted across major sectors. It also stipulates that up to 46 percent will be 
financed through domestic and foreign borrowing. What of the financing of 
the private sector? Table 3 shows the results of a simulation exercise based 
on a gradual return to the pre-war path of real income, and indicates the pri- 
vate and public sector investment requirements for two growth scenarios - 
See the World Development Report, the World Bank, Washington. 1994. and references therein 
for a empirical evidence and a report on the important role of infrastructure expenditures in 
development and in raising the return on private sector investment. 
15 
See the Council Development and Reconstruction, Horizon 2000 for Reconstruction and 
Development, Main Report, Beirut, 1994. 
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low growth (scenario I) and high growth (scenario JJ)•U Note that the CDR 
investment plan falls into the high-growth scenario, requiring higher invest- 
ment by the private sector. The latter amounts to between $18 and $21 billion 
(at constant 1992 prices), spread over the next ten years. Hence, total (public 
and private) investment spending exceeds $32 ($26) billion, well above the 
forecast flow of domestic savings of about $10 ($6) billion. The excess of 
domestic investment over domestic savings must be sought from external 
resources and must be generated by sustained and relatively large net capital 
inflows ranging from $20 to $22 billion (at constant 1992 prices) over the next 
ten years. 
Table 2: CDR: Horizon 2000 Investment Plan 
Broad Sector Year 1-5 Years 6-10 Total Years 1-10 
Physical Infrastructure $4,300 $2,319 $6,619 
Social Infrastructure $1,819 $1,426 $3,245 
Productive Sectors $591 $747 $1,338 
Other Sectors $334 $136 $470 
Total Program $7,043 $4, 629 $11,672 
Source: CDR, 1994. 
Table 3: Investment requirements and foreign finance: 1994-2003 
Scenario I Scenario II 
Total Investments ($, Bn.) $26 $32 
Public Investments ($. Bn.) $8 $11 
Private Investments ($, Bn.) $18 $21 
Foreign Finance ($, Bn.) $20 $22 
Domestic Savings ($, Bn.) $6 $10 
Investment as % GDP 24% 26% 
Source: Author's own simulations and calculations. 
How plausible is it that Lebanon can absorb and attract such substantial cap- 
ital inflows? The answer depends, to a large extent, on the relative real after- 
See N. Saidi, "The Economic Reconstruction of Lebanon: War, Peace and Modernization", op. 
Cit. for details of the methodology used for the simulation. 
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tax rates of return to investment in Lebanon as compared to other countries, 
as well as on the perceived risk of investing in the country. On both counts, 
economic fundamentals seem encouraging. First, the low level (scarcity) of 
available capital implies, ceteris paribus, that the marginal productivity of 
capital and the expected real rates of return to investment are high, thus tend- 
ing to attract capital. Secondly, the achievements noted above - increased 
security, political stability, low tax rates and economic stabilization - have led 
to a reduction in perceived political and economic risks, thus tending to 
increase capital inflows and the total return to investment in Lebanon. 
Thirdly, investment in Lebanon may generate substantially larger payoffs in 
the event of a peaceful settlement in the region. However, although the attrac- 
tiveness of foreign (and domestic) investment in Lebanon is high, it is also 
necessary to create the appropriate channels and financial instruments for 
investment; indeed, the financial intermediation process is crucial. 
The role of financial markets'2 
The potential role of financial markets in Lebanon has two dimensions. On 
the one hand, there is a domestic aspect linked to the standard investment-sav- 
ing intermediation process and to the financing of reconstruction. On the 
other hand, there is an international aspect related to the "renaissance" of 
Beirut as a regional financial center. It is important to highlight certain points 
in this regard. First and foremost, the availability of financial markets will be 
critical to mobilize resources and channel domestic and foreign capital to pro- 
ductive investments. In addition, it will allow for the sharing of investment 
risk and will provide liquidity to the economy.'3 Apart from retained earn- 
ings and other internal resources, the main source of corporate finance and 
credit in Lebanon is bank lending. Medium and long-term funding, project 
finance, and term lending are virtually absent. Indeed, most bank lending 
takes the form of callable overdraft facilities. 
2 For additional discussion of the role of capital markets, see N. Saidi, "The Role of Capital 
MaFkets in Lebanon's Reconstruction: Developing Debt and Equity Markets to Finance 
Reconstruction.'' The Journal otEcononoc Research, Vol. 2 , Beirut, January 1993. 
A good example of the ability of financial markets to provide liquidity is "Solidere", the real 
estate development company set up to rebuild the destroyed city center of Beirut. By creating 
marketable shares as a counterpart to immobilized, unproductive real estate in the downtown 
area, "Solidere" generates liquidity for the holders of rights. The shares can be sold, or used as 
collateral, thus freeing up liquidity that can be used in alternative projects. 
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Over time, a structural change in the sources of finance will come about as a 
result of the availability of financial market as commercial 
paper, bonds and equities, along with liquid markets with a sufficient number 
of participants to ensure competition and transparency, will lead to a structur- 
al change in the sources of finance. As the costs and risks of financial market 
intermediation fall, two effects will be felt - financial deepening, i.e., an 
increase in the volume of available finance relative to aggregate transactions 
and economic activity, and a substitution away from bank lending towards 
marketable securities. 
Furthermore, the banking sector, financial markets and related services are 
important sectors in the economy, contributing more than 40 percent of GDP. 
As such, developing such markets also leads to an expansion of real econom- 
ic activity. Financial market instruments and securities provide alternative 
marketable investment opportunities to traditional investments in real estate 
and Treasury bills. Hence, they make it less likely that capital inflows will 
create a speculative boom, driving up the prices of real estate assets, or lead 
to potentially volatile short-term portfolio investments in Treasury bills. 
Moreover, a market must be created to support future privatizations of public 
sector entities as well as to provide funding for a process of mergers and 
acquisitions in the corporate sector. It will also be needed to mobilize and 
channel capital resources back into the region, thus recovering Beirut's tradi- 
tional pre-war role as a money market center and a conduit for funds to be 
deposited in Western Europe and the United States. Hence, what has been 
termed the "renaissance" of Lebanon's financial markets is underpinned by 
two sets of fundamental factors. First, the need to finance private and public 
sector investment spending during the reconstruction period and beyond; and 
secondly, the need to repatriate capital for investment in the Middle East 
region and beyond. 
Potential size, structure and organization of Beirut's 
financial markets 
The paper will now address three issues: the factors that could underlie a corn- 
4 
As an example of this process of financial transformation see the description of the US experience 
by B.J. Friedman, Changes in the American Financial Markets", in M. Feldstein (ed), The 
A,nericwt in Trans junO, National Bureau of Economic Research, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1980. 
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parative advantage for Beirut to reemerge as regional financial center; the ele- 
ments of what might constitute an appropriate market and institutional struc- 
ture for Beirut's financial markets; and the potential size of such financial 
markets. 
A number of contributing factors can make Lebanon develop a comparative 
advantage as a regional financial market.'5 Among these, one may cite 
Beirut's strategic and cehtral geographic location; its long tradition as an 
international banking center, with support services in the legal and account- 
ing/auditing professions; banking secrecy; unrestricted currency convertibili- 
ty; the absence of capital controls; and low levels of personal and corporate 
taxation. In particular, one should note the absence of discriminatory tax bar- 
riers to foreign investment. 
Indeed, it is important to note that the cornerstones of Lebanon's liberal finan- 
cial policy - banking secrecy, currency convertibility, and unhindered capital 
movements - have been tried and tested. Since 1949 Lebanon has followed a 
flexible exchange rate regime - incidentally, the longest historical experience 
of any country with a flexible exchange rate regime. Despite political turmoil 
in the Middle East, sixteen years of civil war in Lebanon, and the volatility of 
international currency and capital markets, Lebanon never imposed controls 
either on capital movements or on the convertibility of its currency. This fact 
underscores the credibility of both monetary and exchange rate policies and 
institutions, and amounts to a large investment in, and a fine reputation for 
policy consistency. Hence, unlike a large number of emerging countries, 
including the economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
Lebanon has earned its reputation and credibility in implementing and sus- 
taining policies and institutions. 
Despite the aforementioned positive contributing factors, there are a number 
of important reforms and policy changes required in order to modernize and 
develop Lebanon's markets. Fundamentally, the legislative "infrastructure" 
relating to financial markets and the banking sector needs to be revised. The 
objective is to adopt modern trading systems and technology - including a 
See the pi'oceedings of the conference on "Financial Markets in the Middle East", organized by the 
UK Government arid The Royal Institute of International Affairs, (London, April 1994). for a review 
and prospects for the financial markets in the region. See also, the paper by A. Abisourour, "The 
Emerging Arab Capital Markets: Status, Role and Development Prospects," in S. El-Naggar. ed., 
Financial Poluie,c and Capital Markets in Arab Countries, International Monetary Fund, 1994. 
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computerized, paperless system - and to apply international regulatory and 
supervisory norms. Briefly, the following changes are necessary: the mod- 
ernization of laws relating to the banking and financial sectors so as to incor- 
porate international norms and standards, and specifically, to reflect the cre- 
ation of new markets (e.g. forwards, futures, options, etc.) and international 
innovations in instruments and new products; the establishment of an inde- 
pendent capital markets regulatory authority for the licensing and supervision 
of markets and market participants; the introduction of laws to protect 
investors and to ensure the transparency of market operations; and the adop- 
tion of modern accounting and auditing norms and standards. 
In order to address these concerns, Lebanese authorities will be proposing leg- 
islation aimed at enacting a comprehensive capital markets law. Broadly, three 
organizations will be created: the Beirut Stock Exchange (B SE), the Beirut 
Money Market (BMM), and a central depository and clearing organization, 
'Midclear'. The BSE is expected to include a primary issue market as repre- 
sented by a modernized Bourse de Beyrouth,'6 and a Beirut Secondary Market 
for trading. The BSE will deal with all equity and equity-related instruments. 
The BMM, by contrast, is expected to trade in money-market instruments, gov- 
ernment and corporate debt, derivatives and related instruments. A Beirut 
Capital Markets Board (BCMB), set up as an independent authority under the 
capital markets law, would have overall responsibility for these markets. In 
addition, an independent Beirut Capital Markets Commission - accountable to 
the BCMB - would act as the supervisory authority and industry "watchdog". 
Finally, the central depository and clearing house, 'Midclear', would operate 
under Group of Thirty recommendations, providing an efficient paperless sys- 
tem with delivery against payment. 
What is the potential size of a new BSE? Clearly, there is no reliable scien- 
tific method to estimate the capitalization of an emerging or reemerging mar- 
ket. Table 4 shows the profiles and characteristics in 1992 and 1993 of a num- 
ber of emerging stock markets in the "middle capitalization" range. Typical 
of the emerging markets sector, returns and risks are high compared to more 
mature stock markets. 
Though a rudimentary stock market was established in June 1920, the law establishing the 
Beirut Bourse was enacted by Parliament in June 1954. For a history of the Beirut Bourse, see 
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Table 5: Money and Debt Markets: Projected Size, 1994-1997 
Domestic Foreign Total 
Government Debt $5 Bn. $2 Bn. $7 Bn. 
Corporate Debt $2 Bn. $1 Bn. $3 Bn. 
Money Market $2 Bn. $0.0 $2 Ba. 
Grand Total: $9 Ba. $3 Bn. $12 Bn. 
Source: author's own projections and calculations, 
For purposes of "simulation", this paper has included some hypothetical pro- 
jections for Lebanon in 1995. Until the Bourse de Beyrouth stopped active 
trading in the mid-I 980s, more than 40 companies were listed and traded. In 
addition, a number of sectors were represented, such as insurance, banks, 
electric power, real estate, industrial companies, wholesalers and tourism- 
related businesses. The simulation assumes that up to 15 companies will be 
listed by The market has already developed with the listing of 
"Solidere"on the Beirut Secondary Market in June 1994. By the end of 
September, the share price had risen by more than 60 percent, and the market 
capitalization of the company was in excess of $3 billion. The market could 
also include cement companies and other industries, the banking sector,15 
utilities, tourism, as well as new projects. Including "Solidere", the potential 
capitalization of the stock market would be in excess of $4 billion, with a ratio 
to projected GDP of about 54 percent. This would place the BSE in the mid- 
cap range of emerging stock markets. In addition to the stock market, the 
money and debt markets have substantial scope for expansion. Table 5 sug- 
gests some plausible estimates for the size of the debt and money markets 
over the next few years. 
17 
Note that some it) of these companies were previously quoted on the Bourse de Bcyrouth and 
arc currently trading in a 'gray' market. The shares of Solidere are trading on the organized see- 
ondary market exchange. 
Currently, bank share ownership is nominative and shareholdings have to be approved by the 
Central Bank. This prevents the development of a market in bank shares. The Central Bank has 
recently proposed legislation (October, 1994), currently under consideration by Parliament, 
which would allow banks to have up to 20 percent of their capital in bearer, negotiable shares, if 
passed, this would enable banks stibstantially to increase their capital binds and add depth and 
liquidity to the market. 
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Projections are based on current levels of government debt and assume that 
the corporate debt market will grow over the next few years to about half the 
size of the government debt market. Similarly, money-market instruments are 
also expected to grow to about $2 billion. Overall, the equity, government 
and corporate debt, and money-market instruments could represent a total 
value of about $16 to $17 billion over the next few years. While these num- 
bers appear large compared to the current size of the economy, they are plau- 
sible given the reconstruction scenario discussed above and the financing 
required for capital expenditures. 
Concluding comments 
Developing Lebanon's financial markets should be given high priority by eco- 
nomic policymakers. Indeed, efficient financial markets are critical in attract- 
ing the capital flows required to finance Lebanon's substantial reconstruction 
investment requirements, and also in marshaling the capital flows required to 
develop, reconstruct and assist in the transition of a number of economies in 
the Middle East. As the prospects for a peaceful settlement of regional con- 
tlicts improve, a number of countries will be major capital importers. These 
include Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Armenia, and the Central Asian 
republics of the former Soviet Union. Lebanon should develop its capital 
markets so as to act as a regional financial center, attracting funds on an 
national basis as well as acting as a conduit of medium- to long-term finance 
for the countries and companies of the region. As the political map of the 
Middle East is redrawn, its financial map will also be revised. We foresee the 
development of possibly three financial centers in the Middle East. One 
regional center will be based on the Bahrain-Dubai-Kuwait triangle. A sec- 
ond regional center will be an Israel-Jordan-Palestine center, developing as ar 
outgrowth of increased integration among these economies. Finally, a thirc 




The world has changed dramatically since the days when Lebanon was the 
financial center of the Middle East. International capital markets have 
become globalized to a degree unimaginable before the technological revolu- 
tions in communications and information processing. The plethora of new 
financial instruments requires a growing sophistication among both buyers 
and sellers of financial services. The major oil-exporting countries now have 
direct links with international markets, no longer necessitating intermediaries. 
But with falling oil prices and rising domestic obligations, the oil exporters 
also no longer have such enormous capital surpluses which require recycling 
on international markets. 
Dr. Nasser Saidi's paper reflects how Lebanon has changed its strategy in 
response to the new context in which reconstruction and revitalization of its 
economy must occur. Rather than serve as a conduit for exporting capital 
from the region (especially from the Gulf) abroad, Lebanon can serve as a 
center to bring capital in, both for its own immediate reconstruction needs and 
to finance investments in the region, especially in as yet underdeveloped 
financial markets like Syria. The preliminary signs are that Lebanon's new 
strategy is already bearing fruit - with the sale of shares in Solidere, the recent 
Eurobond issue, and the steady inflow of capital to purchase Treasury bills. It 
is interesting to note that much of this capital is return flight capital from the 
earlier era. 
Lebanon's extensive network of expatriates represents an important asset in 
addressing some of the constraints to successful implementation of the strat- 
egy outlined in Dr. Saidi's paper. In addition to providing a source of capital, 
the return of the Lebanese who were previously working at the international 
level can meet the serious shortage of skills in their country's capital markets. 
There are already promising signs, such as the recent establishment (often 
with expatriate involvement) of a number of investment banks as well as 
investment and mutual funds to develop the market for equity and corporate 
bonds. Hence, while there is demand for Lebanese debt and equity, the prob- 
lem now seems to be shifting to the supply side as firms traditionally owned 
by flimilies need to adjust to modern corporate finance. 
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Nonetheless, there are still several building blocks missing if Lebanon hopes 
to play a new i-ole as a financial center. Without even greater reliance on the 
private sector, financing the governments sizable fiscal deficit will mean con- 
tinued crowding out of the private sector through higher interest rates. 
Improved tax collection can help to reduce fiscal pressures, but there also 
needs to be greater reliance on the private sector to finance reconstruction and 
investment costs directly. One important mechanism is the private provision 
of public services through privatization or the creation of competitive 
arrangements for private concessions or management contracts. Such tech- 
niques are being used in Lebanon in some areas (such as Solidere, telecom- 
inunications, and a possible toll road), but they could be more extensive. The 
key issues will be the development of regulatory capacity, transparent con- 
tracting and operating procedures, anJ the enftrcement of clear rules con- 
cerning conflict of interest. 
A second mechanism for addressing the credit crunch facing Lebanon's pri- 
vate sector is the development of long—term savings instruments to comple- 
ment the intlow of foreign capital. While some Lebanese banks are beginning 
to issue longer term certificates of deposit, the use of mandatory private pen- 
sion funds to mobilize savings which are seeking investments with longer 
maturities remains unexplored. The passage of legislation enabling the emer- 
gence of competing private pension funds would play a major role in the 
development of Lebanon's capital markets, as the experience in countries such 
as Chile has shown. 
There are also elements of current government policy that threaten to under- 
mine the emergence of Beirut as a financial center. The high deficit, high 
interest rate policy has been important for rapid reconstruction, but it has also 
made life easy for banks by providing safe investments with high returns in 
the form of Treasury bills. This will slow both the development of credit eval- 
uation skills and the emergence of new lines of business in the Lebanese 
financial market. Moreover, the recent establishment of specialized banks for 
agriculture, housing and industry and tourism (which will receive privileges 
such as government guarantees) threatens to undercut market solutions to the 
problenis of longer term lending, small and medium enterprise credit, and 
equity markets. 
The extent to which Lebanon will be able to spread its experience in attract- 
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ing capital to the rest of the region depends on events and decisions outside 
Lebanon's control. Will countries in the region continue to liberalize their 
financial markets and facilitate international transactions? Will Middle 
Eastern firms be permitted to cross-list debt and equity instruments on 
Beirut's financial markets? Will domestic policy reforms in Middle Eastern 
countries proceed credibly and at a pace that attracts flight capital home? 
These are questions that remain unanswered, and Lebanon's strategy must 
take these uncertainties into account. Although Lebanon continues to have 
regional comparative advantages (such as language skills and ready informa- 
tion about regional markets), prudence would seem to require aiming for 
international competitiveness in financial services - both because the oppor- 
tunities in regional markets remain unclear and because if such markets are 
open to Lebanon, they will also be open to the rest of the world. 
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A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions 
Ahmet Alkan 
Introduction' 
Auctions are events designed to price a sellers item. A variety of auction for- 
mats exist; in particular, an auction may receive open bids or sealed bids, and 
various rules are used for specifying what a winner will pay. The auction for- 
mat adopted may obviously have an influence on the revenue accruing to the 
seller. The present paper explores whether a multiprice (winners pay their own 
bid) or a uniprice (winners pay the highest losing bid) sealed-bid auction is 
more advantageous to a seller in the case of multi-unit auctions. Important 
examples are auctions of Treasury debt, shares of public firms to be privatized, 
and pollution rights. 
Milton Friedman (1960) suggested that the U.S. Treasury switch from the mul- 
tiprice to the uniprice rule. The U.S. Treasury did in fact conduct such an 
experiment in some of its auctions in the I 970s but switched back shortly there- 
after. Throughout the enduring controversy surrounding this matter, most the- 
orists have advocated the uniprice auction, but practice has more often than not 
favored the multiprice model. Instigated partly by events in the U.S. market in 
1990 and 1991 stemming from participants misbehavior, the issue has recent- 
ly witnessed a revival. Following a review of its rules (see Joint Report 1992), 
the U.S. Treasury has chosen once again to experiment with, and is currently 
implementing, the uniprice format in the auctions of two-year and five-year 
notes. In an article written shortly before the move by the U.S. Treasury, Chari 
and Weber (1992) called for a switch to the uniprice rule. In their more recent 
survey of related theory and empirical work, Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) 
also express support for the uniprice auction, albeit in more cautious terms. 
This research was preceded and has been inspired by an empirical study of the Turkish Treasury 
Bill auctions. The study analyzed as data all the individual bids registered at every weekly auc- 
tion held over 1987 - 89 and matched its findings with those obtained through interview/ques- 
tionaire surveying of the participant banks. Preliminary versions of this paper have been present- 
ed in a department seminar at Université Libre de Bruxelles in 1992 and at the Mathematical 
Economics Workshop organized by the Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics (IMPA), Rio 
de Janeiro, in 1993. 
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The main argument behind all this support has been that the average payment 
made in an auction (the auction price, or equivalently, the sellers revenue), is 
likely to be higher under the uniprice rule than under the multiprice rule.2 
The present paper will build and analyze a model of auctions which incorpo- 
rates the presence of resale markets following an auction and which alongside 
allows scrutiny at a dimension largely ignored in previous analyses, namely the 
volatility of the auction price. The findings are pronouncedly in favor of the 
multiprice rule. Before commenting further on what these findings are, I will 
briefly review the arguments put forward on why the uniprice rule would gen- 
erate higher expected revenue: 
(i) In the so-called correlated-values model, where buyers valuations (or esti- 
mates thereof) of the items for sale are assumed to be positively correlated, 
auction theory predicts that participants shade their bids more in the multiprice 
auction than in the uniprice auction, to such a degree that the (average) win- 
ning bid in the former is lower than the highest losing bid in the latter (Milgrom 
and Weber [1982]). Another way to express this phenomenon is that, because 
of the difference in the payment rule, the winner's curse is more severe in the 
multiprice than in the uniprice auction, and (sophisticated) bidders take this into 
account. (The winner's curse is due to the fact that the winners will be those 
bidders who have the highest valuations/estimates, who will then have to down- 
grade their valuations in view of the correlation, and who would thus have over- 
paid had they bid naively not foreseing all this.) Expected revenue is the same 
when and only when no correlation exists among buyers' valuations/estimates. 
Therefore, to the extent that correlation exists, the uniprice rule is to be pre- 
ferred. Participants in Treasury debt auctions are typically dealers who sell in 
the same post-auction market and whose valuations are therefore correlated. 
(ii) Due to higher severity of winner's curse effects, which in general diminish 
with reduced uncertainty, information gathering has a higher return in the mul- 
tiprice auction. The uniprice auction gives rise to less information acquisition 
2 
To the cxtcnt that manipulation may adversely affect revenue, sellers are certainly concerned 
about which auction format is more susceptible to manipulation, but opnimons vary in this regard. 
In fact, Friedman (1960) asserts that the uniprice format will widen participation and thereby ren— 
dci collusion mole diflicult. Opposing this view, Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) express disbe— 
lid that there will be a substantial participation effect and hypothesize that the uniprice auction is 
mole susceptible to manipulation. Chari and Weber (1992). on the other hand, cite 'less market 
manipulation' as one of two ways in which the format change will improve welfare; in addition, 
they suggest that the when-issued market will shrink, which in turn will lessen manipulation. 
A Model of Treasury BillAuctions 237 
by comparison. In equilibrium ex post, the cost of this incremental information 
is a loss of revenue to the seller. This point is emphasized by Chari and Weber 
(1992). 
(iii) Secondary market buyers are less informed than auction participants. They 
infer value by considering what bids have been made in the auction. Auction 
participants therefore take this into account and signal value to future cus- 
tomers. This signalling effect pulls bids higher, the more so under the uniprice 
rule. This result is noted by Bikhchandani and Huang (1989). 
(iv) Because bid preparation is simpler and hence less costly in the uniprice 
auction, participation will be higher and, in turn, so will revenue. This has been 
argued by Friedman (1960). Chari and Weber (1992) also cite this effect, but 
Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) have reservations about it. 
With particular reference to Treasury securities for which there exist strong sec- 
ondary markets, the upshot of points (i) and (ii) above is that the secondary 
market price will exceed the average auction price by a greater margin in the 
multiprice auction than in the uniprice auction. The differential between the 
two margins, assuming competitive entry into the bidders market, is properly 
to be attributed to the evidently higher level of information acquisition activity 
that needs to be conducted under the multiprice rule. In other words, auction 
participants are intermediaries who gather and process information at cost, and 
this cost is higher in the multiprice auction. Chari and Weber (1992) add that 
this incremental cost has dubious social value and is wasteful'. Following 
changes in the payment rule - so they forecast - the return on the associated 
investments will accrue to the Treasury over time. 
The policy thrust of the findings in this paper is that the incremental informa- 
tion that needs to be acquired in the multiprice auction at a social cost may well 
have a social value, namely that of curbing the potential volatility of the auc- 
tion price, which risk-averse buyers and sellers would be mindful about. This 
paper will show that the higher the degree of "intermediation" or "resale on- 
entedness" in the auction, the lower the dispersion of bids (ultimately reduced 
to zero) under the multiprice rule, whereas bidding is unaffected by this degree 
under the uniprice rule. Furthermore, this beneficial reduction of uncertainty 
regarding the auction price comes with no loss in expected revenue - the 
expected auction price is invariant under the degree of resale orientedness as 
well as the payment rule. 
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The mode! employed here is in all ways identical to the classical model with 
which auction theory has started, except for the presence of two features 
which together intend to capture the effect of the resale motive: This paper 
holds that (i) participants resell an exogenously-specified portion of their pur- 
chase in the secondary market, and that (ii) the secondary market clears at the 
average auction price materialized. Also, buyers' valuations (on the portion 
of their purchase which they do keep) are taken to be uncorrelated. 
So far, the paper has dwelled on the policy issue of whether one payment rule 
is better than the other. But the reader should notice that the paper addresses 
a challenge at another level. Auction theory has advanced little beyond the 
static model. The investigation of Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) is a step 
in the difficult direction of capturing the essentials of auctions with resale 
markets. The present work has departed from a similar motivation. Further 
comments on the model and its findings have been left to the concluding sec- 
tion of the paper. 
The model 
There are rn identical items to be auctioned and n+l buyer participants where 
n  m. Each participant places a sealed bid for one item. The m highest bid- 
ders each pay according to a prespecified rule and receive an item. (A tie- 
breaking rule is applied in the case of ties; such a rule need not be specified 
here, as ties will turn out to be zero probability events.) Buyers maximize 
expected gain, that is, they "value" less payment. The auction is called mul- 
tiprice or uniprice depending on whether payment equals one's own bid or the 
(m+ I )st highest bid, that is, the highest losing bid. 
In the so-called independent private values model, the value of an item to a 
buyer is a number known by the buyer but not by the others; it is called his 
personal value and is drawn independently from a common distribution. The 
model introduced here is the same in every respect, with the exception that 
buyers' valuations are "semi-endogenous" in the following way: Let us call 
the average payment made in an auction the auction price. The paper stipu- 
lates that the value of an item for an auction participant u with personal value 
V(u) is p + (1-6) V(u), where 6 is some prespecified "weight" (6 E A = 
I]) and p is the auction price to materialize in that auction. The paper sug- 
gests 6 to be interpreted as the "degree" of resale orientedness of the auction. 
As one parable, for example, consider that there is a post-auction market 
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expected to clear at the auction price, and that winners sell a portion of their 
purchase in this market white keeping the remainder for personal use. 
Formally, let! [0,1] be the set of all potential buyers u facing an auction, 
each being equally likely to be one of the participants and ordered such that 
personal values V(u) are increasing in u with V(0) = 0, V(1) = 1. An auction 
game is then described by a quintuple n, V, R) where, in addition to 
what has already been specified, the last variable R is either M or U depend- 
ing on whether the payment rule is multiprice or uniprice. A (pure) strategy 
of a buyer in such a game is a bid function b defined on I and employed by 
him in the sense that b(u) is the bid that he would make if his identity were u. 
It will be assumed that the specification of F(m, n, V, R) is common knowl- 
edge among all buyers. 
One thus has, for each m, n, and distribution V of personal values, a double 
family of auction games indexed by ö e A. The query to be pursued here is 
on how bidding behavior and the auction price (that is, the seller's revenue) 
are affected by the size of' comparatively, in multiprice and uniprice auc- 
tions. To motivate this query, let us briefly consider the two extreme degrees 
and ö=1. The study of the former case, which originated more than three 
decades ago (Vickrey 1960), has plenty of predictive information about 
behavior and bears in particular the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem: 
the auction price is the same in expectation whether the payment rule is mul- 
tiprice or uniprice. At the other extreme &z I, on the other hand, indetermi- 
nacy reigns. The auction game that obtains at this limit, which the present 
model does not allow, has a continuum of Nash equilibria. It is easily seen, 
in fact, that any real constant c describes an equilibrium, as bidding c is clear- 
ly the best response to all others' bidding c, whence the auction price equals 
c, whether the payment rule is multiprice or uniprice. Thus, while it is deter- 
minate that all buyers identically gain zero in any equilibrium, the auction 
price is indeterminate - indeed, entirely arbitrary - in either auction when = 
1. The games that obtain at and will be referred to as the classical 
and the (purely) speculative games, respectively. 
Analysis and results 
In what follows, the paper will consider m, n, V fixed, and let F(ö, R) = F(m, 
n, V, 5, R) be any auction game as described previously. All results to be stat- 
ed below are well known to hold for m = I when the model is reduced to the 
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classical case. The paper will further assume that m  2. 
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 
This subsection establishes the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. 
The uniprice auction: the dominant strategy equilibrium 
Proposition 1: It is a dominant strategy for any buyer u e I in a uniprice auc- 
tion U) to bid his personal value V(u). 
This result says that, whatever is and whatever the personal values of all 
other participants may actually be, it is impossible for any buyer to achieve a 
higher profit than what he would achieve by bidding his personal value. The 
proof is straightforward and the same as in the classical case. 
The mnultiprice auction: the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium 
Following standard methodology, the paper will restrict attention to the analy- 
sis of symmetric Nash equilibria, that is, those equilibria where every buyer 
employs the same bid function. Formally, a bid function b constitutes a sym- 
metric equilibrium for M) if every buyer u e I maximizes his expected 
gain by bidding b(u) given that every other buyer employs b. 
The following is the first main result of the paper: 
Theorem 1: There exists for every rnultiprice auction F(ö, M) a unique 
increasing bid function which constitutes a symmetric equilibrium. 
Assunzption: The proof given utilizes the assumption that V is differentiable, 
and that (I -u)V is strictly concave, that is, (1 -u)V - V is decreasing in u e I. 
Notation: Call the cumulative probability distribution of the mth highesi 
of n independent draws from the uniform distribution on the unit interval and 
call the density function of 
Towards proving Theorem 1, take any buyer u E I in the auction M), and 
let x be his bid. Suppose that b is an increasing bid function employed by all 
the other n buyers (the opposition). Buyer u wins an item if and only if z  
where z is the rn'1' highest bid among the opposition. Since b is increasing, 2 
b(y), where y is the mlh largest buyer in the opposition. Thus, u wins if anc 
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only if b(y)  x, that is, y  b'(x). Note that if u wins, then the rn-i other win- 
ners are each uniformly distributed with density l/(l-y) on the subinterval 
[y,l]. So the expected auction price, conditional on u winning with a bid x 
and y being the mthl largest buyer in the opposition, is given by 
x/m + (rn-U/rn b(w)/(l-y) dw. 
Having made a bid x, the expected gain of u is 
f f 
R(x) = J0 V(u) + ö ( x/m + (m- 1)/rn b(w)/ 
(1-y) dw) - x) dy. 
Differentiating R(x) with respect to x, one gets 
R(x) ((1-ö) V(u) - (1 - x) / b(b'(x)) - (I - 
- (rn-I) (x)) B(b (x)) / rn (1- (x)) (x)) 
where it is defined for y e I that 
(1) B(y)=-$y b(w)dw. 
Note that b = B. 
Suppose that b constitutes a symmetric equilibrium. Then, x = b(u). Now, 
setting u = b1(x), defining the new parameter 
(2) k = - ö)/(rn - 
and rearranging the optimality condition R(x) = 0, one obtains the second 
order differential equation 
(3) B + B + k 1—u) B = (I — k) v 
in u e I. One has from (1) the condition 
(4) B(U=0. 
Note that the parameter k increases in 6 and takes the unit interval onto itself 
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(for every m  2). We shall refer to the differential equation (3) as B(k). 
To recapitulate, if b is a bid function which is increasing on I and which con- 
stitutes a symmetric equilibrium for the auction M), then B defined by 
(I) is a solution of B(k) that fulfills condition (4). 
Proof of the theorem: In view of the preceding paragraph, the proof of 
Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas I and 2 stated below. 
Lemma 1: There exists a unique solution B of the differential equation B(k) 
which is defined on I and which satisfies (4). 
We shall make use of the expression 
(5) = (n! / (n-rn)! (rn-i)!) (I 
and the identity 
(6) (n+l) = + ... + 
Applying (5) and (6) to (3) and cancelling (n! / (n-rn)! (rn-I)!) on both 
sides, one gets that B(k) is equivalent to 
(7) u B" + (I B' + k B = (I - k) (I V, 
where 
= / (n! / (n-rn)! (in-I)! 
= (n-rn)! (rn-i)! 1/ ((n-j)! j!) (1-u)1 
is positive for all u e I. It is readily checked that B(k) has a singularity at 
= 0 and is regular elsewhere on I. 
Proof of Lemma 1 (Sketch): It is straightforward to compute that the two 
solutions of the indicial equation of B(k) are r = 0 and r = - (n-rn). The gen- 
eral solution B of B(k) is hence of the form 
B = c1 B1 + c., B7 + B* 
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where B' is any particular solution, and B I, B2 are two independent solu- 
tions of the homogeneous equation of B(k) of the form 
B1(u) = a1 u', 
B2(u) = d 
B u = 0 implies c2 = 0. Condition (4) determines c1 uniquely as 
asserted. 
Lemma 2: If B is a solution of B(k) as in Lemma 1, it then follows that B' is 
increasing on I. 
Proof: Let B be a solution of B(k) as in Lemma I. Then 
(8) u B"+ u - 
(m_l_k)(l_u)m2 B' - 
= (I-k) (1 ((I -u)V' - (rn-i )V) 
which one obtains upon differentiating (7). The proof is in two steps. 
Step 1: B' is increasing on an interval [0,u] for some u e (0,1). 
Suppose the contrary, that is, B' is nonincreasing on [0,uI for some u e (0,1), 
and let u* be the maximum of all such u if a maximum exists. Then 
(9) B"(O)O, 
(10) B"(u*) =0, B"(u*) 0. 
It follows from (8), (9), and (10) that 
(II) (rn-i-k) (B'(O) - )  (m-2) k ( B(u*)/(l_u*) - B(0) 
+ (1-k) V'(u*) - (rn-i) V(u*) - (V'(O) - (m-l)V(0)). 
From (7), (9), and (10), on the other hand, 
k - B(0) ) B'(O) - B'(u*) + (i-k) (V(u*) - V(0)), 
and using it in (11) yields 
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B'(O) - B'(u*)  (l_u*) V'(u*) - V(u*) - (V'(o) - V(0)). 
By assumption, the right hand side above is negative, which says that B'(O) < 
B'(u*). Upon this contradiction, therefore, it can only be that u* does not 
exist, that is, that B' is nonincreasing throughout I = [0,11. Now, evaluating 
(8) at u 0, 
(rn- I-k) B'(O) = + 1) B"(0) - k (rn-2) B(0) - (I-k) (V'(O) - (rn-I )V(0)). 
From (9) and the facts that V(0) = 0, V'(O) > 0, then 
B'(O) <- k (rn-2) / (rn-I-k) B(0)  - B(0) = B'(w) dw  B'(O), 
where the last inequality follows B' being nonincreasing on I. Step 1 
follows from this contradiction. 
Step 2: B' is increasing for all u e I. 
Suppose the contrary. Then, in view of Step I and the that B"( I) = 0 
(from [71), there exist u, u' E (0,11 such that u < u', B'(u)  B'(u'), and 
(12) B"(u)=O, B"(u)O, 
(13) B"(u') 0, B"(u')  0. 
From (7), (12), and (13), 
(14) k ( B(u) / (I-u) — B(u') 1(1—u')) = B'(u') - B'(u) + (I-k) (V(u') — V(u)). 
Using (8), (12), (13), and (14), one gets as in Step I that 
B'(u) - B'(u')  (1-u') V'(u') - V(u') - ((I-u) V'(u) - V(u)) <0, 
and reaches the contradiction B'(u') > B'(u). 
The independence of expected revenue 
We shall now turn to the second main result of the paper, stated in the form 
of Theorem 2 below, which says that the expected auction price is the same 
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for all degrees A and under either the multiprice or the uniprice rule. 
Let us consider first the multiprice auction, let B be the unique solution of 
B(k) asserted in Theorem I, and so b = B' be the unique symmetric equilibri- 
um bid function for F(ö,M). When an ordered population y1 Yn+i (that 
is, n independent draws of buyers listed such that y1  ...  plays 
F(ö,M) as predicted by the symmetric equilibrium, therefore, the auction price 
M) = (b(y1) + ... + Taking expectation over all possible draws 
of populations, the expected auction price of F(& M) is 
(15) M) = I/rn So + ... + B'(w) dw. 
For the uniprice auction, on the other hand, it follows from Proposition 1 that 
p(& U) = hence 
(16) Ep(6, U) = V(w) dw, 
a constant independent of to which we shall refer below as it. 
Theorem 2: The expected auction price is It for all ö A under both the mul- 
tiprice and the uniprice rule. 
Proof: Multiply B(k) on both sides by (n+1)(1-u)I (m (1-k)) to get 
(17) (n+ I )/(m( 1-k)) (I-u) B')' + (n+ 1) kl(m (1—k)) B 
= (n+l)/rn (I-u) V = V. 
Upon integrating (17), the two terms on the left side by parts, and using 
Fm, (0) = B( I) = 0, one gets 
(n+1)/(m(l-k)) Jo B'(w) dw - (n+l) klm(1-k) Jo Fmn(w) B'(w) dw 
= So f(=+Ixn÷1)(w) V(w) dw, 
and so 
(18) (n+l)/m Jo B'(w) dw = Jo V(w) dw. 
The theorem now follows from (6). (15), and (16). 
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Dispersion of bids 
Having shown above that the auction price is the same in expectation for all 
6 e A = [0, lJ whether the auction is multiprice or uniprice, the paper will then 
show in Theorem 3 below that the range of bids monotonically shrinks to 0 as 
the resale orientedness parameter 6 increases from 0 to I in the multiprice 
auction. Recall from Proposition I that bidding is unaffected by 6 in the 
uniprice auction. 
Formally, consider the family F of auctions F(ö,R), 6 e A. Let be the 
unique Increasing symmetric equilibrium bid function for F(6,M) and define 
L(6, M) = H(6, M) = Thus, L(6, M), H(6, M) are respectively the 
lowest-value bid and the highest-value bid, and naturally all bids fall in the 
range [L(6, M), H(6, M)], for F(6, M). Define L(6, U), H(6, U) analogously. 
Theorem 3: 
(i) L(6, M) increases and H(6,M) decreases as 6 A = [0,1) increases. 
(ii) L(0, M) = 0, H(0, M) < 1, and lim L(6,M) = urn H(6,M) = it. 
(iii) L(6,U) 0, H(ö,U) = I, for all 6 e A. 
Proof: As mentioned, (iii) follows from Proposition 1. Let Bk be the unique 
solution of the differential equation B(k) as asserted in Lemma I and recall 
that = Bk where k = (6m - 6)i(rn - 6) E A. 
The assertion in (ii) for the classical multiprice auction F(0,M) that says 
L(0,M) = 0, H(0,M) < 1 is well known and easily checked. For the remain- 
ing assertion in (ii), check that B1(u) = c + du is the general solution of B(l) 
for arbitrary constants c,d. By continuity, Bk(u) approaches = c* + 
for some fixed constants c*, d* as k I and for all u e I. Hence, Bk (u) 
approaches B*1(u) = d* as k I for all u E I. It follows from Theorem 2 
that d* it. This concludes the proof of (ii), since k —* I as 6 —÷ 1. 
In order to prove (i), we shall apply the perturbation method: Take any k e 
A and h = k ÷ E C A for e sufficiently small. Then Bh(u) is given by the per- 
turbed solution Bk(u) + E P(u) + 0(E2), where P(u) is a solution on I of the fol- 
lowing differential equation (obtained by substituting for Bh(u) in the per- 
turbed equation (7) and equating the terms with coefficient c), 
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(19) u P' + (I P + k (1 P = - (I ((I -u)V(u) + Bk(u)), 
which additionally satisfies the condition 
(20) P(l) = 0. 
Proof of (i), hence the theorem, now follows from the application of Lemma 
3 stated below. 
Lemma 3: 
(i) There exists a unique solution P of the differential equation (19) which is 
defined on I and which satisfies (20). Furthermore, 
(ii) P is decreasing on I. 
(iii) P'(O) >0, P'(l) <0. 
Proof: The proof of (i) is identical to the proof of Lemma 1, and (ii) is proved 
in a similar manner to Lemma 2. To prove (iii), simply observe that if 
P(0) 0 then, in view of (ii), the expected auction price Ep(k',M) would be 
less than it, thus contradicting Theorem 2. Similarly, if P(l)  0 then, in view 
of (ii), Ep(k',M) would be greater than it. 
Explicit solutions in a special case 
In this section we shall take V(u) to be the identity function 1(u) = u, that is, 
consider that personal values are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, 
and first look at 2 units being auctioned. It so happens that the family of such 
auctions constitutes a special case, and there exists an explicit 
expression for the associated symmetric equilibrium bid functions which will 
he spelled out below. 
Let be the symmetric equilibrium bid function for F(2,n,I,6). Recalling 
the proof of Theorem 1 and differentiating (I), = B' where B is the unique 
solution of the equation B(2,n,l,k) 
(21) (n-(n-l)u)u B"+n(n-l)(l-u)B'+ n(n-l)kB 
=n (n-I) (i-k) u (1-u) 
that satisfies the associated boundary conditions. 
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The general solution to (21) is the sum of two solutions 
B(u) = + A(u) 
where B*(u) is a particular solution to (21), and A(u) is the general solution 
to the homogeneous equation 
(22) (n-(n-l)u)u B +n(n-l)(l-u)B'+ n(n-l)kB =0. 
It is straightforward to find 
B = (I /(n- I )(2n+2-nk)k) (-n(n- I )k - 2 + (n(n- I )k+2)k u + n(n- I )k( I-k) u2). 
In order to reach the general solution to (22), let z = (n- 1)/n u and define P(z) 
= B(u). Upon this change of variable, (22) becomes 
(23) (I - z) z P + (n-I-n z) P + nk P = 0, 
which is the hypergeometric equation 
(I -z)z = 0 
where 
a = [(n-I) + ((n-I)2 + 4nk)U2]/2, 
= Rn-i) - ((n-I )2 + 4nk)U21/2. 
Two linearly independent solutions of (23) are the hypergeometric series 
F(a43,n- 1 ,z) and F(aj3,n- I ,z) In z. The general solution of (22) is thus 
B(u) = + (c + d In ((n-l)/n u)) F(aj3,n-l, (n-l)/n u) 
for arbitrary constants c,d. From the condition that our solution be defined at 
u = 0, follows that d = 0, while from B( 1) = 0, one has c = - B*( I) / F(a,13, 
n-I, (n-I)/n). Thus 
(24) - B*(l) (n-1)/n u) / F(a43,n-l, (n-l)fn) 
is the unique solution of B(2,n,1,k) on the closed unit interval that satisfies 
B( I) = 0. Upon differentiating (24), one gets 
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= (i + kn(n-1)/2 + (l-k)(n-l) u 
+ (1-k) (n-U/n u) / (n-U/n)) /((n-U(n+1- kn/2)) 
where k = 
Below are displayed several instances of (In Figures 1-3,  
S  5, while in Figure 4,  (0) if 11  n.) 
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Figure 2: Bid functions when 4 buyers bid against 2 units with S e (.l,.5,.9} 
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Concluding remarks 
This paper has modelled an auction with resale as a one-period game that has 
a parameter as a measure of resale orientedness and an endogenous valuation 
feature as proxy for the secondary market. It has been shown that, while there 
is utter indeterminacy in the (purely speculative) game with full resale, a 
unique symmetric equilibrium exists for all other degrees of resale under the 
multiprice rule. The findings then say that (i) the expected auction price is 
invariant throughout, and (ii) bids are less dispersed under the multiprice rule 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
A Model of Treasury Bill Auctions 251 
than under the uniprice rule - in fact, all the less so the higher the degree of 
resale. As a policy implication, these results thus lend support to the multi- 
price rule on grounds of price stability next to revenue equivalence. 
To be sure, the two features in the aforementioned model have an ad-hoc 
nature and require justification. Regarding the second of these, let it be stat- 
ed as a conjecture that the model would have borne nearly the same results if, 
instead of postulating that the secondary market cleared at the auction price, 
it had been postulated that it it did so with a margin added. The paper next 
refers to empirical documentation with reference to Treasury auctions. 
Cammack (1991) has measured for the period 1973-84 that the margin 
between the post-auction market price and the auction price for U.S. Treasury 
bill auctions is 4 to 7 basis points, one basis point being one-hundreth of 1 
percent. Empirical observation plus conjectured robustness thus provides one 
level of justification. One may further regard and tolerate the secondary mar- 
ket clearing at the average auction price (plus a margin) as an equilibrium 
nonprofit condition on participants' profits. 
Regarding the "degree of resale" parameter a more legitimate modelling 
would have as a decision open to individual participants. The model then 
becomes rather intractable mathematically. It would not be surprising, how- 
ever, if the model turned out to be robust in this regard as well. 
It is also worthwhile to stress that expected revenue equivalence (Theorem 2) 
is likely not to hold if buyers' primitive valuations are correlated to any 
degree, and that expected revenue is then likely to emerge one degree higher 
under the uniprice rule. This paper concludes with a final conjecture that the 
shrinkage in the dispersion of bids (Theorem 3) will still continue to hold, 
thus lending support to the multiprice rule. 
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Auctions as a method for ascertaining the best price of a good are known to have 
been used in Babylon since 500 BC. In Latin auctio means public sale that is 
derived from augere, to increase. In the context of the present paper, however, 
it would be misleading to establish a relation between such concepts as auc- 
tion" and "increase'; for the paper refers to a particular type of auction, namely 
the English Auction. Indeed, the history of commerce reveals that many types 
of auctions have been designed and implemented. In the last three decades 
economists have become increasingly interested in identifying the relative mer- 
its of alternative auction models. As mounting public sector deficits and their 
mode of financing have become almost a universal problem, policy-makers have 
also been interested in this issue, particularly as regards Treasury-bill auctions. 
Ahmet Alkan deals with one of the most debated issues concerning T-bill auc- 
tions, namely whether uniform or discriminatory pricing is in some sense prefer- 
able. As discussed in his paper, government reports and the writings of acade- 
mic researchers both lead to the suggestion that uniform-price auctions, in addi- 
tion to being more easily implemented, are preferable on the grounds that they 
fare better in reducing the so-called "winner's curse" effect. However, the author 
demonstrates that these results do not hold once a more realistic valuation rule 
is allowed for bidders. Secondly, the paper also addresses a relatively neglect- 
ed aspect of auctions - the stability of prices. 
A heuristic interpretation of the results 
In Alkan's paper the valuation of primary dealers' depends not only on their per- 
sonal value v, but also on the auction price (that is, the average payment made 
in an auction) which is expected, p. Subsequently, let ö e [0,11 and define the 
valuation of a primary dealer as = + (1 - Alkan offers one interpreta- 
In this note, in order to dtstinguish buyers in the primary market from those in the secondary 
market, the term "primary dealers" is used for the former group. This has a special uleaning when 
one focuses on the niarket for Treasury bills in the United States, since only certain financial jOsh- 
utions - called primary dealers - are allowed to bid in Treasury bill auctions there. In the case of 
Turkey, however, this restriction does not apply, even to individuals. Therefore, the term in that 
context simply means buyers in a Treasury bill auction. 
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tion for this type of valuation (referred to as semi-endogenous in his paper). If 
is taken as the portion of T-bills that is expected to sell in the secondary mar- 
ket, then this valuation rule means that the primary dealer looks at the weighted 
sum of its personal value as well as his expected revenue from selling a portion 
of its purchase in the secondary market. It is indeed true that the primary deal- 
ers in T-bill auctions are intermediaries who aim at selling on the secondary mar- 
ket. However, Alkan's "parable" introduces more structure to the problem than 
this self-evident point would imply. First of all, by taking p as the clearing price 
for secondary markets, it is implicitly assumed that the buyers in the secondary 
market have access to information concerning the outcome of the auction. 
Secondly, it also implies that "cornering" is not a major issue.2 Thirdly, by rul- 
ing out the case in which ö = 1, it is assumed not only that there is a personal 
value for the primary dealer apart from the market price of the Treasury bill, but 
also that this personal value is separately taken into account in valuation.3 
The problem dealt with in Alkan's paper can be summarized as follows: Under 
the semi-endogenous valuation assumption, what is the effect of the changes in 
on both bidding behavior and auction prices in uniform-price and discrimina- 
tory auctions? The answer to this question is given in two parts. The first one, 
which is summarized in Corollary I, states that the expected auction price is 
invariable with respect to changes in and is not dependent on the type of auc- 
ti()n used. Hence, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds. This result means 
that, in the semi-endogenous valuation case, the winner's curse cannot be a rea- 
son for choosing between alternative auction schemes. In addition, Theorem 3 
presented in the paper is aimed at supplying the second part of the answer. Here 
the concern is whether a change in ö has any effect on the variance of primary 
dealers' bids. The findings indicate that the dispersion of bids decreases as 
resale propensity increases for discriminatory auctions, whereas it remains 
unchanged for uniform-price auctions. 
2 
These two assumptions are said to be in line with the observations made in the Turkish market 
for Treasury bills. On the othcr hand, the problems manifested in the incidents that took place in 
the United States a few years ago indicate that the cornering problem is much more severe in the 
U.S. market for Treasury bills. 
It is possible to give various explanations for this assumption. In Turkey, for example, banks 
are required to hold a portion of their liquidity requirements in the form of Treasury bills. Non— 
coinphanee with this requirement wilt subject banks to fines. On the other hand, in Turkey as 
well as in litany other countries, Treasury bills constitute the base for repurchase agreements. 
Hence, the personal values of primary dealers may be quite different from the market price and 
may play a significant ole in dealers' bidding behavior. 
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In conclusion, Alkan demonstrates that, once primary dealers are allowed to fol- 
low a more realistic valuation rule, expected auction prices for these two auction 
models do not differ. However, if the stability of auction prices is taken as 
another choice criterium, then discriminatory auctions fare better than uniform- 
price ones. These findings are most certainly sufficient in raising doubts about 
the strength of previous arguments favoring uniform-price auctions in more gen- 
eral and/or realistic environments. Although Alkan's paper offers rather strong 
arguments in challenging currently dominant views, it also confuses the reader 
in its treatment of correlated values. The model developed in the paper explic- 
itly assumes no correlation whatsoever among valuations. Nonetheless, the 
existence of such correlations was also counted as one of the arguments favor- 
ing uniform-price auctions over discriminatory ones. Since the semi-endoge- 
nous nature of valuation stems from a common factor, that is, the expected auc- 
tion price, and since primary dealers sell in the same secondary uncor- 
related valuations can hardly be the outcome. This is a point which requires fur- 
ther elaboration. 
Saad Andary 
The following comments focus at first on the structure in which the material of 
Ahmet Alkan's paper is presented, and then on the content of the paper itself. In 
order to be presented at a workshop dealing with financial market development 
in the Middle East, this paper should have extended the model of auctions to at 
least two Middle Eastern countries which adopt the sale of Treasury bills by auc- 
tion, namely Turkey and Lebanon. The current controversy in the United States 
as to whether or not the multiple-price auction system should be abandoned in 
favor of the uniform-price auction system could have been presented and con- 
trasted with the current practice in the two Middle Eastern countries mentioned 
above. 
The paper - as presented at the workshop - states that it seeks to build and ana- 
lyze a model of auctions which uncovers a dimension largely ignored and which 
bears a policy implication in favor of the multiple-price auction. Nonetheless, 
it then proceeds to describe arguments relating to the uniform-price system with- 
out explaining what the ignored dimension actually is. There are a few points 
that need elaboration, while others need reorganization. For example, the defi- 
nition of the two auction systems and the review of arguments supporting either 
one should be elaborated on. In addition, the findings of other studies, which 
are presented in the conclusion, should ideally be included in the introduction. 
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Moreover, the paper should supply the proof of Theorem 3, which indicates that 
the dispersion of bids decreases as the degree of resale orientedness increases 
to one. In the conclusion, the paper submits that more legitimate modelling 
would have the degree of resale (ö) as a decision open to individual participants, 
but that the model then becomes somewhat intractable mathematically. If it 
does, then the usefulness of the entire model becomes questionable. 
